Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

169. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

April 25, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

• The President
• Secretary Herter
• Under Secretary Dillon
• Ambassador Houghton
• General Goodpaster
• Colonel Walters
• General DeGaulle
• Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
• Ambassador Alphand
• Mr. de Courcel
• Mr. Lebel

The President opened the conversation by saying that in their talks on the previous day,¹ General DeGaulle and he were agreed on procedures for the summit; that General DeGaulle would write Mr. Khrushchev setting this forth and that they were in hopes of finishing by Sunday, but if not, the President might return from Portugal for the meeting. They had agreed that disarmament would be the major subject for discussion though there was a slight difference of approach between our way of approaching it and General DeGaulle’s. General DeGaulle wished to propose the prohibition of certain delivery systems for nuclear weapons with appropriate inspection which would be world-wide and open Russia completely to inspection. He himself, in the light of Khrushchev’s rejection of his open skies proposal at Geneva in 1955, wanted to start out more modestly with a limited area in which inspection techniques could be tested.

Secretary Herter then said that this would be tantamount to opening the whole of the Soviet Union to inspection, and General deGaulle nodded agreement.

The President said he could see no objection to making this proposal although he was not very optimistic about it being accepted, but that his proposal was something in the nature of a fallback position. General DeGaulle said that of course if the proposal were agreed to, a group would have to be set up to study the means of implementation and techniques in inspection would have to be developed, but that there would have to be a series of phases for implementation. General DeGaulle said that when he had proposed this to Khrushchev, he had said he would agree to any kind of inspection providing it was reciprocal anywhere. Secretary Herter asked whether this covered nuclear weapons and the President said that it did not; it involved delivery systems, as both he and General DeGaulle were agreed that the weapons themselves could easily be hidden, but it related only to the means of delivery. General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had spoken of missiles, aircraft, and launching sites, both fixed and mobile, which he understood to cover submarines. The President then said that he did not see any reason why this should not be proposed. General DeGaulle said that he felt we could not propose nothing, nor could we propose everything as the Russians did, but we must propose something substantial, and this type of proposal would have a great effect on public opinion and would redound to the credit of the West.

The President said that in the field of contacts, he and General DeGaulle were agreeable to proposing that we might double present contacts, and if need be, triple them. We would have no difficulties in this field. He had once asked Mr. Hoover, head of the FBI, whether it would greatly increase his problem if we allowed in 10,000 Russian students instead of 40, and Mr. Hoover assured him that it would not. Secretary Herter pointed out that we had offered the Russians to exchange a large number of students and that they had found this awkward and had finally come up with 23.

General DeGaulle then said that though we might agree to increase exchanges, this did not mean that we would necessarily buy two or three times as much from them. For instance, France purchased a million tons of petroleum a year from them. Such a proposal did not mean France would be obligated to buy two million tons. Nevertheless, he said, Khrushchev always comes back to the subject of an increase in trade between the East and West. The President said that if we agreed on other things we could look into the problem of increasing trade.

Secretary Herter pointed out there are certain legislative limitations such as the Johnson Act.²

The President pointed out that if this type of provision were included in a formal treaty and it were ratified by the Senate, it would have over-riding effect and be the supreme law of the land. Secretary Dillon pointed out that what the Soviets were really after was long-term credits and that the Johnson Act limited these. Secretary Herter said he had one concern in this respect. If a declaration came from the summit advocating greater commercial exchanges, this might encourage other nations to send trade missions to Moscow and would, in turn, give the Soviets an opportunity to send large numbers of people to other countries to carry out subversive activities.

The President said that any statement covering an increase in East-West trade would have to be drafted very carefully.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that the real problem lay in the fact that the Soviets really don’t have much to sell, and they have trouble in paying for what they do buy. Secretary Dillon said that the Soviets were driving for credits but we would rather see such credit, as it were available, go to help non-communist, underdeveloped nations. General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev admits that they don’t have much to sell now, but says that they were developing at a high rate and in a few years will have a great deal to sell. The President expressed the view that the most we could do at the summit would be to appoint a committee to study what could be done to expand East-West trade, but that the matter of social and cultural exchanges would be no difficulty. General DeGaulle and the French Foreign Minister expressed their agreement.

On the matter of Germany, General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had told him that Berlin constituted a dangerous situation. There was still fire in the ashes of World War II and this might flare up if not settled; that we must regulate the status of East Germany and West Berlin. He would never allow either of them to belong to Adenauer, but he did not insist that West Berlin be a part of East Germany. It could become an international city under the United Nations control with guaranteed access. General DeGaulle said he told Khrushchev that if he divided Germany permanently in this manner, if he treated Berlin as something apart; he would be rekindling that fire and creating, at least on the German side, a reason for war. He said he had asked Khrushchev why he brought up matters of this type if he really wanted relaxation of tensions. After all we had lived with the present situation in Berlin for 15 years; there was no reason why we could not go on for a further number of years.

General DeGaulle said that when he told Khrushchev this bluntly he became less urgent and said that they could go along for two years, at the end of which, if no settlement had been reached, he (K) would have to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, but in the meanwhile there would have to be some temporary arrangement on Berlin. General DeGaulle said that he had told Khrushchev that if he was trying to tell us that we would have to get out of Berlin at the end of two years the answer was “no go”, and that as for his temporary arrangement on Berlin this would depend on what he was trying to put into it.

