Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

20. Despatch From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

No. 2129

Paris, June 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

• De Gaulle Government and French Atomic Energy Policy: Conversation with De Rose, Foreign Office¹

De Rose, like Goldschmidt (see Despatch 2128)² said that the choice of M. Guillaumat as a cabinet member by General de Gaulle had no special significance in connection with atomic energy policy. Guillaumat is an excellent administrator and a strong personality, and therefore promises to be equal to handling any reorganizations that might be necessary in the armed forces.

As far as production and testing of atomic weapons is concerned there is clearly no special significance in the appointment. It is doubtful that military production will be within Guillaumat’s jurisdiction, since he will be in effect Minister of the Armed Forces, a post which normally does not have responsibility for military production including production in the field of atomic energy. De Rose reiterated what Ambassador Alphand and M. Pelen³ had said to the State Department in Washington on May 26 concerning the French position on cessation of tests.⁴ De Rose said that he personally has long felt that for both internal and external political reasons France must test a weapon of her own fabrication. France would be willing to carry out such a test underground and in accordance with any agreed rules on controlling fallout, but it would not forego testing entirely. He thought that General de Gaulle’s views would be along these lines, but said that he had no confirmation of this based upon personal contact with the General.

He also repeated what Ambassador Alphand had stated in Washington: that while France wants at least a few bombs under her exclusive control, she does not regard this as a substitute for integrated defense. France does not aspire to autonomy in the field of nuclear weapons.

He said that France would not agree to a cessation of tests unless (1) there were also an agreement with the USSR on controlling production or (2) the United States would give France either a certain number of bombs or at least as much technical information as France could get on her own by carrying out the tests she looks forward to. He admitted that there was no strong likelihood of achieving an agreement on controlling production in the near future and recognized that even the amended Atomic Energy Act of 1954⁵ would not permit the transfer to France of atomic weapons, thereby leaving the alternative of supplying information on weapons production as the only practicable negotiable possibility.

Max Isenbergh
Special Assistant for Atomic Energy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.13/6–1158. Secret.
1. Jean Tricornot de Rose.
2. Dated June 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.13/6–1158)
3. Pierre Pelen, Counselor in the French Embassy in Washington.
4. No record of this conversation has been found.
5. A proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitting the transfer of nuclear materials information to other nations passed Congress and was signed by the President on July 2, 1958. (72 Stat. 276)