Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State⁰

Rome, May 22, 1958, 8 p.m.

3515. 1. While in last week of Italian electoral campaign signs increasing voter interest have appeared (and although, as indicated below, French situation has in last few days injected new element), campaign has generally lacked atmosphere of crisis marking 1948 and to some extent 1953 elections. Some political leaders claim apathy due to increasing political maturity of voters who appear to be considering issues unemotionally and in some cases apparently reveling in freedom of choice presented in far greater measure than in either 1948 or 1953 [2 lines of source text not declassified.] Also some evidence voters tired of polemics. Traditionally large turnout for Italian elections expected to continue.

2. In contrast with previous elections Center parties, as well as all others, running independently and competing with one another for votes. Campaign polemics among Center parties concentrated primarily on two issues: (1) church-state conflict; and (2) state intervention versus private enterprise in economic sphere. Leftists have stressed anti-missile campaign but this has probably not gained them any significant new strength. Presence US troops in Italy has not figured prominently in Leftist campaign. PCI attacks on Common Market do not appear to have aroused interest of electorate but have served to embarrass PSI because of its qualified “neutral support” of Common Market.

3. Despite Prato affair and PRI-PR memorandum to Zoli on Catholic Bishops proclamation,¹ Embassy under impression anti-clericalism as campaign issue not likely hurt DC. DC leaders in fact say net effect of issue will be to DC advantage. Issue is now and has been for many years political stock-in-trade PRI-PR and latest step vis-à-vis Zoli obvious attempt to thrust PRI-PR ticket into limelight far out of proportion importance both parties. Although PCI-PSI have launched charge DC, in alliance with ecclesiastical authorities, aiming at “clericalization of state”, lately both parties emphasis this theme seems to have tapered off. Voters to whom these parties appeal anti-clerical in any event. Saragat May 11 pointed out it is not in PSI interest to widen breach between Catholic and non-Catholic workers. On balance, Embassy believes church support one of major sources of DC strength and will continue to be.

4. Clever and intelligent manipulation private enterprise vs state intervention issue by Malagodi (PLI) presumably one of reasons many political observers predicting large PLI gains May 25. To some extent Covelli and PNM have campaigned on this issue too, emphasizing state should intervene to assist private enterprise, not to control or impede it. Fanfani has tried to blunt issue by assuring public DC will restrain state enterprises and state interventions.

5. Recent PCI-PSI clash on United Front issue of interest. Togliatti in May 12 press conference strove to drive wedge between Nenni and Socialist base by asserting PSI leader does not want unity of action with Commies but party base does. Labeled rupture of Unity of Action pact “mistake”, pointing out nothing has been achieved since then. Longo stated PCI in past invited voters to vote for Leftist parties but added “today we cannot do this because PCI not certain votes given to PSI serve to reinforce democratic front”. Communists naturally fear post-electoral Socialist unification might isolate PCI. Commies claim they not against Socialist unification if based on Socialist principles but oppose having PSI placed on “anti-communist terrain”. Nenni in press conference May 20 said:

1) He had never considered Socialist unification on basis of anti-communism and that “if present problems in Italy are to be resolved it cannot be done by ignoring PCI Parliamentarians”;

2) No alternative possible in Italy without Communist support and if DC shifts to right PSI does not exclude return to frontism, even though in somewhat different form than past;

3) Present PCI-PSI polemic due to “electoral campaign and to new offensive launched by international Communism against so-called revisionism”, remark possibly indicating he considers attacks against his party carried out on Moscow instructions.

6. As in previous Italian election, parties and platforms have frequently played secondary role to political personalities. Question post-electoral party alliances in dispute between factions in DC, PSDI and PSI so that results obtained by these factions plus manipulation preferential votes may determine nature and strength of next government.

7. Disheartening aspect present election campaign is that total PCI-PSI strength in Parliament seems unlikely to decrease substantially effects of Khrushchev report,² Soviet armed intervention in Hungary and “plus–2” factor in new electoral law³ may cause some losses to PCI but these likely to be compensated by PSI gains, partly explaining present PCI-PSI polemics. Communists may lose some votes in north and gain some in south although PCI prospects in south depend to some extent on whether Lauro can take votes away from it. In general, there seems to be in Italy rather widespread feeling, shared by many political leaders, that Commies no longer represent threat they once did. This may induce some voters, dissatisfied with DC to cast protest vote for Left with less fear than they would have in 1948.

8. PSDI, plagued by internal disorganization and divided on whether to cooperate with parties to Left or to Right, has conducted somewhat drab, spotty and uninspired campaign. Relying to great extent on Saragat’s ability to command newspaper space PSDI leaders sanguine they will increase present 19 Deputies to at least 25 and possibly 30, despite Romita’s death, competition with Olivetti’s Comunita in Piemonte, and L’Eltore defection in Rome. Pacciardi predicts at least 10 seats for his PRI-PR ticket but may fall short by 2 or 3 seats.

