11. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State0
5458. One must be braced for the unexpected in present situation characterized as it is by censorship, psychological warfare by interested parties, and unclear relationships between Paris and Algiers, not to speak of tension in Tunisia. Nevertheless in our best judgment situation may remain unclear and outwardly little changed over next days.
Period will be in one sense preliminary test of strength between Pflimlin Government and Algiers pro-De Gaulle regime. Former will strive solidify its position in metropolitan France, and maintain facade of unity within army and Paris-Algiers collaboration. Pflimlin will depend on party support represented by present Assembly majority (which so far includes Communists), counting on help from trade unions, Catholic Church and absence passionate clamor for De Gaulle in country.
On other hand Algiers regime plus Gaullists in France will continue exploit drama of reported new-found Moslem-French affinity in Algeria, effect on public mind of sudden lift of army prestige and morale, and more fully nurtured propagation of idea that return De Gaulle is inevitable.
It is difficult assess the strength and prospects of these forces at work. Public apathy toward De Gaulle can operate for or against him [Page 17] depending on circumstances. Diminuendo in public manifestations in Algeria of Moslem love for France or revelations of its lack of spontaneity could of course affect strength of those working for army and de Gaulle.
If Pflimlin holds firm and is able push through quickly constitutional reform, position his government will be strengthened.
It is doubtful Pflimlin can count on same majority for reform as he received for special powers. Pinay, Duchet and company seem to have become Gaullists and will work more actively against government. Necessity two-thirds majority in Assembly or three-fifths majority in both houses if referendum to be avoided, makes Communist position even more important. Our preliminary estimate is that Communists, anxious to maintain their present line of respectability, support of Republic, and Popular Front-directed parallel action with Socialists, will vote for government. Fact that vote on constitutional reform may be considered as last chance block De Gaulle should help Pflimlin.
In conclusion we believe as of now that Pflimlin still has chance consolidate his position and tend agree with De Serigny1 that “time working for Pflimlin Government” (Algiers 429 to Department).2 However, if this true, compulsion on part Algiers military act to change situation becomes greater. Action could take place Tunisia, Algiers or in France. Aim would be to return De Gaulle to power. If no action by military does take place de Gaulle’s return becomes postponed but by no means eliminated as eventuality at later date.