Mr. Spierenburg’s comments on recent events are
influenced by the fact that he has been a particularly ardent supporter
of the original Schuman–Monnet
concepts of integration, a view which he shared with many fellow Dutch
nationals—and that he has been an active and forceful member of a High
Authority whose membership has been relatively weak and passive over the
past year. In addition, as noted above, he is commenting in the
immediate aftermath of the High Authority’s defeat.
High Authority views and actions subsequent to this conversation have
been reported in Colux 232 and Colux 233.2 Most recently (over the past weekend) the High
Authority has consulted in Luxembourg with Mr. Jean Monnet3 on the course of action and posture which it
should adopt in the future, particularly in relation to the governments
and the Council of Ministers. According to High Authority officials,
Monnet urged the High
Authority to pursue an active policy of tackling the issues and of
taking the leadership in relations to the governments and the Council.
He advised the High Authority to make better and greater use of
publicity to generate support for its views. At the same time, and in
line with Mr. Spierenburg’s position he thought it
inadvisable for the High Authority to launch a political attack on the
governments and the Council as a countermeasure to the rejection of the
High Authority’s plan for dealing with the coal crisis. With regard to
the prolonged delay
[Page 115]
in
renewing the membership of the High Authority, he did not consider this
necessarily a disadvantage, since the governments might be able to act
in a more European spirit and make better appointments at a later
period, particularly after the German elections.
It may be expected that Mr. Monnet’s views, as in the past, will carry great weight with
the High Authority.
Enclosure4
Luxembourg,
May 19,
1959.
Memorandum of Conversation
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Spierenburg, Vice-President of the
High Authority
- Mr. Boochever, U.S. Mission
SUBJECT
- Situation of the High Authority following the Council of
Minister’s rejection of its “manifest crisis” proposals
Referring to the widespread public comment on the recent decision by
the Council of Ministers in Strasbourg and the interest of the
United States generally in the progress and prospects of the High
Authority I inquired concerning the official reaction of the High
Authority to the Council’s action and any personal views that Mr.
Spierenburg might have. In reply and in the
course of the subsequent conversation, he made the following
principal points:
1. The High Authority has taken no official position as yet, apart
from the proposals to the Council in Strasbourg concerning special
measures to deal with the Belgian situation.5 The members would be
discussing on the following day the Council action and its
implications. Mr. Spierenburg believed that it
would be necessary to make a report
[Page 116]
promptly to the relevant Assembly Committee
outlining what had taken place. Apart from that, the main tasks of
the High Authority for the near future were (a) to deal with the
Belgian problem and particularly to get the Belgians to carry out
the necessary and over-due structural reform of their coal industry;
and (b), to contribute effectively to a coordinated energy policy
for the Community in fulfillment of the High Authority’s mandate
from the governments.
For the rest, Mr. Spierenburg’s remarks
reflected his personal views about the situation.
2. While he regarded the Council’s rejection of the High Authority
proposals as a serious matter, he saw “no reason why the High
Authority should convert it into a tragic drama.” The Ministers were
clearly within their rights under the Treaty in rejecting the
proposals, but the disturbing aspect was the reasons and motivations
underlying this action. He referred particularly to the
unwillingness of the French to have the High Authority act in
accordance with the Treaty provisions requiring it to limit
production by enterprises rather than by country. In advocating a
system of country quotas Mr. Jeanneney was, in
his view, running counter to the provisions of the Treaty.
3. Mr. Spierenburg was not sure how seriously
the future work of the High Authority would be affected by what had
happened but considered that the attitude revealed by the French
government in the coal question did not bode well. He said there had
been those in the High Authority (particularly Messrs.
Daum and Reynaud) who
believed that, in dealing with the new French government, the main
problem was to familiarize the new people in power, such as Mr.
Jeanneney, with the basic concepts of the
Treaty and of the Community and that the process of “education”
would change the initial unsympathetic attitude. He considered that
this view was now completely bankrupt and had never been valid
because it was not a question of individuals, their level of
information about the Community or their good will, but rather
something more fundamental and basic in the attitude of the French
government, of which the position on Community issues was merely a
manifestation.
He thought that Monnet was also
excessively optimistic about the prospects for a change in the
current French attitude towards European integration, particularly
the prospect of De Gaulle’s
more benevolent views mitigating the open hostility of Debré to the integration
concept.6
[Page 117]
Mr. Spierenburg fears that the position adopted
by the French government in the rejection of the High Authority’s
“manifest crisis” proposals will strengthen the hand of the French
bureaucracy in opposing the High Authority on other matters and make
the day-to-day operations of the High Authority more difficult. He
noted that the French bureaucracy had never been particularly
sympathetic to the Community or cooperative.
4. The outlook for the High Authority would be clearer after a period
of perhaps six months and by the end of the year it should be easier
to say in which direction events were moving. In general, he had the
feeling that the integration movement was checked or in recess for
the time being and that nothing would be likely to change this trend
for the next two years or so. He referred particularly in this
regard to the French emphasis on a Franco-German axis as the
dominant note of France’s relations with the Continent, which in his
view runs counter to any emphasis on building or developing further
the integration concept. Mr. Spierenburg
believes that the French are seriously misguided in preferring a
Franco-German alliance to a development of strong European
Communities and does not think that the French “flirtation” with
Germany will last more than a year or two. He saw little to be
gained from a counterattack by the High Authority since he did not
believe that this would significantly influence the French
government. Consequently, for example, he was inclined to have the
High Authority make a factual report to an Assembly Committee and
then leave to the Assembly how it wished to proceed.
5. When asked about Monnet’s
recommendations calling for joint action by Euratom, the Common
Market and the High Authority to prepare recommendations on
long-term energy policy, Mr. Spierenburg said
he was puzzled concerning the objective of this maneuver. He could
not explain how Monnet’s ideas
differed from the present mandate to the High Authority to develop
such recommendations which was being carried out within the
framework of the “Mixed Committee” with participation of
representatives from Euratom and the Common Market. He hinted that
members of the Common Market and Euratom Commissions might have
prompted Monnet on this
recommendation since in his view both of the Commissions would
welcome such an assignment from the Ministers.
6. It was regrettable that the High Authority proposals came before
the Council at a time when the German government was facing
elections since no one in the government was willing to risk
antagonizing German industry in these circumstances. Mr.
Spierenburg did not seem to consider that
there had been any fundamental change in the German government’s
attitude towards European integration, although the Erhard faction
favoring intergovernmental “cooperation” had in his
[Page 118]
view acquired a stronger position and
German industry was making its views more strongly felt in resisting
any outside influence.
7. A hopeful element for third countries in the Council’s action is
the precedent established with regard to import restrictions. Both
the High Authority and the Council rejected the idea advanced in
some quarters of introducing quantitative restrictions on imports,
under Treaty Article 74, paragraph 3, without introducing
restrictions on Community production under Article 58 of the
Treaty.
8. Mr. Spierenburg said that his own tentative
thinking was running in the direction of an eventual merger of the
energy work of the three Communities in a new institutional
framework. He felt that this might hold some promise since the
French had already made suggestions for coordinating the energy work
of the three Communities and since it was a logical step to link the
various sources of energy under one set of institutions. This might
be a way, moreover, in which to enlist De Gaulle’s influence in a positive fashion in the
integration movement. While something might be lost in this process
from the point of view of the powers now incorporated in the ECSC
Treaty, it was not clear how far the French or others would go in
trying to weaken the present Treaty powers once they become faced
with the specific problems and consequences that this would
entail.
