Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

128. Memorandum of Discussion at the 417th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

August 18, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. U.S. Policy on France (NSC 5721/1; OCB Report on NSC 5721/1, dated April 22, 1959; NSC Action No. 2087; [document number not declassified]; NSC 5910; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 13 and 17, 1959)¹

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the draft U.S. Policy on France (NSC 5910). (Copy of the briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting; another is attached to this memorandum.)² He first took up the split on Algeria, pointing out that the JCS—OCDM position boils down to throwing our weight behind France, while the Majority propose that we work with both sides and third parties.

The President inquired as to what was meant by supporting France. Did it mean that we would support France in the UN? Mr. Gray said that he didn’t think the JCS and OCDM meant that we would give a blank check to de Gaulle. Rather, whereas we now pursued a middle-of-the-road policy, they propose that we support De Gaulle in every way we can where to do so would not run counter to our basic objectives. They propose that we “get off the dime” and take a more positive role even though this might mean immediate adverse impact upon our relations with other countries. Specifically, he believed that JCS took the view that, if De Gaulle makes any reasonable approach to the problem in the UN, we would support him. He called on Mr. Hoegh for further comment on the point.

Mr. Hoegh said that present policy had not worked. We want the French to be relieved of the heavy burden imposed upon them by the Algerian conflict. We would like to see them relieved of the cost of maintaining 16 divisions in Algeria. If De Gaulle were given direct encouragement, he felt the issue in Algeria might be resolved.

The President responded by saying that this would be the trick of the week if we could do it. How could we say that we support the French and still not damage our interests? The whole of our history, the President stated, is anti-colonial, and the French action in Algeria is interpreted by the rest of the world as militant colonialism. To support the French would run counter to everything we have done in the past. Three or four years ago, the President said, he had had Ambassador Lodge get up in the UN to free the United States of any colonial taint by saying that Puerto Rico could have its independence if its people indicated that they wished independence. To stand up with the colonial powers would be to cut ourselves from our own moorings; it was an adventurous idea. With the French already forced to give independence to Tunisia and Morocco, they have no justification for withholding it from Algeria. Their only excuse was that Algeria was more advanced than Tunisia and Morocco—but this was the result of action by the French themselves. For the French to say that they can give up Tunisia and Morocco but not Algeria may appear to be very logical to them, but where would it put us if we were to support them in this view?

Mr. Hoegh said that he hadn’t intended to say that Algeria wouldn’t achieve independence. All that OCDM had intended was that De Gaulle should be encouraged to get the issue settled. The President responded by stating that if we favored independence, that position would certainly be interpreted by De Gaulle as opposition rather than support.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that we have already said that we support French efforts directed toward an equitable solution in Algeria. The President said that that was correct and that we could not support de Gaulle. The President added that a solution “in consonance with U.S. interests” meant that we should avoid the charge that we were one of the colonial powers. Because we are the most powerful country in the world, we are already considered a supporter of colonialism, and we had great difficulty disabusing the countries like India of this impression.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that under the JCS split in paragraph 46³ we would also not object to the use by the French of MAP equipment in Algeria so long as only conventional weapons were involved. The Secretary felt that the reaction of other countries to such a position would be terrible.

The President pointed out that when Tunisia wanted arms we had been worried that if we gave her arms, it would cause terrific trouble with France. We can’t allow ourselves to be put in the position of giving France a blackmail power over our relations with independent nations. The President said he didn’t want to discourage honest opinions, but it would take a lot of argument to convince him to approve a policy such as that proposed by the JCS and OCDM.

Secretary Dillon said that a real problem was that we didn’t know the French position on Algeria; we were not even sure they had a real position. We were therefore being asked to support a position which was unknown to us. He suggested that the key place in which this issue would arise was the United Nations, and suggested that Ambassador Lodge give his views on the problem.

