Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

178. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 1, 1960, 10 p.m.–1 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Consultation

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Penfield
• UK
  • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British
  • Ambassador Mr. B. Boothby, Foreign Office
  • Mr. T. Brimelow, Counselor of Embassy
• France
  • Mr. Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
  • Mr. Claude Lebel, Chargé d’Affaires
  • M. P. Pelletier, Foreign Office
  • Mr. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor of Embassy

After dinner the three Foreign Ministers assembled in the drawing room. The Secretary referred to the conversations which had taken place in Paris between the Heads of Government with respect to finding improved methods for closer tripartite consultation.¹ The Secretary said the United States considers such consultation desirable but continues to believe that it should not be institutionalized to the point of antagonizing our allies. He mentioned in this connection the sensitivity in particular of the Italians and the Canadians, and the French Foreign Minister interjected also the Germans.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that Prime Minister Macmillan had put his ideas on paper in the form of letters to Presidents Eisenhower and de Gaulle.² The British did not yet know what their partners thought of the Prime Minister’s suggestions.

Couve said the French had thought that the Foreign Ministers could meet from time to time in a more systematic way than in the past. Presumably the Heads of Government should also consult but there was some limitation on how frequently they could actually meet. The French had received Mr. Macmillan’s letter but had thought that the question could be discussed here in Washington before they replied.

The Secretary made the suggestion that it might be possible to assign senior officers whose competence was not limited to any one region or function but rather global in scope who could keep in touch with each other, prepare agendas and discussion papers for the Foreign Ministers and in general assure some system and continuity in the consultations without creating or constituting anything in the nature of a permanent secretariat.

Mr. Lloyd said he wanted to talk bluntly about the facts. Before Suez there had in fact been close and effective tripartite consultation. The problem was really to get back to the previous situation. After all it must be recognized that the three powers had common responsibilities for Germany and were the three Western permanent members of the Security Council. As he had suggested in Paris he thought what the Foreign Ministers’ consultations needed was really better preparation. Meetings of the Heads of Government, he recognized, would be more difficult to arrange and to handle.

The Secretary said that though the three Foreign Ministers had had in fact many meetings they had never been adequately prepared in advance. This was the main reason for his suggestion that each Foreign Minister designate someone who was not saddled with specific duties but had global responsibilities. Both Couve and Selwyn Lloyd asked whether the Secretary contemplated that there would be direct contact between these three officers. The Secretary replied affirmatively, saying again that it would be a sort of informal and unofficial secretariat.

Mr. Lloyd expressed the opinion that it might be better to arrange to set up an ad hoc group in advance of scheduled Foreign Ministers meetings and in the place where they would meet to draw up an agenda and prepare papers for consideration by the Foreign Ministers.

The Secretary then cited Mr. Merchant as the kind of officer he would be prepared to designate and, with reference to Mr. Lloyd’s suggestion, added that Mr. Merchant could meet with his counterparts almost anywhere. He then went on to cite the press stories in today’s newspapers about tonight’s meeting of “the Big Three” and said he was sure that these stories would raise many questions on the part of NATO and our allies.³ Mr. Kohler commented that in fact the Department had already had a number of applications for briefing.

Couve said he thought it would be easy enough simply to report that this was the first opportunity for the Foreign Ministers to get together after the Summit fiasco in Paris. They naturally wanted to review the events there and consider the resulting situation.

Mr. Lloyd said he wanted to ask Couve bluntly whether the arrangements for tripartite consultation as proposed by the Secretary would satisfy the French Government. Couve replied that such arrangements would be satisfactory on the political level. However, they would not cover the question of military coordination which he felt the Foreign Ministers were not in a position to discuss tonight. In this connection he mentioned the possibility of the Standing Group and commented that understanding on military questions was really a matter involving the national security of each of us.

The Secretary commented that the United States really believed in its alliances. We were all together and the security of one was the security of all. There was no such thing as separate national security.

Selwyn Lloyd said that in the military field it seemed to him there were three main questions of major concern. The first was the question of button pushing. The second was the French determination to secure an independent nuclear deterrent capability. The third was the question of the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany.

Couve commented that the question of the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany was a very specific problem, to which Selwyn Lloyd retorted that it was a problem of a kind on which the three powers should have their ideas in line.

The Secretary then cited the United States offer on the provision of MRBM’s to NATO.⁴ He said we were anxious to get this proposition on the table and discuss it.

Couve commented that if he understood the proposal correctly the big problem posed would be in whose hands the MRBM’s were held, especially in the case of Germany. The Secretary agreed with Couve that this was a special problem, particularly as respects relations with the Soviet Government.

Selwyn Lloyd said this was a portentous subject to discuss and that it involved horrible dangers in the event of leaks. The Secretary and Couve agreed but expressed the opinion that there was no danger from present company. Selwyn Lloyd then went on to say that he understood that France was unwilling to accept either the first or second alternative of the proposal made by Defense Secretary Gates.⁴ Consequently this meant that the idea was for bilateral arrangements on MRBM’s. This would mean that Germany would get its own MRBM’s.

