Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

168. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 16, 1958, midnight.

Polto 1716. From USDel.

1. NATO Ministerial Meeting opened in secret plenary session at 10:15 a.m. December 16.¹ Foreign Minister Luns (Netherlands) in capacity as President of NAC delivered brief opening speech (summarized below). Council then went into secret restricted session to discuss Berlin as first topic under Item II of agenda (Review of International Situation). Morning’s discussion devoted entirely to Berlin, at conclusion of which drafting group set up to prepare draft NAC communiqué on Berlin. At end of morning session Council decided to meet at 3:00 p.m. to discuss agenda Item I (Spaak Report on Political Consultation),² and to take up draft communiqué on Berlin at 5:30 p.m. Berlin discussion at morning session will be reported in separate telegram.³

2. In opening plenary speech Luns spoke of important problems before NATO at this time. December meetings provide occasion for “examination of conscience”, principal touchstone in this respect being annual review, which must be considered in light of NAC decision accepting MC–70. Also, annual review results must be projected against background of evaluation of Soviet threat. Said that background documents prepared for this meeting confirm that Soviet menace still as great as year ago, when Russian scientific achievements prompted important decisions taken by NATO heads of government. Berlin issues illustrates Soviet threat in its most crude form. Soviet threat to Berlin is new effort in long series of attempts to impose disengagement, deatomization and demilitarization of central Europe and thus dissolve NATO’s defensive build-up in Europe. In reply to this challenge NAC must take clear firm stand.

3. Luns then briefly listed some of NATO’s accomplishments, mentioning first increased strength shield forces, and welcome progress in German build-up. Said practice political consultation has good progress to show. Termed Spaak’s report excellent and lucid. Added wished draw one consideration to Council’s attention: “Once a certain coordination has been reached, no change should be brought about without further consultation with all partners”. This particularly important in those cases where vital interests small powers are at stake. Spoke of some progress in NATO coordinated defense production (mentioning hope start Hawk production).⁴ Expressed regret that NATO has not made much headway on question of effective measures to counter Soviet economic offensive.

4. In conclusion, Luns said that long-lasting and unrelenting Soviet threat may lead to a certain indifference and fatigue in West, and a propensity to underestimate its gravity. Such a development could threaten our readiness to make indispensable sacrifices for keeping enemy at bay. NATO governments must impress upon their peoples true nature and magnitude of continuing Communist challenge in order convince peoples of necessity maintain and pursue NATO military effort.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1658. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and The Hague and pouched to the other NATO capitals and Moscow.
1. The verbatim (C–VR(58)60) and summary(C–R(58)60) records of this session, both dated December 16, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1168.
2. Not found.
3. Polto 1718, December 17, is printed in volume VIII, Document 112.
4. Early in 1958, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands accepted the U.S. proposal to use U.S. Government-owned property rights and to facilitate industrial contracts for the European manufacture of the Hawk, a U.S. Army surface-to-air missile system. The NAC in June 1959 created the NATO Hawk Production Organization, which administered and controlled the production program.