Ambassador Lodge stated that the question would arise in acute form in the General Assembly this fall. It had been discussed now for four years and the discussion became more tense each year. The issue had become a symbol in the Arab countries and in the Muslim world as a whole. If we identified ourselves one hundred percent with the French, it would weaken our standing in Muslim countries—in Libya and also in countries farther away from Algeria, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. He pointed out that our popularity in such countries bears upon our ability to maintain military activities and installations in those countries. He didn’t believe that we could hope to stay in such countries whether the people wanted us there or not. In the case of the Suez affair, the President had taken a very strong position on just such an issue. To change our policy on Algeria would have a bad effect even in the Scandinavian countries. He said there were rumors in the UN at present that a resolution would be put forward by Morocco, asking us to get out of our bases in Morocco. Our policy in the UN on Algeria should, he believed, be as follows: If the French abstained, the United States should also abstain as it has in the past; if, on the other hand, the French participate in the vote, we should judge the proposed resolution on its merits. He also believed that we should work against any resolution that would make trouble. The French wanted a bad one, but the Algerians were too clever to accommodate them. The Algerians and their supporters would probably propose a resolution which was identical to the one voted upon last year.⁴ Since we had abstained last year, it would be very difficult for us to do anything but abstain this year. He believed that subparagraph (2) of the Majority position offered the only promise—the only ray of light. We should give no blank check, no rubber stamp. We should tell the French that we believe in a strong France, but that the strength of France will not be helped by making its name a bad word all over the Muslim world. He said that he spoke as a strong advocate of Franco-American solidarity.

Secretary Dillon said that it was a fundamental feeling in the State Department that the Algerian issue could not be treated separately. State did not believe that we could go along with France on this issue and hope in this way to get them to go along with us on some of the other issues. These issues had to be treated as a package, and we should give France help everywhere that we can. But giving support to France on Algeria may sacrifice more important U.S. interests than supporting her on other matters. The Secretary felt that one of the most important things that could be done was for the President, in his conversations with General de Gaulle, to give De Gaulle a feeling of participation in world councils. The President agreed with this view.

Mr. Gray asked whether the views Secretary Dillon had just expressed weren’t best reflected in the third alternative in the paper. In response the Secretary said that he could see little difference between the first and third alternatives. Present policy includes doing what we can on Algeria. He felt that alternative one was written somewhat harshly. Mr. Gray explained that perhaps the reason for this was that the Planning Board was trying to get an exposition of the different points of view. He added that he was sure that acceptable language could be worked out on this question. Secretary Dillon said that Mr. Gray’s last remark bore upon a basic element in State’s thinking about the paper. State didn’t think the Council should attempt to finalize the paper until after the President’s talks with General de Gaulle. Mr. Gray agreed.

The President suggested that the situation here was somewhat like the situation in Berlin, where the Soviets were attempting by their actions to force us into concessions. Similarly, de Gaulle, in an effort to get us to support his views, had refused to accept nuclear weapons without French control of them and had withdrawn French naval forces from NATO control. But we were not going to be blackmailed, the President said, by De Gaulle or anyone else. On the other hand, he could understand why military men could take the position that NATO was more important than Algeria and thus support a position of the sort the JCS was supporting in this paper. But you had to take account of all of the effects of your actions, and on this issue we had to continue to take a somewhat cagey position.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that De Gaulle was attempting to come up with something new on Algeria; he had asked the French Cabinet to present its views, and was also making a trip to North Africa. Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that on Algeria De Gaulle was more liberal than the French Cabinet.

Mr. Gray then turned to the military aid question, referring first to the discussion of this question in paragraph 16 and describing the split in paragraph 17⁵ of the General Considerations. He pointed out that one of the major issues was the use of MAP equipment in Algeria. Mr. Gray said that if the positions on this issue were overstated he was responsible. He had attempted to force this issue to the surface because, he felt, we had a policy which was more honored in the breach than in the observance.

