203. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 0
3385. I delivered President’s letter to General De Gaulle at seven this evening.1 He read it through quickly and courteously thanked me for it but made no further comment.
In accordance Merchant–Houghton telecon 2 I informed him that I had been told a second letter would be forthcoming soon.3 He acknowledged this also without comment.
At this point I remarked that I had only returned from Africa the middle of last week and found myself in some confusion as to whether [Page 437] undated letter regarding withdrawal of French Mediterranean fleet from NATO was a fait accompli or rather a declaration of intention (see Embtel 3360).4 After brief hesitation he replied that it would be a fait accompli in the event of war. He proceeded to say that France had to look after its African interests and that inasmuch as this not a NATO responsibility France had to assume that responsibility herself.
Finally he is of the opinion that he outlined this move to Secretary Dulles and under the impression that Secretary appeared sympathetic and somewhat in accord.
In this connection, Lyon’s informal notes of February 6 conversations with De Gaulle read as follows:
Secretary: “The French Ambassador raised recently with me the status of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean. We are quite prepared to see a review of that situation, both as to the French forces and our own. However, it is a highly technical matter and should be carried out in NATO. Our own position is, however, that we look on such a review with sympathy.”
Debre: “It is not merely a technical question, and a political aspect could evolve therefrom which is linked with the transportation for French forces in the Mediterranean. Algeria is such a part of France’s domain and the Algerian problem means so much to us that it is a fundamental political question. The French Mediterranean fleet is so linked up with France’s vital interests that we cannot share it without sharing our problem. We are either backed up in our policy or must keep separate.”
At this point De Gaulle calmed down Debre and said that the matter was of great importance for “our Algerian policy, and as we do not have a common policy for North Africa and as NATO doesn’t cover North Africa we have a problem to discuss at Washington. If there is war the French fleet will of course rush to NATO and become a part of NATO forces.” Thereupon the Secretary replied: “We see the force of what you say. However, disengagement of the French fleet in the Mediterranean would affect contractual arrangements.”5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–1659. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.↩
- Eisenhower’s March 14 letter to De Gaulle is printed in volume VIII, Document 223.↩
- According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Merchant on March 16, Houghton called him that morning to tell him that he had not yet delivered Eisenhower’s letter to De Gaulle because of no mention therein of the French fleet withdrawal. Merchant told Houghton that a second letter would be sent exclusively on that subject. After talking with Herter, Merchant called Houghton back and authorized him to inform De Gaulle of a forthcoming letter on the fleet question. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/3–1659)↩
- See Document 204.↩
- Telegram 3360 from Paris, March 16, reported that Joxe told Houghton the previous day that the omission of a date in the French note on the fleet question was significant, and that this French note was not an ultimatum but a declaration of intent, about which details for implementation would follow. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/3–1659)↩
- For Dulles’ brief summary of this February 6 conversation, see Part 2, Document 95.↩