The President said that he felt that the background or theme we should operate against is that we believe in the self determination of peoples, and that we feel they should be allowed to express themselves freely concerning their own future; peoples of Berlin, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or other areas, and if we stress this constantly it will require considerable acrobatics on the part of Mr. Khrushchev to prove that he was right in trying to dispose in a dictatorial fashion of the people of West Berlin and East Germany. We should stress that we believe in this. General DeGaulle replied that we did believe in this, but he did not. The French President said that in order to relax tensions, if we made these proposals early in the Conference, it would prevent the discussion on Berlin and Germany from becoming venomous and acrimonious later on.

General DeGaulle then said that in the same framework we might see if something could be done jointly to assist the under-developed nations. Even if we only accepted in principle and leave to a committee the task of working out the specific implementation.

The President pointed out that the Soviets have not supported such projects financially when undertaken under the aegis of the UN. For instance, their quota of the Special Fund was 15 million dollars and Secretary Dillon stated that they had only put in one million dollars. Their performance with regard to the Children’s Fund was similar.

General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had expressed pessimistic views regarding the U.S. disposition and then pirating the President’s proposal of 1953,³ he said he had proposed using part of the savings on disarmament to assist under-developed countries. The President again expressed doubts regarding the Soviets disposition to do anything substantial, and General DeGaulle again expressed his desire to make some proposal in this area and try and work out the details.

Secretary Herter said that he was just a little concerned regarding the order in which the topics were discussed at the summit because if we reached agreement on a number of these things the Soviets might then become very tough on Berlin at the end of the Conference.

General DeGaulle said that we should seize the initiative and say to the Russians “have you come here to seek a decision or not”. If so, let’s talk about disarmament and exchanges and perhaps joint assistance to the under-developed nations. He will, nevertheless, talk about Berlin, but perhaps not so violently.

Secretary Herter expressed concern again concerning the Soviets taking such earlier agreements as might have been reached for granted, and then become difficult on Berlin. General DeGaulle said that we should make it clear that all of the agreements were tied together and that if the Conference broke up over Berlin, anything that had been agreed earlier would not hold. For this reason he favored small meetings. On the first day, perhaps, the four chiefs of government alone and later the foreign ministers would join them. He felt that they should hold their meetings in the mornings, leaving the afternoons free for bilateral visits and exchanges, and at the end a large meeting could be held with ambassadors and other members of the delegation. He felt that private contacts with Khrushchev were effective. Both the President and General DeGaulle agreed that Khrushchev talked in a more reasonable fashion when he was alone and that the presence of other Soviets seemed to make him more intransigent. The President indicated that he would go to Lisbon on the 23rd, but might return if the Conference had not concluded. General DeGaulle said that he had hoped they might be finished by Saturday night, particularly if they had restricted meetings.

The President then asked about a communiqué⁴ and General DeGaulle said he was agreeable either way. The President said there was only one thing he would like to see included in the communiqué, and that was General DeGaulle’s statement of September 16, 1959 on Algeria still stood, and he could use the occasion to reaffirm his support for the General’s statement. General DeGaulle said he did not like to use the word Algeria, but in his speech to Congress⁵ he would express his belief that nations have the right to self determination in democracy.

The President said that sections of our press were indicating that General DeGaulle had hardened his stand and he knew this was not so in light of what the General had told him, and was merely seeking an occasion to reaffirm his support. General DeGaulle said that the last time he had told the President in advance that he would make the statement and the President had then expressed his support. He would make a statement to this effect in New York tomorrow and if the President wished to endorse, that it would be fine. Secretary Herter then asked about the communiqué and the President recalled that they had indicated on the previous day that a brief communiqué might be forthcoming.

General DeGaulle said that such a communiqué might say that these conversations had been useful in defining the position that they would take in common to go to the summit for the purpose of achieving a relaxation in the international situation. The President said he thought that would be helpful.

General DeGaulle indicated that he would pay a final call on the President the following morning with Madame DeGaulle, and the President said that he would receive them in the residence.

Secretary Herter again expressed concern that if in order to achieve relaxation of tension we gave Khrushchev everything he wanted early and then he got tough on Germany at the end, this would not be good. General DeGaulle said that there was a gamble involved and this was that Khrushchev did want to be known as the man who had relaxed tensions and that we would indicate that if the Conference broke up over Berlin, that nothing that had been agreed previously would stand. Secretary Herter said that we should not announce anything until the final communiqué, and General DeGaulle agreed with this and said that everything should remain open and connected until the final communiqué.

It was then agreed that Secretary Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville would meet immediately after lunch and work out a communiqué. Both the President and General DeGaulle expressed their agreement in advance to whatever communiqué was worked out by the Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister.

Vernon Walters
Colonel, U.S. Army

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1631. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters. The conversation was held at the White House.
1. See Document 168.
2. Reference is to the Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, which prohibited financial transactions with any foreign government in default of its obligations to the United States. (48 Stat. 574) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments who were members of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516)
3. Reference is presumably to Eisenhower’s proposal for the reduction of armaments made in his address, “The Chance for Peace,” delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. In this address, he proposed a limitation of the sizes of the military forces of all nations, a commitment by all nations to limit their production of materials devoted to military purposes, and the international control of atomic energy to promote its peaceful use.
4. See footnote 9, Document 168.
5. For text of de Gaulle’s address before Congress on April 25, see Department of State Bulletin, May 16, 1960, pp. 771–773.