Secretary Dillon stated that it had been our consistent policy to oppose the use of MAP equipment in Algeria; we have told the French this a number of times. Since the war in Algeria had become a hot one within the last three or four years, we have not provided the French with equipment under our military assistance program which would be useful in Algeria. Earlier we had provided them some things—for example, ammunition and jeeps—which could be used and have been used in Algeria. However, the matériel we had provided as military assistance was all mixed up with surplus equipment and other matériel that the French had bought from us; the MAP component was therefore difficult to distinguish. The Secretary didn’t believe that, because the French have used in Algeria equipment we have supplied, we should stop giving equipment which is not useful to them in Algeria. On the other hand, to make the change proposed by the Joint Chiefs would have catastrophic results. Everyone knows that we have made an effort to prevent the use of our mat[riel in Algeria, and they realize that we can’t fully control its use.

The President responded by agreeing with Secretary Dillon that we can’t always know what use is made of our equipment, but he was against giving the French equipment for use in Algeria. We should make it clear that we are giving assistance for defense against the Communist menace. Every place in the world our military assistance was for this purpose—either for defense against Communist aggression or for defense against internal subversion. In the whole field of economic help, however, we have had a narrower view than we should have. The real menace here was the one and a half billion hungry people in the world. We haven’t been sufficiently alert in meeting this problem. But in the field of military assistance we should continue our present policy of giving aid for defense against Communism.

Mr. Gray then turned to the split in the second sentence of paragraph 46, with respect to providing conventional equipment to France on a reimbursable basis “so far as practicable”. The President thought that the United States had stopped providing conventional equipment to France on a grant basis. Mr. Gray responded that there was no clear-cut policy. Mr. Stans pointed out that it was indicated, on page 42 of the Financial Appendix,⁶ that no grant military assistance was contemplated for conventional equipment. Mr. Gray stated that State and JCS wished some future flexibility in this matter, whereas the Majority wished a flat prohibition against grant aid for conventional equipment.

Secretary Dillon said that he felt it was important to put as much military assistance as we can on a reimbursable basis for balance of payments reasons. He didn’t, however, see any difference in this respect between conventional equipment and advanced weapons. In fact, in the long run, we might be better able to sell advanced weapons than conventional equipment. If the Algerian war ended and the French divisions in Algeria were so run down that re-equipping them with conventional equipment in any reasonable time was beyond French capacity, we might decide that grant assistance for conventional weapons was more in accordance with U.S. interests than grant aid for advanced weapons. He was willing, he said, to put in strong language to indicate that, to the maximum possible extent, military aid of all kinds should be on a reimbursable basis.

The President agreed that, in view of the recent doleful report by Secretary Anderson on the U.S. balance of payments situation, it would be sensible to put all aid on a reimbursable basis. The reserves of many countries were rising, while ours were falling. We should get Europe to pay for its own military equipment and should take the six U.S. divisions out. We had made a deal with the British, in connection with the installation of IRBMs in Britain, that the British would bear certain of the costs. He felt we were in a hazy position on this whole matter.

Secretary Anderson suggested that the problem was that we were getting into a bad position. Everyone agrees to the principle involved, but there was disagreement on how to get started implementing it. Secretary Anderson said that it was not clear from footnote a on page 37 of the Financial Appendix, how much of the aid listed on the military assistance line represented grant assistance.

The President asked what the $111 million figure for FY 1959 represented. Did it cover infra-structure and logistic lines? Mr. Irwin responded that it was not for infra-structure but for modern weapons and equipment. The President asked whether we weren’t closing out all modern weapons in view of the French refusal to permit storing of nuclear warheads in France under U.S. custody. Mr. Irwin pointed out that we were providing advanced weapons to French forces in Germany. He noted that General Norstad had raised the question of whether we should go ahead with advanced weapons for France unless the French agreed that such weapons would remain in Germany or that they would be turned back to the United States when French units were rotated from Germany.

Secretary Dillon also noted that the table on page 37 covered deliveries and expenditures, and that it therefore included assistance programmed in prior years. The President said that if this assistance included modern equipment, and modern equipment was what the French had thrown out of France, we ought to stop providing this assistance.

