136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0

2107. Following for immediate delivery is text of letter from President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Advise date and time delivery.

“September 11, 1959.

Dear Harold: My talks with General de Gaulle went very well, I believe. The discussions were completely friendly and open, and it seemed to me that each succeeded in putting across to the other exactly what we had in mind, although the time available was so short that I was obliged to leave one or two items to be covered in a written communication to him.

As anticipated, the question of Algeria, and of U.S. support for France on this issue, was uppermost in his mind. I made it clear that we wanted to support our French friends and hoped they would take a course which would make this possible. His thought is that when the rebellion is over, Algeria will be able to make its choice as to whether to remain completely French, to have a certain degree of autonomy, or to have complete independence. He will make a public statement on this within the next few days, and seemed confident that it will be one both you and I could support.

We discussed very frankly the difficulties that are ahead in the United Nations. The French do not wish to discuss Algeria in the UN, holding that this is an internal affair. We pointed out that someone should speak for France and make a good presentation of what France has done for Algeria in the economic, social and other spheres. If this is done early there will be time to round up other delegations. We are hopeful that his public statement will give the basis we need.

It is clear that he has given a great deal of thought and attention to the problems in Africa, believing that the countries there should sooner [Page 278] or later be able to decide their own future. He said that France has started this process within the French Community, with members deciding of their own free will whether to work in common with France on matters of defense, foreign affairs and economic activity. He noted that Guinea alone has chosen to be independent, but still wants, and is receiving, French help. He expressed a great deal of concern over the threat of communism in the area, and the efforts of the Soviet bloc to “buy” their way into various countries through extending aid to them. (Incidentally, he said flatly that Sekou Toure is a Communist.)

We discussed my suggestions regarding aid to underdeveloped countries primarily.1 Of course he, again, is concerned most with the French Community. I believe he will agree that it is vital for the Western countries to work together.

Our discussions regarding tri-partite consultations were relatively brief, ending in clear agreement on the idea of conferring informally among ourselves regarding matters that lie beyond NATO. I mentioned that ad hoc staff committees could be established, but that I thought it unwise to establish institutions of a formal or permanent character and he agreed.

He expressed himself as heartily in favor of the North Atlantic alliance, which he felt should be maintained and developed. He raised several questions, all well known, in a very restrained fashion. He questioned the integration of forces as taking from the people a sense of responsibility for their defense, and losing the impetus of patriotism. On this I simply pointed out the necessity of integrated control for effective military operations in the present era, and some of the difficulties that would be inescapable in a coalition of purely national forces—not only for effective combat, but also in failing to provide a basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Europe. Both with him, and in my brief remarks at NATO and SHAPE, I stressed the need to develop a dedication to Western ideas, extending beyond the traditional national patriotism of the past.2

He seemed to be satisfied with our discussion regarding the decision to use atomic weapons. I made the point, as we had discussed at [Page 279] Chequers,3 that unless the situation were one of surprise attack, with bombers overhead, we would of course never unleash the use of nuclear weapons without consulting our principal allies. With respect to atomic weapons, General de Gaulle said that France will continue to develop its own. I explained the difficulties deriving from our legislation to him, and he seemed quite aware of them. He did not press for more liberal action on our part, and said he is not asking for anything in this regard.

Finally, with respect to German questions and the visit of Khrushchev and a possible summit meeting, I found a close identity of views. On Berlin we reached complete agreement to remain entirely firm on the principle of not abandoning Berlin but to examine with flexibility such changes as might be possible in the present arrangements. He showed no concern regarding the Khrushchev visit—but no optimism either. He did not think a summit meeting would be helpful unless some constructive result might be anticipated. He felt that some advance assurance of this is essential.

All in all, I believe the visit and the discussions were of real value in demonstrating that we are joined in common purposes. Incidentally, I think General de Gaulle was highly pleased that the ceremonies he had arranged succeeded in showing me such courtesy and so warm a welcome. I was encouraged to find him confident, cooperative, and clearly in command of the affairs of his government.

Thanks very much for the character sketch of Mr. Khrushchev that you sent and for your ideas as to the line I might take in discussions with him.4 I am grateful for all the help I can get.

With warm regards,

As ever, Ike.”

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/9–1159. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted by President Eisenhower.
  2. See Document 133.
  3. For text of Eisenhower’s remarks to the NAC on September 3, see Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1959, p. 412. Regarding his conversation with Spaak and Luns on September 3, see Part 1, Document 222. A copy of the September 3 news release summarizing his remarks at SHAPE is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1457.
  4. See Documents 366 and 367.
  5. Reference is to Macmillan’s September 5 letter to Eisenhower. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)