The Secretary commented that the first thing to do was to make up our own minds as to whether the deployment of MRBM’s was really militarily important to us. If so, then we must not fall out among ourselves but decide together how to handle the question.

Couve said that from his point of view we did not know the answer to this question. Maybe the answer could only be supplied by General Norstad.

The Secretary replied that much depended on whether French territory would be excluded from a NATO deployment arrangement.

Selwyn Lloyd said he thought it was important to decide about deployment in Germany. Perhaps Germany was too far forward?

The Secretary pointed out that we were talking about mobile missiles which did not involve the same deployment considerations as the stationary IRBM’s. He said it was clear we must show a keen sense of timing in this question.

Mr. Lloyd agreed that as to deployment, military considerations were important, then went on to say that there were also considerations of cost. To this the Secretary replied that in his mind the first consideration was not a question of cost but the security of the free world.

Couve repeated that we must consider whether a military determination would be obtained as to where the missiles should be deployed. The Secretary replied that Norstad had established a requirement for 300 missiles which would presumably be everywhere.

Mr. Lloyd then raised the question as to whether the United States legislation would permit independent control of MRBM’s. The Secretary replied categorically that US legislation would not allow such independent control. He said we were thinking in terms of multilateral control. If there were independent controls this would be divisive instead of unifying within the alliance.

Couve commented that we were then talking about NATO weapons. He still did not know whether stationing in Germany would be necessary. There ensued a general discussion as to what kind of missiles were presently stationed in Germany with mention of the Nike-Hercules and the Matador-Mace capabilities there. It was concluded that as of now there are no missiles stationed in Germany which could be considered strategic in nature. During this discussion it was also stressed that the main reason for General Norstad’s decision that there should be no IRBM’s stationed in Germany was the fact that these required a fixed site and would have been geographically highly vulnerable there.⁵

At the end of this discussion the Secretary then mentioned that he had had letters from von Brentano with respect to Germany’s interest in nuclear cooperation which indicated clearly that there would be mounting pressure for German participation.⁶

Couve said that from the French point of view the main question involved was NATO control as against their own control. The Secretary acknowledged this, stressing the importance of the problem as to whether there would be independent or NATO control.

Selwyn Lloyd then reverted to the Secretary’s remark about von Brentano’s inquiries and in response to his question the Secretary said that we were simply stalling, taking no action for the time being.

Couve commented that he well remembered that during the consideration of the Western European Union arrangements he, as the French representative, had raised the question as to whether the restrictions on the Germans prohibited their “having” as well as “producing” nuclear weapons.⁷ At that time both the UK and the US had said that “having” such weapons was not prohibited. Some general discussion of this question then ensued leading to the conclusion that in fact the German renunciation applies only to the production and not to the possession of nuclear weapons. In this connection Couve pointed out that the French had never criticized the United States for providing Nike, Mace and other nuclear capable missiles to the Germans. After some related and inconclusive further discussion the Secretary said that we should not kid ourselves as to the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Technological development was so rapid that changes in weapon capabilities came practically every month.

Mr. Merchant commented that he thought the place where the Russians drew the line on German possession of nuclear weapons was really on strategic weapons, that is, those capable of reaching inside the USSR. He thought two main questions were posed by the discussion. The first thing to be decided was whether and, if so, what German territory might be needed for MRBM deployment. The second was in whose hands these weapons should be held.

Couve commented that if we asked the military for a decision on deployment they would probably just say the wider the distribution the better. The Secretary agreed with this remark and in this connection referred to the booklet on the Polaris missile which had been sent to NATO and which covered questions of range and mobility.

The Secretary said that the discussion to this point had shown the need for a military determination and he felt this was needed urgently. He pointed out that we were all in the same boat. In part at least the MRBM’s were needed to replace obsolescent air capabilities. The United States would be willing to take the initiative in securing the military determination but would only do so if the French military were able to talk about the question on the basis of free world security and not on the basis of political problems connected with considerations of national sovereignty. He realized that this presented problems for France.

Couve de Murville agreed that this presented a problem for the French but stressed again that he thought the first need was for military decisions regarding deployment. The Secretary said all right but that there should be no delays in getting such decisions. He remembered how long the European countries took to decide on details connected with the Hawk production program.⁸

Ambassador Caccia said that he had understood that the Norstad requirement for the procurement of 300 MRBM’s between 1963 and 1965 had already gone through the Standing Group and been fanned out to the NATO governments for consideration. In a sense the military decision had already been made and it was now up to the governments to indicate their readiness to cooperate.

The Secretary commented that if this were the case it raised serious question as to the recent report to the effect that the French Minister of Defense had stated categorically that France cannot accept either of the alternatives in the Gates proposal. Couve replied that no firm decision had as yet been made. However, he continued, a lot of problems were raised by the US proposal. This proposal required NATO control. Apart from France it was not at all certain that some of the other countries would be willing to participate or to share in the financing.

The Secretary after repeating that cost was not the first consideration reaffirmed that the United States was talking about a NATO MRBM capability and not about separate national ventures in this field. Couve repeated that at a total cost of $750 million for the program he thought that the smaller NATO countries would not be prepared to accept.

