Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

159. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, October 9, 1958, 7 p.m.

777. Ref: Deptel 3587 to London rptd 729 Bonn.¹ I have just seen Von Eckardt² after departure Macmillan.³ He told me that talks had gone off very well and that atmosphere had been cordial. Von Eckardt raised subject De Gaulle memorandum⁴ and said Chancellor was greatly concerned lest matter leak to press. [7 lines of source text not declassified] Von Eckardt stressed importance coordination statements to be made Washington, London, Bonn, Rome in event leak to press. British Under Secretary State Information Ralph Murray arriving Bonn Friday connection forthcoming Heuss visit London⁵ and Von Eckardt plans discuss matter with him. Said that Chancellor planning send personal letter De Gaulle immediate future stressing and explaining his concern implications and consequences proposals. Macmillan told Chancellor he instructing Ambassador Jebb Paris suggest to De Gaulle he write another letter Spaak setting forth his ideas with regard extension area and scope NATO and omitting reference concept tripartite directorate. Macmillan felt this move might obviate necessity reply by British and ourselves to original letter, particularly with regard latter point which both acceptable [unacceptable] and explosive.

I feel Von Eckardt’s recommendation re coordination lines public statements in event press discussion well founded and would like suggest this be done soonest Washington. Although Von Eckardt did not mention French, consider equally important Paris be prepared make statement consistent with line followed by four other capitals.

Von Eckardt’s comments, which undoubtedly reflect Chancellor’s views, confirm importance we avoid reacting to De Gaulle memorandum in way which would lend credence to idea we prepared grant French special position comparable with that enjoyed by British. Even semblance justification such suspicion could cause grievous damage to German attitudes and relations with French and ourselves.

For this reason I believe we should avoid substantial interim reply De Gaulle even along lines suggested by British, which might be taken by Germans imply our willingness discuss, in sense proposed by French, many problems raised by basic revision NATO. On other hand, I see danger allowing matter rest too long without some reaction by us, since Germans would tend suspect secret consultation behind their backs, and whole issue might be aired public press with unhappy consequences. Therefore, I support suggestion informal tripartite meeting Washington in fairly near future, as means opening De Gaulle’s eyes major problems and dangers inherent his proposal. From our viewpoint, condition success such meeting would be full confidential briefing Germans (as well as Italians)⁶ on discussions and that French be aware this.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–958. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Rome.
1. Telegram 3587 to London, October 8, summarized an informal discussion with British Embassy officials in Washington regarding De Gaulle’s memorandum on the reorganization of NATO. The discussion explored courses open to the United States and the United Kingdom but no commitments were made. (ibid., 740.5/10–858)
2. Felix Von Eckardt, Head of Press and Information Department, Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Macmillan visited Bonn October 8–9 for informal discussions with Adenauer on matters of common concern.
4. Part 2, Document 45.
5. Dr. Theodor Heuss, President of West Germany, visited the United Kingdom October 20–22, 1958.
6. See Part 2, Document 50.