Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

132. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State⁰

Paris, April 23, 1958, 8 p.m.

Polto 3392. Department pass Defense. NAC Meeting April 23, 1958—Item II—Minimum Essential Force Requirements (MC–70).

Chairman¹ asked Council to accept MC–70 recommendations.

Belgium could not approve until written reply received to Belgian question regarding inclusion certain national command minesweepers in MC–70 requirements.²SGRep said it would be very difficult include these vessels in force tabs but Cinchan will include them in guidance to Belgium and Netherlands and will take them into account during annual review. Belgium said would forward this to Brussels when written statement received.

Canada accepted recommendations, noting that all countries have some questions regarding country breakdowns. Denmark did not have final instructions but felt sure MC–70 would be accepted “in light statements made by Danish Defense Minister at Defense Conference”.³ France accepted MC–70 recommendations reminding Council of statement by French Defense Minister at Defense Conference that MC–70 accepted for planning purposes only and France could not commit itself at this stage to meeting requirements placed on her.⁴ Germany would not have final instructions until April 30. Noted that German acceptance would surely repeat reservations on MC–70 made by German Defense Minister during Defense Conference.⁵ Greece authorized accept MC–70 for planning purposes but specifically reserved right raise questions during annual review. Italy had not received final authorization accept MC–70 but felt it would likely be forthcoming. Luxembourg saw no difficulty in accepting document. Netherlands had same difficulty as Belgium and needed to await further instructions. Norway accepted MC–70 recommendations. Portugal did not have final authority but anticipated no difficulty accepting MC–70 recommendations. United Kingdom “happy” to accept MC–70 recommendations “in light Sandys’ statements at Defense Conference”.⁶ United States expressed regret NAC could not approve MC–70 recommendations today. Enormously important get this document accepted. United States prepared agree completely to MC–70 and expects to fulfill requirements as well plan ahead. Hoped this discussion could clear away doubts and differences so that at next meeting NAC could give formal ratification to what is done today.

[18 paragraphs (4-½ pages of source text) not declassified]

Burgess

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–2358. Secret. Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to Ankara and the NATO capitals.
1. Beginning in 1957, the Secretary General of NATO served as chairman of all NAC meetings. Secretary General of NATO was Paul-Henri Spaak.
2. At the Defense Ministers Conference April 15–17, Belgium endorsed MC–70 as a minimum force level but questioned the delegation of Belgian minesweepers by the Standing Group. Belgium asked for inclusion of a note that Belgium would maintain 42 minesweepers under national command which would perform NATO missions, and quoted the Netherlands as agreeing with this view. (Polto Circular 24 from Paris, April 16; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1658)
3. At the Defense Ministers Conference, Denmark reported it was reorganizing its defense structure to achieve a better balance between force goals and economy. It stated that it was unlikely to reach MC–70 goals, which were far in excess of reality and were not feasible from a political or economic viewpoint. These views are summarized in Polto Circular 24.
4. French views at the Defense Ministers Conference are summarized in Polto Circular 24.
5. German reservations at this conference included problems arising from the large numbers of missiles in Germany. Specifically, questions of land and technicians could not be attained without hindering the German buildup. Germany also felt that technical innovation required constant examination of the types of missiles deployed. These views are summarized in Polto Circular 24.
6. In addition to his queries at the Defense Ministers Conference concerning naval warfare, as summarized in Document 133, Duncan Sandys, British Minister of Defense, commented that it was difficult to determine just how strong the NATO shield should be. He added that the demands of NATO must not be allowed to restrict the buildup of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. He felt MC–70 would be “clearly exceedingly expensive,” and the Defense Ministers must distinguish between the essential minimum and the militarily desirable forces. His comments are summarized in Polto Circular 24.