Secretary Anderson called the Council’s attention to the last paragraph on page 43 of the Financial Appendix, dealing with the undelivered balance of grant military assistance and programs for FY 1959–62. Secretary Dillon suggested that not too much emphasis should be placed upon the forecasts included in the Financial Appendix; these forecasts have been made up without consideration of the way we were now thinking.

Secretary Anderson said that we must some time reconsider assistance to France in the light of growing French financial reserves. Secretary Dillon said that he was willing to put assistance now on a reimbursable basis, but he was worried about limiting ourselves to such a basis for the next four to five years. Secretary Anderson suggested that if a change was necessary the policy could be reviewed. Secretary Dillon noted that this would involve coming back to the NSC.

Mr. Gray then pointed out that infra-structure and the costs of NATO headquarters were not included in the military assistance figures in the Financial Appendix. These figures assumed that there wouldn’t be any grant assistance for conventional equipment. The military figures therefore covered only advanced weapons, training, packing, etc. The Financial Appendix, accordingly, reflected the Majority view and did not reflect any possible decision to give grant assistance.

The President suggested that the Secretary of the Treasury should tell us which countries appear to be in good financial condition. Except where we had made commitments, no more grant assistance should be given to such countries. We would of course have to continue grant aid to countries like Iran and Turkey. We should have a general policy on military assistance to the effect that if a country can afford to do so, it should purchase its military equipment. If we provided equipment that was not first-line equipment (e.g., T–47 tanks), it could be sold at a reduced price.

Mr. Irwin noted that we are not giving grant aid to Germany or Britain. We have provided France both conventional equipment and advanced weapons on a grant basis. The question was whether we should continue to provide both types of assistance on a grant basis. If we don’t give them advanced weapons on such a basis, the French won’t meet their MC–70 goals.⁷

The President said that if we have committed ourselves in NATO— if our word was pledged—we couldn’t renege. Mr. Irwin stated that we were not pledged in the sense that the President suggested. The President nonetheless indicated that he felt we might have made an implicit commitment. Mr. Irwin pointed out that Defense was with the majority on this question.

Secretary McElroy suggested that MC–70 goals weren’t going to be met in any event, and that if the French failed to meet their MC–70 goals because of their refusal to buy equipment, this would only mean that another part of those goals would not be met. He felt the United States had to take a strong position on this matter.

The President returned to his suggestion that we should provide grant assistance of all types only to those countries which can’t afford to buy military equipment. On the other hand, we should put the proposed qualifications about grant aid for conventional equipment in the French paper if we thought the French could not afford to buy such equipment.

Secretary Dillon said that State was prepared to agree to a suggestion of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the effect that “except in unusual circumstances” aid should be on a reimbursable basis. The President agreed to this approach within the context of a general directive along the lines that he had suggested.

Secretary McElroy suggested that one reason for the French reluctance to purchase equipment was the fact that the French were allergic to taxes; it was, in other words, not just a foreign exchange problem in the case of France.

Mr. Gray next referred to the Treasury–Budget proposal in the last sentence of paragraph 46. Mr. Stans immediately withdrew the proposal.

Mr. Gray went on to direct the Council’s attention to the split in paragraph 42–a, on nuclear cooperation with France. He summarized paragraph 24 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1),⁸ and described the split between JCS and the Majority.

The President inquired as to the legal situation. He thought that under the law we could provide help to a country only when it has demonstrated a nuclear capability. Were we talking about a change in the law? Mr. Gray said that under the JCS position such a change was clearly contemplated, and might be necessary under either proposal.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that legislation was to be sought under paragraph 24 of the Basic Policy. He argued that we could not ignore the legislative situation. In his opinion the chances were zero that we could get legislation through Congress providing for bilateral assistance to the French. We shouldn’t lead De Gaulle to believe that we would be able to do so. Probably the only way that we could get Congressional approval would be through a multilateral approach. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President suggested that it was as if we had been fighting wars with bows and arrows and then acquired pistols. Then we refused to give pistols to the people who were our allies even though the common enemy already had them. We got into the strangest inconsistencies under free governments. He felt the Joint Congressional committee was singularly unenlightened. The President thought that we ought to try very hard for a multilateral approach, and inquired whether new legislation would be necessary in that case. Mr. McCone said that legislation would be required. Secretary McElroy said that if a multilateral approach involved establishing an “authority”, legislation would be required.

