201. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- French Fleet
PARTICIPANTS
- M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
- M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
- Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER
Ambassador Alphand had requested an appointment with Mr. Murphy to discuss Germany. After a few remarks on this subject he switched to the French fleet action.
He said he had discussed this subject with the Secretary several weeks ago.1 The French fleet does not have a new status as the result of the recent action. The situation in peace-time is not affected; an agreement could be reached on war-time cooperation. What the French have done is not against the spirit of the alliance. France has taken this action only because of its special national interests on the borders of the Mediterranean. [Page 429] Recently, the Acting Secretary in a discussion of the French action had referred to the tripartite talks [7 lines of source text not declassified].
Mr. Merchant replied that it is not ready for initialing.
Mr. Murphy asked about the NATO status of the French fleet action. Mr. Merchant said it would go to the Council today and be referred to the military committee for discussion.
Mr. Murphy asked what was the rationale of the French move. He understood the national interests of the French, but did not understand why they do not seek to achieve these within the NATO framework. This was a particularly awkward moment to bring this subject forward, and the public reaction was to be greatly feared.
Ambassador Alphand suggested that there had been a leak from somewhere.
Mr. Murphy replied it was vain to hope that the matter could be kept from leaking. It is bound to become public. We dread the day when the news becomes public. He then reverted to the question, what is the purpose of the French move?
The Ambassador said it is related to the special responsibilities of the French in Algeria. U.S. policy in Algeria is not the same as the French. France needs the fleet as a first priority to protect the lines of communication between France and Algeria. This does not mean that the fleet cannot cooperate with NATO. France is ready to make arrangements.
Mr. Murphy said it is obvious that U.S. policy is not the same as France’s, vis-à-vis Algeria. Algeria is a French problem. The U.S. is happy to stay out of it. Through the years the U.S. has voted with France in the U.N. (Alphand interrupted to say, except once.)2 Mr. Murphy then went on to say that the U.S. has leaned over backwards in the hope that France would work out the problem. We hoped that General De Gaulle would seize and settle the question. We would be glad if France would find a solution. We have the impression that General De Gaulle is angry with the U.S. as concerns Algeria.
The Ambassador replied that this was a wrong conception. French problems are different, and the French need these ships.
Mr. Murphy asked why association in NATO should block the use of these naval units for this purpose.
The Ambassador said if they are under NATO command the French would have to have NATO authority to use them.
Mr. Murphy said the question of the use of the fleet in war-time is serious. General Norstad had said that we could be reasonable and perhaps [Page 430] give the French fleet a status similar to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. But, in time of war the U.S. fleet is at the disposition of NATO. The French are taking their fleet away. This is a serious blow to the alliance.
The Ambassador said the total tonnage involved was only 40,000 tons. This would not, he said, change the efficiency of the alliance.
Mr. Murphy then asked, if this is so, what is the purpose of the change? Nobody has it in mind to prevent the free use of the French fleet if the French wish to use it.
[6 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified]
Mr. Merchant pointed out that we had an agreement on the carrier Belleau Wood. It had been loaned for a specific purpose—anti-submarine warfare, and it had been earmarked for NATO. This created a practical problem.
The Ambassador said we are ready to talk at any time about the problem raised by this carrier.
Mr. Murphy said that the French fleet action raised unnecessary problems. Suppose, he continued, we took our five Divisions out of Germany and earmarked them for use in the Far East, in the time of war, for example.
The Ambassador rejoined that the French action was based on the reasons given. The U.S., as well as the U.K., had forces under national command. He pointed out that what had been done did not affect anything outside of the Mediterranean. He asked what he was to say to Paris on the link.
Mr. Murphy said no decision has been made, that we were watching the evolution in NATO.
The Ambassador said that, if there was a leak to the press, the French would say that some units of the Mediterranean fleet only were affected, that the efficiency of the alliance was not affected, and that the action was taken because of the special responsibilities of France in North Africa.
Mr. Murphy replied that the French have had these responsibilities in North Africa for years. It would be very awkward to try to explain the reason for the French action. He pointed out that the contemplated action had never been mentioned in the tripartite talks.
The Ambassador said he had mentioned this matter several times but not in the tripartite talks.
Mr. Murphy said the matter should have been mentioned in the tripartite talks.
