Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

62. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Dr. Hallstein’s Views on European Integration Problems and British and French Attitudes

PARTICIPANTS

• Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community
• Dean Brown—Office of Western European Affairs
• Russell Fessenden, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs

In the course of a dinner conversation, Dr. Hallstein made the following points of interest on the European Economic Community and related problems of European integration.

1. The British position towards the Common Market will be resolved when someone emerges on the scene in the U.K. who fully accepts the reality of the Common Market. Dr. Hallstein likened the situation to his negotiations with the French on the Saar. He had tried unsuccessfully for some time to negotiate a Saar settlement with the French Government, but was unsuccessful because he could find no one prepared to accept the basic fact that the Saar was in reality completely German-oriented. When Maurice Faure became responsible for the problem on the French side, Dr. Hallstein began his discussions with him by simply saying “Are you prepared to accept the fact that the Saar will be completely integrated into Germany within a year?” Faure was a little taken aback by this initially, but after some reflection, said that he was prepared to accept this. Dr. Hallstein then said, “Good. We will be able to reach a settlement.” What is now needed on the British scene is a “Maurice Faure” prepared to accept the reality of the Common Market. Dr. Hallstein said that he did not now see anyone in England prepared for this, but he was hopeful that someone would emerge. As soon as that happens it should be much easier to resolve the problems of relationships between the Common Market and the U.K. and other European countries.

2. Dr. Hallstein was relaxed about the prospects about the Outer Seven forming a unit comparable to the Common Market. The Common Market countries form a natural unit, and it was difficult enough for them to get together. The Outer Seven countries, on the other hand, by no means form a natural unit. Denmark for example, is really on the fence between the Outer Seven and the Common Market. For Austria the problem is basically political. If the political problem of Austrian neutrality did not exist, Austria would join the Common Market readily.

3. Although unwilling to make any predictions, Dr. Hallstein clearly felt optimistic that the Common Market’s transitional period would be speeded up. He cited a comment Chancellor Adenauer had made during hearings on the Common Market Treaty in Germany.¹ Adenauer had said that the 12–15 year transitional period was not particularly important. If the treaty is a success, the transitional period is likely to be much less; if it is a failure, many more than 15 years will not be enough. Signs now point very clearly to the Common Market being a success, especially because the business communities in the Six countries have not only fully accepted the Common Market but are moving at a much faster rate than the governments to adjust to the Common Market. As this process continues, it is quite possible that there will be strong pressure from private groups of both business and labor to speed up the transitional period and bring about the Common Market in a much shorter time than in ten years.

4. Dr. Hallstein said that he had recently talked to Premier Debre. He had found Debre to be just as strongly opposed as he expected to the supra-national concept. He had told Debre, in effect, that he was not greatly concerned about these conceptual aspects. All that mattered to him was that the actions required by the Common Market Treaty be adhered to.

5. In answer to a question, Dr. Hallstein said that very little progress had been made with the African Development Fund of the EEC. In his talk with Debre he had told the latter to drop his suspicions of the Fund and to permit EEC officials to visit various Community areas. He told Debre that the Fund had been wrung out of the Germans and should be used. Debre, he thought, may have been somewhat impressed, but not much, at his statements that the aim of EEC is to help France in Africa, not to supplant it.

6. Dr. Hallstein said that he had also talked with De Gaulle some time ago. De Gaulle had also put much emphasis on the fact that the concept should be one of international cooperation, organization, not of a supra-national unit. Dr. Hallstein said that he had deliberately avoided debating this conceptual difference with De Gaulle. Again, all that mattered was that the treaty be adhered to. Dr. Hallstein said that he was not discouraged about De Gaulle’s attitude, for he felt that the Franco-German rapprochement was very basic to De Gaulle’s thinking. He said that the meetings between Adenauer and De Gaulle had built up an invaluable relationship. De Gaulle’s comments, especially at the recent Bad Kreuznach meeting,² had been very reassuring indeed. Even as skeptical a person as the Chancellor was completely reassured by the categoric nature of De Gaulle’s assurances.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.00/6–1359. Confidential. Drafted by Fessenden.
1. June and July 1957.
2. November 26, 1958; see footnote 1, Document 40.