Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

167. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

April 22, 1960, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

• The President, General DeGaulle, Mr. Claude Lebel, Lt Colonel Vernon A. Walters

After the usual exchange of amenities the President said he had some papers he would like to give General DeGaulle. First was for his confidential and personal information and related to our deterrent capabilities.¹ It covered some of the weapons systems in our deterrent capabilities. The second paper he wished the General to look at covered four (4) points which we thought might be useful for discussion at the summit.² He wondered whether the General would care to discuss these at this time or whether he would prefer to think it over and talk about it at a later time. The third paper related to procedures at the summit.³ He felt that it was important to the three Western powers that they agree in advance, and if they are agreed, General DeGaulle, as the head of the host government, might perhaps write a letter to Mr. Khrushchev setting forth our understanding concerning procedures to be followed at the summit. General DeGaulle thanked the President and said he would retain the first paper (deterrent capabilities). On the second paper (questions for discussion at the summit), he would like to have an opportunity to read it over and talk to the President subsequently.

On the third paper, he said he agreed with the idea of his sending a letter to Khrushchev, and he would do so after they had worked out an understanding between the three Western powers.

The President then said that at their last meeting⁴ they had discussed means of insuring satisfactory consultation as between France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and that the Embassies were working on this problem and that it was his feeling that the three countries were in much closer contact than had been the case previously. He wondered whether General DeGaulle shared this opinion and the French President said that he did.

The President recalled they had decided to do this without having recourse to heavy, ponderous machinery or organization, and General DeGaulle expressed his agreement with this concept.

The President then said that he would next talk about a matter that was really none of his business, but he felt he should tell General DeGaulle he had received a communication from nine African powers telling him that French efforts to suppress the rebellion in Algeria were driving the African nations out of the Western camp.⁵ They could not countenance this effort to perpetuate colonial rule. His reply then was that this was none of his business, but rather between them and France, but he felt he would be remiss if he did not mention the tone of these communications. They had also protested about the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. The President said that as he understood it, General DeGaulle still stood by his statement of September 16th and he would like to confirm this for himself so that he could perhaps reaffirm his support for this policy. He said that while General DeGaulle might have used independent expressions in his speech at Constantine,⁶ he felt certain that his policies remained the same.

General DeGaulle said that this was indeed the case. He still stood by his statement of September 16th, at which time he had offered the Algerians three choices: complete independence with secession from France; complete Frenchification; or else an Algerian government tied to France by treaty. If the choice were for independence, then they could secede. He had asked the rebel leaders to discuss a cease-fire with him. They had refused to do so unless the future status of Algeria were also discussed. He could not do this as it would imply recognition of the rebels as an Algerian government. The only way a true Algerian government could be set up was through a free expression of the people’s feelings in the referendum. But a referendum could not be held while the fighting was going on. He had told the Algerian rebels that if they were able to agree on a cease-fire, he would call a round-table conference and they would all work out the referendum together. They had refused to do so, so obviously when he visited the Army in Algeria, he could not tell them anything other than they must continue the task of pacification until such time as the rebels were prepared to discuss a cease-fire.⁷

He said he would like to point out that France had a mandate from the United Nations on Togo and Cameroon. Following the UN vote, France had given both of them their independence⁸ and France was in the process of signing treaties on independence with other States such as Madagascar and the Mali Federation. In a year the French Community would be an association of independent states. The President said he was delighted to hear this and he hoped the U.S. would enjoy with the countries of the French Community the same close and warm relations which we had with France itself.

General DeGaulle said that in regard to the nuclear tests, he did not feel they had contributed a great deal to area contamination. The President said there are some indications that fallout from tests held as long ago as 8 or 9 years might still be present, and that the scientists themselves did not agree on the exact consequences. He did convey the thought to General DeGaulle that it might be well to hold such tests underground. He was not attempting to absolve himself from any of our previous tests.

General DeGaulle said that he would take note of what the President said and that the French were looking now to find suitable underground locations in Corsica. The President said he would be fortunate if he could find some caves because the underground excavations involved were very expensive.

General DeGaulle said he had found Mr. Khrushchev in a fairly moderate frame of mind.⁹ He had offered to try and help settle the Algerian question, but General DeGaulle had asked him to stay out of this matter. Khrushchev had told him that he hoped the French would remain in some form in Algeria because if they left the Americans would move in and that would be worse. The President laughed and said he had enough headaches right now without taking on Algeria, but this was typical of Khrushchev’s attempts to divide the Western alliance. He did the same thing with us and he did it with the British. General DeGaulle said it was essential that we not be divided, but that we be united and he felt that if Khrushchev realized that we would not back down he would not do anything rash or present us with an ultimatum. In discussions with General DeGaulle he had mentioned the possibility of a two-year moratorium on the status of Berlin although saying at the end of that time some solution would have to be found.

The President and General DeGaulle then discussed the Oder Neisse border and felt that this seemed to be permanent and that a Western guarantee of this border might be a valuable card to play in some way if tacit West German consent could be obtained to it. It was felt that this could not possibly be obtained prior to the German elections next year, but thereafter some flexibility on the part of the Germans should be hoped for. General DeGaulle said that France was anxious to be close to Germany and to have good relations with her, but for understandable reasons she was not unduly anxious for German reunification or to see Germany grow larger. Khrushchev’s attempts to stir up anti-German feeling in France had not been successful. His reception in France had been “correct” but not enthusiastic despite occasional groups of communists. General DeGaulle felt that if the summit meeting could be kept going for a week without a split, this in itself would be a success and lead to later summits and the creation of an atmosphere of relaxation of tension. He said that he had told Khrushchev “you say you want to relax tensions. If this is true why do you harass us with questions like Berlin that can only lead to trouble.” He felt that we should not allow ourselves to be pushed out of Berlin, but that we should not use the word never, never, never; and that a Western guarantee of the Oder Neisse line might relieve Polish pressure on Khrushchev, as not merely communist Poles were concerned about this frontier, but all Poles were.

The two Presidents then discussed the Gettysburg trip on Sunday and agreed to go alone with their interpreters.

After further cordial amenities General DeGaulle took his leave of the President.

Vernon A. Walters¹⁰

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters. The conversation was held in the President’s office at the White House.
1. A copy of the paper, “United States Strategic Force,” dated March 21, which listed the component parts of the U.S. strategic capability, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1631.
2. A copy of the undated paper, “Our Summit Purposes,” is printed in vol. IX, Document 133.
3. A copy of the undated paper, “Summit Procedures,” in which Eisenhower suggested that de Gaulle, as host for the summit meeting in Paris, should raise the question of procedures with Khrushchev, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1631.
4. See Document 151.
5. This April 21 memorandum expressed “deepest concern” by George A. Padmore, Liberian Ambassador, spokesman for nine African nations, to Satterthwaite about the continued atomic explosions in the Sahara as well as the Algerian conflict. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
6. In de Gaulle’s March 3 statement at Constantine, he said that the Algerian problem could not be settled for a long time and only after victory of French arms.
7. De Gaulle visited Algeria March 3–5 to explain his position to the French Army.
8. On March 13, 1959, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1349 (XIII) providing for the termination of the trusteeship agreement for the French Cameroons on January 1, 1960. On December 5, 1959, it adopted Resolution 1416 (XIV) approving April 27, 1960, as the date for French Togoland’s independence. Both of these territories became republics on those respective dates.
9. Khrushchev made a State visit to France for talks with de Gaulle March 23–April 2.
10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.