Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

212. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Rome, June 18, 1958.

PARTICIPANTS

• Hon. Amintore Fanfani, Secretary, Christian Democratic Party
• Senator Girolamo Messeri
• Dr. Raimondo Manzini, Italian Foreign Ministry
• Ambassador Zellerbach
• Mr. Bond

SUBJECT

• Italian Post-Electoral Political Situation

The Ambassador opened the conversation by conveying to Mr. Fanfani the oral message contained in Deptel 4502.¹ Mr. Fanfani expressed his deep appreciation for the message and said that the election results had served to confirm and strengthen Italy’s ties with the United States. He said the campaign had demonstrated that these ties are now an accepted fact of Italian political life rather than a polemic issue. Although the U.S. as such was scarcely mentioned in the campaign, even by the Communists, the presence of the U.S. was felt in the background and obviously regarded with favor by a majority of the electorate. Mr. Fanfani [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] remarked that the conduct of the Embassy throughout the pre-electoral period had been just right; it had been always in the background but had never intruded itself into the electoral contest, an intrusion which might have done a useful service to the Communists.

At this point Mr. Fanfani digressed to say that recent events in Yugoslavia had confirmed the wisdom of U.S. support of Tito, which many Italians, even some of pro-American sympathies, had previously questioned. He said the Italian electoral results may have also strengthened Tito’s hand vis-à-vis the Soviets, since he now knows that he has at his back a stable anti-communist Italy which will not betray him on behalf of the Kremlin.

Returning to the election results, he expressed the view that one of the most encouraging features thereof had been the way Italian youth had voted. Between 46 and 48% of the new young voters, he said, had voted for the DC alone, not because of superior DC organizational work but rather for ideological reasons stemming from the progressive and forward-looking DC social and economic program. Even [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Andreotti had been impressed by this fact, which he regarded as a vote of confidence on the part of Italian youth in the Center-Left formula; this had in fact been one of the principal reasons why Andreotti had withdrawn his opposition to such a formula.

In response to a comment by the Ambassador regarding the discouragingly strong showing of the extreme Left in the elections, Mr. Fanfani said the important point was that this had been the first time since the war that the PCI had lost ground. Not only had they lost 3 seats in the Chamber but they had also lost votes in such Communist strongholds as Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna. He hastened to add, however, that this was not to deny that Communist strength still represented a major problem for Italy, a fact which he had pointed out in a recent speech to the DC National Council. He said he was particularly disturbed by PSI gains,² which he regarded as more dangerous than the PCI showing. A significant part of the PSI gains in the south he attributed to the violent anti-clericalism of the Radicals, and to a lesser extent the Republicans, which had not gained votes for those parties but had merely had the effect of frightening a considerable number of Monarchist voters into Nenni’s arms.

Turning to the problem of the organization of the new government, Mr. Fanfani expressed confidence that the PSDI Central Committee meeting, scheduled for June 19–20, would confirm the vote of the Party Directorate in favor of PSDI participation in the new government. He said he was in close and continuing touch with Saragat and that Matteotti had so far shown himself to be reasonable; on the contrary, Zagari had continued to be “excitable”. On the subject of PSDI representation in the Cabinet, Mr. Fanfani said it was not true, as had been reported by the press, that Saragat would be given the post of Foreign Minister. He acknowledged that Saragat would very much like to have that post, but said that he would not get it, not because he was not trusted, but because such an appointment might give the impression of a change in Italian foreign policy. He stated that Saragat probably would, however, be given the post of Vice President of the Council of Ministers, and that Preti would probably be the new Minister of Finance; in addition he said that Simonini might be given the Labor Ministry and Tremelloni either Industry and Commerce or State Participations. He added that the PSDI would probably also want 5 or 6 vice ministerial posts, a demand which he regarded as reasonable. In response to a leading question by the Ambassador, Mr. Fanfani declined to mention any names in connection with the post of Foreign Minister, but did assure the Ambassador that whoever would be appointed to that post would be entirely dependable from the U.S. point of view. He also refused to be drawn out on the probable distribution of Cabinet posts to his own party.

Mr. Fanfani said he had offered Pacciardi a post in the government but that Pacciardi had declined on the ground that he hoped to become party secretary at the PRI congress in October and wished in the meantime to retain a free hand. He said that if a DC-PSDI coalition could be formed he hoped to expand it to a tripartite government by the addition of the PRI following the latter’s party congress (for which reason he said it would be necessary to keep one or two cabinet posts “available” for the PRI). He added that in the meantime the PRI could be expected at least to abstain in parliamentary votes, thereby giving a DC-PSDI government a bare majority in the Chamber.

Mr. Fanfani stated that immediately after the elections he had suggested the re-establishment of a quadripartite government to Saragat and Pacciardi, both of whom had said, however, that the inclusion of the PLI would make it impossible for their respective parties to join the government. He said that despite this fact he had maintained friendly contact with Martino and other “reasonable” elements of the PLI, who had shown a sympathetic understanding of the DC position but had asked that the DC not do anything which would preclude possible DC-PLI collaboration at some future date.

In response to a question Mr. Fanfani said that he hoped for and expected support from certain PNM deputies, but that he had been unable to discuss this question with the PNM for fear of frightening off Saragat. He added that he also hoped for the support of the SVP (3 seats in the Chamber and 2 in the Senate) and planned to include in the government’s presentation speech some friendly words for them; he said that if he went too far in this direction, however, he would run the risk of alienating the Monarchists.

Mr. Fanfani indicated that if the PSDI should decide against joining the government, the DC would proceed to set up a monocolore government. Although he did not so state, he gave the clear impression that he intended to head the new government regardless of its formula.

As to timing, he confirmed that the Zoli Government intended to resign on the following day barring parliamentary delays.³ He said the President of the Republic would in that case conduct his consultations with party leaders over the week-end and probably give the charge to a new Prime Minister-designate on the following Monday; if this timing were adhered to the new government might well be formed by the end of that week (June 27–28).

Referring to Saragat’s recent statement on the nationalization of the Italian power industry, Mr. Fanfani said that this had been primarily a political gambit which Saragat had not really meant, and that Saragat’s statement on this subject before the Central Committee would be so worded as to leave several loopholes. He said Saragat’s idea was to allow existing leases to private power companies to expire and then to re-examine them to determine whether or not such companies should be nationalized. Thus, he said, this is really a question “for the next generation”. He said he was not afraid to give the Ministry of State Participations to the PSDI, firstly, because Saragat shared Fanfani’s views regarding the limitation of the area of state participation in industry, and secondly, because Saragat suspects Mattei of financing the Left-wing opposition within the PSDI and would therefore like to cut him down to size in order to shut off this independent source of funds to Matteotti and Zagari. He added that even President Gronchi has finally become convinced that Mattei is dangerous and must be controlled.

[1 paragraph (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/6–2758. Secret. Drafted by Bond. Sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 1685, June 27.
1. Telegram 4502 to Rome, June 10, requested that the following message be conveyed orally to Fanfani: “I have forwarded your message of appreciation to Secretary Dulles and through him to the President. I have been asked to acknowledge that message with thanks on their behalf, and to express their personal good wishes to you. The President and the Secretary have been impressed by the vigorous campaign fought by your party and know that your electoral success promises an ever constant reinforcement of the democratic strength of Italy.” (Ibid., 765.00/6–458)
2. See Document 211.
3. Prime Minister Zoli submitted his resignation on June 19.