175. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Energy Cooperation with France (Meeting of Chiefs of State and Heads of Government—Paris, May, 1960)
[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 174.]
Mr. McCone said that in his discussions of the past two days with French atomic energy officials he found that they were increasingly aware of the cost and time required for construction of a French gaseous diffusion plant. He thought this might be the time to consider whether we should try to make a deal which would keep the plant from being built. He recalled speaking to the President about this idea a year and a half ago at which time the President was favorably inclined.1 Mr. McCone had then spoken to M. Perrin who rejected any consideration of the idea since General deGaulle was determined to have a complete and integrated independent French atomic energy program. Mr. McCone mentioned also that a few months ago Ambassador Alphand had spoken to him of the French opposition to the cut-off of production of fissionable materials since French production has barely commenced.1 At that time Mr. McCone had said that, if this was all that troubled the French, the United States could easily fill the gap. He had had AEC staff look into the anticipated French production of weapons-grade U–235 in the next 10 years. From their knowledge of French plant construction plans, they had estimated that, by picking up surplus power available to U.S. gaseous diffusion plants, the U.S. could in 6 months produce enough additional weapons-grade U–235 to satisfy French requirements for 10 years. The U.S. estimate of French production costs was $38 per gram whereas the U.S. cost is $11—$17 per gram. There would thus be both greater economy and early availability for the French by this approach. He suggested that the Secretary might want to call Couve and suggest that this be given consideration on both sides.
The Secretary said that he was very much interested in this approach. He thought that the French behavior in recent months and particularly in the past week had blotted out the effect of many previous petty irritations such as the Mediterranean fleet, the air defense argument, [Page 368] etc. Accordingly, he would assume that the past Congressional opposition to such cooperation would be greatly diminished. Mr. McCone said that he believed the Joint Committee would be favorably disposed though they would not of course favor exchange of nuclear weapons information. The Secretary continued that he would like to speak to the President about this matter and if the President agreed then the President might make the suggestion to Couve who would be in Washington next Thursday.2
Mr. Farley said that he agreed that Congressional approval could probably be obtained for such an agreement. He thought, however, that there was a policy question for the United States, since the French would undoubtedly agree only if the end use of the material was unrestricted. This would mean that we would foster an independent French nuclear weapons capability much earlier than would otherwise be the case. This was different, for example, from our present approach to IRBM capabilities in Europe. The Secretary said that he was sure the British and the Germans would be opposed. Mr. Farley said that he thought the smaller NATO countries would also be uneasy.
The Secretary concluded by saying that this matter should be taken up urgently in Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–2060. Secret. Drafted by Farley and approved in S on May 26. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence. See also Document 174.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩
- See Document 179.↩