Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

285. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

PVC/MC–12

Ottawa, July 10, 1958, 10:20 a.m.

PRESIDENT’s VISIT TO CANADA

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, July 8–11, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Merchant
• Canada
  • The Prime Minister
  • Mr. Sidney Smith
  • External Affairs Under Secretary Jules Leger

SUBJECTS

• 1. China
  • a) Trade
  • b) Recognition
• 2. Joint Cabinet Defense Committee
• 3. Columbia River
• 4. ALCAN Highway Paving

The Prime Minister opened the meeting by referring to the universal Canadian press interpretation of the President’s speech¹ as meaning that the United States did not intend to amend its tariff and trade policies to meet Canada’s problems. He said also that certain sentences in the President’s speech were going to be taken out of context by the opposition. He said that he himself did not share the view generally expressed by the press and thought the speech frank and friendly.

At this point Mr. Smith said that whereas he had not discussed the matter in recent days with the Prime Minister, he would like to reopen the question of Communist China both in terms of trade and recognition. He said that he considered the President’s address admirable and brilliant but that he did feel the press interpretation placed on it as described by the Prime Minister was going to increase pressure in Canada to turn to China as a market for their exports in the absence of an opening up of the US market. He went on to say that many Canadians felt diplomatic recognition essential preliminary to a favorable trade opportunity. Moreover that during his own election campaign he had been queried at almost every meeting as to Canada’s policy toward Communist China. Both the President and the Secretary reacted with vigor to this presentation, detailing the US position.

The Prime Minister had not supported Mr. Smith up to this point. He then said he would like to revert to the Ford export case. He asked if the granting of a license would require Congressional action and if the consultation between the two governments on the Ford case for example would require weeks. The Secretary said that whereas each case would have to be considered in consultation on its own merits, he felt sure that in a case like the Ford export matter a US Treasury license could be issued in twenty-four hours or forty–eight hours. The Prime Minister expressed surprise and gratification. He then asked if some other word than license could be used. The Secretary explained the trading with the enemy act and the fact that the word license was legally correct. He said however that what it amounted to was granting an exception and that we and the Canadians could use that term. Again the Prime Minister indicated pleasure.

The discussion then swung back to the general question of recognition and the Prime Minister explained that the matter was under reexamination and that in fact the strong position he had taken on non-recognition in the House last November had brought him under heavy attack during the last election campaign. The President noted that it was his understanding that the Prime Minister had won 208 out of 265 seats in the election. The Prime Minister then called for Hansard and read in extenso his November speech on this subject.² The President and the Secretary applauded the position he had taken at that time and the reasons he had adduced. The President described frankly the consequences which he felt would flow from diplomatic recognition of Peking by Canada and the damage that he felt would be thereby done to United States-Canadian relations. (Following the meeting the Secretary remarked that it would be well for the Department to prepare a reasoned résumé of its position on recognition in the form of an aide-mémoire or note to the Canadian Government.) The discussion then turned to the question of the proposed joint cabinet defense committee and with one or two minor changes the draft submitted by us was approved. (It was subsequently issued to the press.)³

The President then raised the question of the development of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin. He said that he felt the time had come for the Prime Minister and himself to tell their people concerned with the problem that a solution should be promptly agreed. He said this had dragged on far too long and he assured the Prime Minister that the United States was prepared to make reasonable concessions in the interest of reasonable agreement. He mentioned that General McNaughton in his public advocacy of diversion had seemed to reduce the chances of acceptable agreement being reached. He reminded the Prime Minister again of the length of time which had elapsed since this problem had first come under study and urged that both of them take action to move negotiations to a mutually satisfactory conclusion.

The Prime Minister then opened his briefing book and read part of his brief including a statement that no governmental decision had been reached on the diversion matter. He went on to say that he could assure the President that General McNaughton had not been authorized to speak for the government. As a matter of fact he said that he had not even talked to him since he had come into office. He said however that he would call him in and impress upon him the need of a prompt agreement.

The President then raised the question of the Neuburger bill on the paving of the ALCAN Highway.⁴ He indicated that he thought the general purpose of a sharing of cost on improving the road had merit but that while he had not seen the text of the bill itself he understood that it contained certain detailed conditions and criteria which the Canadians might find unacceptable.

Surprisingly the Prime Minister and Sidney Smith then reverted to the question of recognition of Communist China and were met by the repetition of our views. They appeared to gain a clearer insight into the cogency of our reasons and the depth of conviction on which our policy is based.

The meeting ended at about 11:40.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Prepared by Merchant. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s Office in the Parliament Building.
1. Prior to the meeting on the morning of July 9 (see Document 283), President Eisenhower laid a wreath at the Canadian War Memorial and addressed a joint session of the Canadian Parliament. For text of his address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 529–537.
2. Diefenbaker spoke before the House of Commons on November 1, 1957.
3. In telegram 34 from Ottawa, July 7, Merchant cabled the text of a draft Canadian proposal for a joint ministerial defense committee. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1043) The following day, the Department replied that the joint committee was politically useful in view of the Canadian interest. (Tosec 3 to Ottawa; ibid.) The U.S. Delegation prepared its own draft of the agreement (ibid., CF 1048), which is the one under reference here. For text of the statement on the joint defense committee as released to the press following this meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1958, pp. 208–209. The texts of the notes formally establishing the Canadian-U.S. Committee on Joint Defense, exchanged at Ottawa August 29 and September 2, 1958, are in Department of State, Central Files, 742.5/9–458, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 471–473.
4. On July 2, Senator Neuberger and five other Senators had introduced a bill appropriating $11 million for resurfacing and improving the ALCAN Highway, subject to a similar Canadian appropriation.