227. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 0
Polto 833. For Ambassador Burgess. Following is letter to Secretary from Spaak, handed to us today:
Verbatim Text.
Dear Mr. Herter: I shall see you in Washington next week. As I have many things to tell you, I wish to set forth to you in writing certain of the problems that I should like to take up with you, in order that you may have an opportunity to think about them.
I. Coordination between the NATO meeting and the Conference of the Four.
I have received your letter1 and have found your arguments pertinent. I shall therefore propose to the Council that no changes be made in the dates originally fixed, with the understanding that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will agree to make a report to the Permanent Council on the result of the Four-Party talks.
This appears to me to be essential. I am convinced that that report will not give rise to any difficult discussion, but that, on the contrary, the unity of NATO will be strengthened by this series of meetings.
I can foresee serious difficulties if this report were not given, or even if it were postponed.2 A feeling of uneasiness prevails among the allies other than the big powers. They believe they are not consulted sufficiently. They would be keenly disappointed if advantage were not taken of the facilities afforded by their presence in Paris to inform them fully.
If the procedure I advocate were not followed, the conviction that a political directorate is in process of being formed would take shape, and such a belief would, in my opinion, be the beginning of a serious crisis within the (North) Atlantic Organization.
[Page 502]And so it is actually a decision of principle that must be taken. In view of the oft-repeated affirmations by United States leaders on the importance of NATO, I am certain that the possible error I have pointed out will not be committed.
It appears from my trip to London and Bonn that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Von Brentano are prepared to attend a meeting of the Permanent Council after the conclusion of the meeting of the Four.3
II. Political consultations within NATO.
Whereas in 1958 and the first months of 1959, the situation with respect to political consultation was constantly improving, it is evident that there has been a serious set-back during the past few months. Several important decisions have been adopted without any actual discussion in the Permanent Council. This is the cause of the uneasiness and irritation I have pointed out. There must be serious effort to correct this situation. I consider that a good position concerning the two December meetings would constitute a good beginning, but I think more must be done. In my opinion, discussion about certain problems concerning territories not covered by the Washington Treaty4 should be systematized. I am thinking of Africa and the Middle East in particular.
It is no longer possible to isolate European problems from those arising elsewhere. NATO must be adapted to the new forms of the Communist threat.
For several countries their interests in Africa or the Middle East are of vital importance. These countries tend to neglect NATO to the extent that the Organization proves to be incapable of giving them the aid they expect.
It must be admitted also that there is some basis for the argument that calls for establishing strategy on a world-wide basis. This need could be at least partially satisfied, if, within committees, limited in number, created in the organization, the political, economic, and military (problems?)5 of Africa and the Middle East could be thoroughly discussed in order to coordinate the individual positions.
Naturally, the general principles of consultation as recommended by the “three wise men” would continue to govern.6
[Page 503]This seems to me to be a point of capital importance for the future.
III. Economic problems.
In my opinion, if the present discernible evolution of international policy continues, economic problems will take precedence.
It is primarily in the economic sphere that the Communist challenge will have to be accepted. Mr. Khrushchev leaves us no doubt regarding this.
I make no secret of the fact that although I am sincerely happy to see the danger of war fade, I am nevertheless disturbed to note that the West is not at all prepared for its new tasks.
It seems to me that the time is at hand when the United States ought to take a strong initiative in this regard.
The United States saved the free world with the Marshall Plan and NATO. Twice it has found the exact answer to the Communist menace as this presented itself.
The miracle must be repeated a third time.
The economic problems are many and they are interrelated: Relations between the Six and the Seven; economic and commercial relations between the United States and Europe; American aid; coordinated policy with respect to certain underdeveloped countries.
All this is a subject in which I confess I am far from being an expert, but I feel that it is in this sphere that action must be taken, and taken quickly and spectacularly. As the danger of war becomes apparently less imminent, it will be necessary, in order to maintain cohesion among the free nations, to give them new objectives in addition to those of their common defense.
The authors of the Treaty of Washington understood this perfectly. This explains Article 2 of the Treaty.7 Now that the possibility that was foreseen is materializing, a joint course of action must be mapped out.
Only the United States can take such an initiative. I can assure you that it would be very well received in Europe, where the best minds are keenly aware of the problems before us and await only bold leadership.
Accept, sir, the assurances of my highest and most devoted consideration. Signed P. H. Spaak.
End Verbatim Text.
[Page 504]We are puzzled by what Spaak may have in mind under paragraph III. Will try to find out and report.8
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–1059. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official Translation. Transmitted in two sections.↩
- Herter’s November 5 letter to Spaak conveyed the Secretary’s concern about the difficulties in arranging the schedule for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in relation to the December 19 meeting of the Heads of Government. (Topol 819 to Paris, November 5; ibid., 396.1–PA/11–559)↩
- Apparently the sentence ends here, although there is no punctuation at this point in the French text. (Translator’s note.) [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Spaak visited the United Kingdom and Ireland November 2–5 and Bonn November 6. Spaak refers here to a proposed report by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany to the NAC immediately following the Heads of Government meeting in Paris scheduled for mid-December.↩
- I.e., the North Atlantic Treaty.↩
- Translator’s note: One or more words are missing from the French text at this point. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- See footnote 4, Document 139.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 139.↩
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Polto 850 from Paris, November 13, reported that in private conversation the previous day Spaak did not present any detailed plan regarding paragraph III, but emphasized that the West did not have adequate coordinating machinery in the new era of “peaceful coexistence” to compete with Communist penetration of emerging independent states outside the NATO area. Spaak did not think the United States would need to shoulder a larger proportionate share of the costs of any long-range NATO plan but felt that U.S. imagination and leadership in developing such a plan were indispensable. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–1359)
In a November 12 letter transmitted in Topol 869 to Paris, November 12, Herter thanked Spaak for his letter and suggested that Spaak should be prepared to discuss his views on the NATO defense effort during his visit to Washington. (ibid., 740.5/11–1059)
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