Mr. Merchant said he thought there were really four specific problems connected with the MRBM program. First, where should they be produced? Second, who should pay for them? Third, where should they be deployed? And, fourth, who controls them? There was general agreement with this summary.

The Secretary stressed that the United States had made a pledge in 1957 to aid in the development of a MRBM program for NATO.⁹ It had now made an offer to meet this pledge. The question is whether the Europeans want to accept that offer. If they do not then the United States will have to rethink the whole question.

Couve commented that some of the NATO countries want the MRBM program if the US pays for it. Others would be willing to pay if they could control the MRBM’s.

The Secretary pointed out that the European NATO countries spend between $13 and $14 billion a year on defense. The Polaris program would really be very small potatoes within this total.

Mr. Merchant again stressed the urgency of the question. What we really need is government decisions. Basically the SHAPE requirements have been laid down. Deployment decisions really depend on governments’ decisions regarding the MRBM arrangement and these should be speeded up. The Secretary commented it would be necessary to apply the needle in the right place.

Couve indicated he did not disagree with Mr. Merchant’s remarks but insisted that it would be a normal procedure to have deployment requirements determined by SHAPE without regard to political factors.

Selwyn Lloyd then cited a report that the British had opposed WEU lifting the tonnage requirements on German naval vessels.¹⁰ He denied that the British had taken any such action. After some general discussion it was agreed that in fact the Germans have not yet made formal application to WEU for relief from tonnage limitations.

The Secretary then said he would try to summarize this phase of the discussion. With respect to the development of tripartite consultation he felt it had been agreed that each Foreign Minister would designate an officer to follow through on this matter. For his part he would designate Mr. Merchant right now and asked his British and French colleagues to designate counterparts with whom Mr. Merchant would keep in touch. He repeated that he thought the officers selected should have global competence. He also emphasized that there should be no announcement of these designations. Couve assented and said that he would probably designate Charles Lucet. Selwyn Lloyd said that he had been thinking of an officer of somewhat lower rank, possibly the equivalent of the State Department’s Counselor, Mr. Achilles. However since Mr. Herter had designated Mr. Merchant he thought probably the British designee would be Pat Dean. The Secretary then confirmed that all were agreed that a high level officer would be desirable for this purpose.

The Secretary then said that the second conclusion was that we should apply the needle with respect to the MRBM proposition and get going. Ambassador Caccia said that he thought he would like to discuss with Mr. Merchant just where the needle should be applied. The question of the MRBM proposal was now before NATO and steps should perhaps be taken to force a political decision. Couve commented that we should be realistic—the permanent North Atlantic Council would never reach a decision on this matter. Selwyn Lloyd then suggested that maybe the needle should be stuck in Couve and himself. The Secretary agreed it should, especially in Couve, to whom he turned, requesting that if the French firmly decided that they wanted neither alternative of the US proposal they should tell us so promptly.

Couve said that the French position with respect to French territory was known to the US. Germany was a different matter and agreement had almost been reached on nuclear cooperation covering weapons for the French forces stationed in Germany. He thought the French could consider the placement of MRBM’s on German territory if the requirement were agreed. However he must distinguish between that and French territory. Selwyn Lloyd then questioned the difference between French and German troops on German soil in this connection. He thought this was a frightfully important question for tripartite consideration. What do we really want in Germany? Couve commented that if we could make up our minds on this question then we must discuss the matter frankly with the Germans. The Secretary agreed as did Selwyn Lloyd but the latter went on to say it was very important how we presented the matter to the Germans.

Mr. Merchant then closed this phase of the discussion by saying he thought there were three pressure points on which we should act. First, NATO should be pressed to expedite a decision on the US offer. Second, General Norstad should be asked to submit his proposals on deployment of MRBM’s without regard to political factors. Finally, the Standing Group should be asked to press for governmental acceptance of the SHAPE MRBM requirement. Before turning to the subject of Africa the Secretary again stressed the urgency of this question.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/6–160. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on June 3. The conversation was held at Secretary Herter’s residence. The Ministers were in Washington for the SEATO Council Meeting May 31–June 2. Copies of the memoranda of conversation, June 1, covering their discussions of disarmament and Africa are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1686.
1. See Document 172.
2. See Document 177.
3. Not found.
4. See footnote 4, Document 164.
4. See footnote 4, Document 164.
5. No record of this decision by Norstad has been found in Department of State files.
6. These letters have not been further identified.
7. This statement has not been further identified.
8. Reference is to the Hawk surface-to-air missile system. Early in 1958, five European countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, accepted the U.S. offer to use U.S. Government-owned property rights and to facilitate industrial contracts for the manufacture in Europe of this missile system. The NATO Hawk Production Organization, set up by the NAC in June 1959, supervised the program. See Part 1, Document 168, footnote 4.
9. In Dulles’ statement to the NAC, December 16, 1957, he announced that the United States was prepared to make available to other NATO countries intermediate-range ballistic missiles for deployment in accordance with the plans of SACEUR. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, pp. 8–12.
10. Not further identified.