9. DC largest enigma. Although due to new electoral law DC will have to poll close to million more votes to maintain present Chamber proportion, DC leaders appear confident party can overcome this disadvantage and at least hold its own. Many political observers, however, predicting DC will lose some Deputies. Generally agreed DC unlikely to gain absolute Chamber majority; more likely will emerge from elections with approximately present Parliamentary strength, falling short again by about 40 or 50 seats of safe working majority. Shortfall of DC vote more serious this time because of squabbling between Center parties. DC might gain absolute majority in Senate (they now have 110 seats and require 13 more for a majority) since Senate electoral law relatively more favorable to DC. Rightist parties by running separately have reduced their chances of acquiring sufficient votes in individual colleges to elect Senators. Past year of DC monocolore rule, in eyes many observers including some DC, considered serious handicap, permitting opposition parties to recall only performance Zoli government and to ignore four years relatively progressive DC administration: Biggest DC asset relative prosperity.

10. Liberals hope to double Deputies in Chamber. They have been receiving strong support in sections Italian press normally dedicated to support Center government, e.g. Rome’s Messaggiero, Milan’s Corriere Della Sera and Florence’s Nazione. Liberals have attacked DC strongly for “excessive statalization” and with press support have succeeded in establishing clear public position on this issue.

11. In general, Rightist parties appear declining. PNM suffers from lack of funds and is caught between DC and Liberals on one side and Lauro’s PMP and MIS on other. PNM has done more than demogogic PMP to develop party platform and philosophy but its propaganda uninspired and it recently reduced to supporting some PLI and DC theses. Decline in PNM representation in Parliament more or less universally agreed on. MIS, badly divided internally, expected to lose strength, only question being how much. Party does not appear to lack funds and is making enormous effort to attain respectability despite fiery nature of attacks on Communism and DC and nostalgic appeals to patriotism. Lauro, whose strength limited almost exclusively to Mezzogiorno, has conducted vigorous campaign and may make strong showing in some areas. Party, at least in Naples, does not appear to be badly damaged by bout with Zoli government last March and may emerge from elections strongest party on Right.

12. French crisis⁴ constitutes important new element in Italian electoral picture, effects of which still difficult to assess. Events of past few days in France and Algeria, and their possible implications for Italy, have caught imagination of Italian electorate as no other issue has in current campaign. DC have been quick to capitalize on situation as demonstrating dangers of political fractionalization and lack of stable center, on basis of which they have appealed to electorate to give votes to DC as only party which can provide guarantee of stability. PCI on other hand has used French crisis as proof threat rightist dictatorship, comparing Fanfani to de Gaulle. Evidence seems indicate that if present confused situation in France persists through May 26 it may well help DC at polls, whereas if de Gaulle should come to power before Italians go to polls it would probably redound to electoral benefit PCI and other Leftist parties. However French crisis evolves, PLI and parties of extreme Right appear worried over effect de Gaulle’s role on their electoral fortunes.

13. Last minute pre-electoral poll of reputable survey agency shows smaller number “undecided” voters but little change from previous poll results. Responses to questions re favorite party produced following results: PCI 14 percent, PSI 12.1 percent, PSDI 7.1 percent, PRI-PR 1.4 percent, DC 42.3 percent, PLI 5 percent, PNM 2.8 percent, PMP 2.8 percent and MSI 3.6 percent; other parties one half of 1 percent and “undecided” 8.4 percent. Researchers feel (on basis analysis other questions) at least one half “undecided” actually PCI voters and should be added to above percentages for total 18.2 percent Communist vote. Poll forecasts no major shifts from 1953 percentages with possible exception slight decrease PCI vote and slight rise in PSDI and PLI votes. Poll taken after launching Sputnik III but before French crisis and May 20 Soviet note offering Italy treaty friendship and non-aggression. Latter obviously intended influence Italian elections but not expected have important effect.

14. In summary DC will continue as leading party although it will still be unable form majority government by itself. Communist-Socialist vote will probably again represent about one-third of electorate despite some Communist losses, especially to Socialists. Right appears to be on decline with good chance Lauro will emerge largest Rightist party. Liberals expected to make comparatively large gains. Basic post-election problems will continue to be (1) DC’s ability to form stable coalition; and (2) Socialist unification. Embassy’s views on these problems will be reported when full election picture is known.

Zellerbach

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/5–2258. Confidential. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Athens.
1. Following the conviction of the Bishop of Prato, the Catholic Bishops of Italy issued a strongly-worded condemnation of the court’s action. The members of the court were threatened with excommunication. The Republican (PRI) and Radical (PR) Parties responded with a memorandum to the Prime Minister attacking Church interference in civil affairs.
2. Apparent reference to the so-called “secret speech” on Stalin’s regime that Khrushchev made to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956.
3. Not identified.
4. On the night of May 13–14, French troops seized control of the Government of Algeria in order to prevent the formation of a government under Pierre Pflimlin. The Pflimlin government won a vote of confidence from the French National Assembly on May 14. On May 15, General Charles de Gaulle announced his readiness to assume the government of France. At a May 19 Paris press conference, de Gaulle reiterated his willingness to assume control of the government.