Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

316. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

May 9, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Foulkes
• Major Eisenhower

General Foulkes said he was making a call to say goodbye after a long association. He said he was retiring after 35 years of service, 15 of which were in the capacity of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff of Canada. He protests certain attitudes and actions on the part of the Canadian government but this fact has nothing to do with his retirement. Actually, his difference in views with the Canadian government stems mostly from what he considers excessive confidence on their part in disarmament and a feeling on their part that too much money is being spent on defense.¹ He expressed chagrin over the visit of Field Marshal Montgomery to Canada last month in which this officer did more harm than General Foulkes thought possible. Montgomery had stated that NATO has now become useless, that there is no longer a need for Canadian and U.S. troops to remain in Europe, that the French should command NATO, and that defense budgets of current magnitude are no longer necessary. The Finance Minister, of course, made use of Montgomery’s statements in a hurry.

The President observed that Montgomery, when a senior commander in NATO, had “raised hell” when any talk had arisen regarding cuts in his forces. General Foulkes recalled the statement by Montgomery that an American and a Canadian must be shot on the first day of any war, even if he had to do it himself.

In response to the President’s question, General Foulkes said the Canadian defense budget comprises 9% of the country’s GNP. This comes to $1.5 billion, which is 30% of the entire federal budget. This figure used to be higher, but Diefenbaker was recently elected on the basis of an economy drive and the budget has been balanced for the first time this year. General Foulkes pointed out the Canadian problem in defense. Canada has no hostile borders. Therefore, air defense constitutes its major activity. When it is no longer possible to defend against a manned bomber, it becomes hard to say what Canada should do. The President said that Canada should be more concerned over attack by manned bombers than should the U.S. This threat, moreover, should not be belittled by anybody. It is most important that Canada and the U.S. act as solid partners and both make some sacrifices. Dropping out of the partnership on the part of Canada could eventually make the U.S. turn isolationist. He said when Diefenbaker is here on the 3rd of June he will try to persuade him to place the facts of life before the people. Diefenbaker should jam the hard realities down the throats of his people since he commands an almost terrifying majority. General Foulkes expressed concern over neutralist talks in Canada and mentioned a correspondent here in Washington by the name of Minifie who has contributed to this. He said the cooperation between the military services of the two countries is very fine indeed. He feels that the difficulty in Canada is not with the people but with the government. He referred to the cancellation last year of Exercise Sky Hawk by the Canadians on the basis that we might offend the Russians. (Here the President humorously interjected that we have already offended the Russians, obviously referring to the current furor over the downing of our U–2 aircraft.)²

General Foulkes said that Mr. Green is the greatest proponent of disarmament in Canada. He was instrumental in the cancellation of Sky Hawk. Green further insists we will never use the atomic bomb first. This downgrades the effectiveness of the deterrent.

The President said that our five people on the Western side who are working on disarmament positions are making pretty good progress. He expressed hope that if the military services of the two countries stay together, the politicos may eventually have to conform. He cited the condition in the U.S. after World War II where the politicos dictated a reduction of forces to such extent that Korea had to be evacuated, resulting in conflict in that area. He said the Russians will never attack if we are strong enough. This fact is obvious: we ourselves did not attack in Europe in World War II until we were convinced we had the strength to win. If we allow our strength to dwindle, they can make us surrender without a fight. The President emphasized that only strength can cooperate, weakness can merely beg. If the spirit of the people is broken, however, there is nothing left. He plans to tell Diefenbaker that his great hope in disarmament is first to get some arms to disarm with.

General Foulkes said Mr. Green considers the atomic weapon “immoral” and supports the French on the idea of nuclear disarmament before conventional. This the General feels would be disastrous because the deterrent is the only thing which has saved us thus far. He thought we might start with some form of conventional disarmament. The President agreed that disarmament should be progressive. He recognized we cannot check on bombs which are already made. General Foulkes said we cannot turn the clock back. All we can do is to abolish force as an instrument of policy.

The President said he felt the U.S. Congress to be in error on the subject of dissemination of atomic information and weapons to reliable allies. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He cited history regarding the time when Congress thought, in spite of the advice of the military, that we would be the only ones to possess the atomic weapon.

General Foulkes expressed concern over a visit by General Heusinger next week.³ General Heusinger has previously expressed the view that he needs conventional forces sufficient to fight the Russians for two or three days without atomic support. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The President disagreed with Foulkes mildly in that he would like to see the Germans take on far more obligations than a mere 12 divisions. He then suggested that General Foulkes appoint himself as a one-man mission upon retirement to show the Canadian people the military and political implications of the course their government is following. General Foulkes agreed.

In answer to the President’s question, General Foulkes described his successor, Air Marshal Miller, as a man who will be able to do a good job. He has previously been a Deputy to Norstad in NATO. He recognized that Miller lacks the service and prestige of himself, but feels he will do well.

The two then reminisced about their first acquaintance in 1944 when General Foulkes commanded the Second Canadian Division in Europe. Later, General Foulkes had been acquainted with General Lemnitzer in Italy. The President expressed admiration for General Lemnitzer, who he expects to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He recalled the terrible wrench on his own part when he submitted his resignation from the Army to Congress on July 10, 1952.

General Foulkes then mentioned the embarrassment that the cutback in BOMARCs had caused the Canadians since they had committed themselves so wholeheartedly to this weapon.⁴ The President said that Canada needs primarily Minuteman and Polaris to increase their deterrent power. He realizes that they should not discount air defense activities entirely. General Foulkes said that Canada has real estate and railways to contribute to the free world defense.

At the close, the President directed me to investigate the end result of a proposed cutback in BOMARCs.⁵ He acknowledged that financial considerations require us to make a stern accounting for each weapon before we accept it for production.

John S. D. Eisenhower⁶

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Canada. Confidential Drafted by Goodpaster.
1. In a May 6 memorandum for the President, Dillon briefed Eisenhower on Foulkes’ visit and stated that he might confide that he was resigning in protest against Canada’s national and joint defense attitudes. (Ibid.)
2. A U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane (U–2) was shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1.
3. No documentation on Heusinger’s visit to Washington has been found in Department of State files.
4. On April 29, the House Appropriations Committee reduced the Bomarc B budget proposal and deleted all procurement funds not already committed to the program.
5. On May 11, Major Eisenhower wrote to General George S. Brown asking for a brief study on the impact of the cutback. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project Clean Up, Canada) Brown transmitted the study, which concluded that a serious gap would result in U.S. air defenses if the program were canceled, on May 26. (Ibid.)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.