35. Letter From J. Robert Schaetzel of the Office of the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Disarmament to the Representative at the European Coal and Steel Community (Butterworth)0
Dear Walt: We have now reached the end of the Euratom hearings1 road and while the memory is fresh I though it useful to set down a few of the more vivid impressions of the events of the last two and a half weeks. This informal account will supplement the telegrams and other material sent you.
The curious and frustrating aspect of the hearings is that most of our difficulties were not related directly to the Program but to other considerations. First, we were late in getting the program up to the Committee. This lateness was in large part due to the internal squabble over the safeguards issue (which in turn was largely unrelated to the Euratom Program) and to complete the irony was the subject of profound uninterest to the Committee. Second, by the greatest ill-luck we managed to have the Euratom Program before the Committee at the very time when they were infuriated by the treatment given by the Administration to the unanimous recommendations of the Joint Committee with respect to the domestic nuclear power program. Third, there were the factors of the exceedingly bad relations which presently exist between the Joint Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission.
The latter point is so important that it deserves a further word or two. As you well know the Program which was put before the Congress [Page 65] was in certain ways a miracle of staff work, both American and European. The Program outlined in more detail, I think, than any of us would have expected to be possible, the nature of the Program and how it should be put together. But the Committee is so distrustful of the AEC that they are unwilling to accept the Program as the best that could be prepared in the time available and looked upon it with suspicion and construed general references as an attempt to hide the details from them.
On the part of Senator Anderson particularly this suspicion of Administrative motives and intentions spilled over to Euratom and he expressed continual doubt as to the Community’s financial integrity and its political responsibility and in a sense left the impression that he viewed the entire entity as a potential deadbeat. The important point, however, is that these allusions to Euratom were distinctly secondary to the suspicion of the AEC and the Administration. The amended enabling legislation reflects this and the difficulties which this legislation create will be for the US in administering the Program and not in posing new problems for the Europeans.
We all came away with one conclusion: It is indispensable that an atmosphere of mutual respect and confidence be rebuilt between the Joint Committee and the Administration. Initially, this is something which the AEC must do with the Joint Committee, but it also will involve a special effort on the part of the Administration as a whole in its relations with both the Committee and the Congress. To meet the doubts expressed regarding the nature and durability of Euratom itself USEC will have to make a special effort to report fully on all aspects of Euratom’s development, both with respect to the Joint Program and its other activities. These reports should be in a form that will allow them to be transmitted regularly to the Joint Committee for its information. The visit of members of the Committee to Brussels in September and the Armand visit to Washington in mid-October should be helpful in this connection.2
You will find that the hearings, the Committee Report and the legislation have the net effect of Congressional support of the Joint Program as it was worked out in Luxembourg. But the enabling legislation and the legislative history that has been created will enable members of the Joint Committee to state that they have not irrevocably committed themselves to this Program and that continued Congressional support of it will be dependent upon further information on progress made under the Program. This legislative history is particularly important in view of [Page 66] the lack of confidence now existing which I mentioned above. This is not to say that I expect Congress to renege on the Program but rather to suggest that if we are to move quickly and smoothly ahead with it this will only be accomplished if we handle skillfully our relations with the Joint Committee.
One of the disappointing aspects of the hearings was the almost total lack of interest by the Committee in the political overtones or the political potential of this Program despite the fact that they are professional politicians. Their nerves were dead in terms of transferring their political experience to the problems which Euratom has as a new institution, fighting for its life against national states. The Committee, while accepting our assertions, appeared to care little about the contribution the Program promises to make to the cause of European integration. There was no interest whatsoever shown in the French nuclear weapons program, the relationship of the Euratom Program to it or where the Germans may eventually go into this field. In some side discussions, not recorded in the hearings, the consensus of the Committee seemed to be that if they were in the shoes of the French they too would be pushing ahead with nuclear weapons development.
I do not know what can be done to kindle some further interest in the political aspect of the Program. One thing which should be done, in my view, would be to involve the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees more directly in the matter than has been the case so far.
One other warning emerges from the hearings and that is that the Euratom Commissioners in their contacts with members of the Joint Committee both in Brussels and the United States, must be prepared for detailed questions on the technical and economic aspects of the Joint Program, as well as the Community’s other activities. A broad-brush political response to questions will at best bore the Committee and at worst confirm the suspicions of certain members that there is really no substance to Euratom. Obviously one way of preparing Euratom for this situation would be for them to read the hearings. This suggestion is not without its element of danger, of course, for as Max Kohnstamm said, portions of this record are sufficient cause for a declaration of war by Euratom on the United States.
In anticipation of favorable Congressional action literally hours before adjournment I can only say that my personal reaction is that we have the substance of victory with none of the flavor of victory. This reaction is probably because I have been too close to it and perhaps I do not fully accept yet the inherent price one pays for the democratic process. Certainly favorable Congressional action on a complicated program of this magnitude at such a late date in the Congressional year, given the existing relations between the Executive and the Congress, is a remarkable achievement. In no small part this is due to Jack Floberg’s masterful [Page 67] testimony. He was skillfully supported by Mr. Dillon—at no small sacrifice given the other crises which were upon his shoulders during those weeks.
Now all we have to do is organize the Program and get those damn reactors built.3
Yours sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, EUR/RPE Files: Lot 70 D 351, Congressional. Confidential.↩
- The hearings began on July 22 and concluded on August 13.↩
- No documentation concerning the visit of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to Brussels has been found in Department of State files. Armand’s visit to Washington in mid-October was cancelled.↩
- In Senate Concurrent Resolution 116, August 20, Congress gave full approval to the International Agreement between the United States and EURATOM and to the bill enabling the United States to begin detailed planning with EURATOM on the implementation of the joint program. For text of the concurrent resolution, see 72 Stat. B22.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