The Ambassador replied that everyone knew that General De Gaulle would make changes in NATO, not of a fundamental character. The present change shouldn’t be permitted to snowball.
[Page 431]Mr. Murphy said he did not understand the General’s philosophy about NATO.
Ambassador Alphand said the General wanted to have a strong alliance, but there had to be more of a concept of national responsibility. Soldiers had to be imbued with the idea that they were defending their own soil. It was not good to ask a man to fight exclusively defending others.
Mr. Murphy replied that one doesn’t strengthen forces by pulling them out. He suggested there could be a French command for the affected vessels. We were ready to discuss this, but the timing of the French action was very bad, citing the Berlin crisis.
Ambassador Alphand said he had mentioned this on January 22nd. The French action was not related to the Berlin crisis.
Mr. Merchant said that the Ambassador had only talked about a rearrangement of command and had said nothing about a change in the war-time earmark of the fleet.
The Ambassador said the U.S. has exaggerated the importance of the French action. If the U.S. stopped cooperating on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tripartite talks, he did not know where we would go. The U.S. was, in fact, stopping action which had been going on and he concluded that the U.S. had taken the decision to stop things, at least temporarily.
Mr. Murphy replied that we want to see where you are going.
[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Ambassador Alphand said the General has a lot of things in mind: the organization of theatres of operation for the whole world, decisions about the employment of nuclear force, and a reorganization of NATO. General De Gaulle is, however, closely allied with the Western position.
Mr. Merchant asked then whether the French fleet action was one step in a program. Ambassador Alphand said it was.
Mr. Murphy said that we should know what the complete pattern is, if it is intended to make basic changes in the nature of the alliance. He pointed out that the French fleet action would have repercussions on the other members of the alliance. The Belgians, for instance, had just reduced the period of conscription. He then asked whether the French were, in fact, stopping with the withdrawal of these 40,000 tons. The Ambassador replied that we should not construe the French action as something fundamental.
Mr. Murphy replied the other side will know how to construe the French action. The news will get out; people will talk. The prospect of keeping this secret once NATO knew about it was very small. The U.S. [Page 432] has not, however, taken any decision on the link question mentioned by the Ambassador.
The Ambassador said that the U.S. has decided to interrupt what has been going on. The French wanted a tripartite discussion of Africa and would have been ready on March 16 to cover the entire African problem. M. Lucet added that the French were drafting an agenda and that views have already been exchanged on it.
Mr. Merchant said we had not received any agenda, and Mr. Murphy invited the French to hand over their agenda. Mr. Merchant said, in any event, we wouldn’t be ready by the 16th. (There was then some discussion as to exactly what would be discussed; the Horn of Africa talk was mentioned, including the possible participation of Ethiopia and Italy.)
Mr. Murphy then said it is important not to unsettle the alliance, noting that alliances are always in a delicate state.
Ambassador Alphand said one must understand De Gaulle who does not oppose the alliance, but is a nationalist. If, he continued, the U.S. makes a link, he feared the worst. The General would be furious and there would be a chain reaction.
Mr. Murphy said that apart from the U.S. there was no question that other NATO members would react to what the French had done.
Ambassador Alphand intimated this was not important.
Mr. Merchant said that it wasn’t clear to him whether the French were making an announcement of something they had done or something they intend doing through the regular way in NATO.
Mr. Murphy said we were suspending judgment until we see how this matter shook down.
The Ambassador reiterated that the U.S. had taken a decision.
Mr. Merchant replied that our decision was only to examine what the French action means. He reverted to the Belleau Wood problem. We obviously don’t want to withdraw the carrier, but we were bound by law on this subject and might have to seek Congressional legislation.
Ambassador Alphand said the agreement contemplates special use of the carrier for other purposes. In any case, the French were ready to talk on this subject whenever the U.S. was ready.
Mr. Murphy said he was optimistic that the French fleet problem would be solved because we have to work it out.
The Ambassador said that if he cabled Paris on the present situation it would be psychologically terrible.
Mr. Murphy asked him to cable the facts, leaving out any suppositions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–1159. Secret. Drafted by Alfred G. Vigderman, Officer in Charge of German Affairs, and L. Dean Brown, and initialed by Merchant.↩
- Reference presumably is to Alphand’s conversation with Dulles on January 22; see Document 187.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 193.↩