47. Editorial Note
On January 23, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would introduce customs duties on import of U.S. coal in excess of a duty-free limit effective February 16. The German action was in response to a continuing surplus of domestic coal production. Secretary of State Dulles discussed German coal restrictions with Chancellor Adenauer during Dulles’ February 4–8 visit to Europe. This discussion took place on the road to Wahn Airport near Bonn:
“I spoke about the coal situation pointing out that it was a matter of great concern to us and might have an impact on German-American relations. [Page 96] I said it would involve largely increased unemployment of the coal areas of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, etc. The Chancellor said he had problems too in the Ruhr. He said that a German representative had gone to Washington on Wednesday for further conversations, and he had thought the matter was in fairly good shape. He said that his representative had talked to John L. Lewis, who had expressed himself as reasonably satisfied. I said this is quite different from the impression we had received of LEWIS’ views, and I hoped that something could be done to compromise the situation and at least not act hastily.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1200)
In spite of U.S. protests, the German import restrictions went into effect on February 16. On February 18, the High Authority of the ECSC, which had initially resisted German actions, recommended that a “Manifest Crisis” be declared under the terms of the Coal and Steel Treaty to meet the surplus of coal and the critical situation in the Belgian coal industry. Belgian coal fields were economically unproductive and had been kept in operation through ECSC subsidies which were scheduled to end in February forcing the Government of Belgium to shoulder the full burden for continuing subsidies.