Ambassador Lodge suggested that as a former Congressman he was impressed by the way the President had put the matter; he thought that such an argument would be very effective with Congress.

The President said we don’t expect a war between the NATO countries. To deny them modern weapons was silly as could be. He thought he should have a very good memorandum prior to his talks with General de Gaulle on what the authority of NATO should be in this area. Secretary Dillon said that that was State’s suggestion.

The President concluded this discussion by saying he thought that he would make a great farewell speech in which he would discuss what we do to ourselves in the name of defending ourselves.

The National Security Council: ⁹

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5910; in light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memoranda of August 13 and 17, 1959.

b. Tentatively adopted the following amendments in NSC 5910:

(1) Page 29, paragraph 41 : Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto.

(2) Page 30, paragraph 41–a: Include the Majority version and delete the JCS version.

(3) Page 30–A, paragraph 41–c: Delete the bracketed language and the footnote thereto.

(4) Page 31, paragraph 41–c–(1),–(2) and –(3): Include the Majority version and delete the JCS–OCDM version.

(5) Page 33, paragraph 46, first sentence: Include the Majority version and delete the JCS version.

(6) Page 33, paragraph 46: Delete the second and third sentences and substitute the following therefor: “In the absence of unusual circumstances, conventional equipment and advanced weapons and training should be made available to France on a reimbursable basis.”

(7) Page 33, paragraph 46: Delete the last sentence and the footnote thereto.

c. Referred NSC 5910 to the NSC Planning Board for review and revision in the light of the discussion at the meeting and of the President’s forthcoming meeting with President de Gaulle.

d. Noted the directive by the President that a briefing memorandum on the development of NATO arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons, would be prepared by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for his talks with President de Gaulle.

Note: The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate action.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Robert H. Johnson

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson, Director of the Planning Board Secretariat, on August 26.
1. For text of NSC 5721/1, “U.S. Policy on France,” October 19, 1957, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXVII, pp. 181–200. A copy of the OCB report is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 340, France. A copy of NSC Action No. 2087 is ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. [text not declassified] NSC 5910, “U.S. Policy on France,” August 3, 1959, and the August 13 and 17 memoranda are ibid., OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, France.
2. Not printed.

3. Paragraph 46 of NSC 5910 reads:

   “In the light of the availability of U.S. resources and over-all demands upon them, continue to furnish France military assistance for the purpose of assisting France to fulfill the missions of its U.S.-approved military forces for NATO, so long as we are assured that such assistance will be used only in support of approved NATO military operations. In the absence of unusual circumstances, conventional equipment and advanced weapons and training should be made available to France on a reimbursable basis, except for commitments already made.”

   A footnote in the text after the words “advanced weapons” in the last sentence reads: “As used in conjunction with the Military Assistance Program, the phrase ‘advanced weapons’ is defined as missile weapons systems, with or without nuclear delivery capabilities, and such other weapons systems as possess nuclear delivery capabilities.”

4. Reference is to the defeat on December 13 of a U.N. General Assembly resolution, introduced by 17 Asian and African nations, which purported to recognize the right of the Algerian people to independence and urged negotiations between France and the provisional government of Algeria. The vote was 32 to 18 with the United States and 29 other countries abstaining.
5. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of NSC 5910 are the same as paragraphs 19 and 20, respectively, of NSC 5910/1, Document 145.
6. Not printed.
7. MC–70, “Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958–1963,” was prepared by the Military Committee of NATO in early 1958 as guidance and a yardstick of progress in the 1958 and successive Annual Reviews. See Part 1, Document 131.
8. NSC 5906/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” authorized flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability, for U.S. forces in opposing local aggression. Approved by the President on August 5, it is scheduled for publication in volume III.
9. Paragraphs a-d and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2120, approved by the President on August 21. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)