123. Memorandum of Conversation0
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 19–24, 1960
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- Secretary Herter
- Theodore C. Achilles
- Foy D. Kohler
- France
- Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister
- Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
- Charles Lucet, French Foreign Ministry
SUBJECT
- French Initiative on European Organization
During his call on the Secretary today the French Foreign Minister said he wanted to explain the French initiative with respect to European organization1 which had been going on for the past couple of months. This had started, he said, with the meeting with Adenauer in July and [Page 299] consultations had been held since with the other members of the Common Market. The French initiative was now out in the open but on their side they had been careful to say nothing in public and little to other governments until consultations had been completed, for two reasons. First of all, they felt it important to avoid giving the impression that there was a Franco-German directorate within the Common Market. Secondly, they had felt it essential that they be in a position of having consulted all members of the Six before stating any public position.
Couve said that until now the Europe of the Six had been operating only on an economic basis. The general idea of the French initiative was related to the concept that the Common Market in fact signified or involved a concept of a “united Europe” in all fields, essentially in the political as well as the economic. Experience had shown that what was being done in the economic field could only be fully developed if there were some kind of political union of Western Europe. The question arose of the timing of the evolution. The French had felt that the time had now arrived to go ahead since it was already clear that there should be political support for the Common Market, especially in view of the change of international atmosphere since the unsuccessful Paris meetings in May and the prospects that tensions might continue for years. The French had thought that there should be a modest start now, to be followed by successive progressive steps in the future and into the new fields beyond the purely economic aspect. Basically this involved international policies, cultural and educational relations and coordination of some military problems. It was necessary to develop the habit among the Six governments of getting together and seeking agreement on positions to be taken through regular and systematic meetings of the heads of government and of ministers. The whole thing was pointed eventually toward, to use DeGaulle’s term, a “confederation”. Some administrative structure would be necessary—a secretariat which could prepare studies and the like. Also there was need for some kind of public discussions in an Assembly which would create a popular movement toward European unity. The proposed referendum or plebiscite was also related to this need.
Consequently, Couve said, the French had taken their initiative. Of course there were difficulties and some suspicions and a certain amount of amour propre. However, with some possible exception of the Dutch, he thought he could say that all five agreed that something should be done, especially in the political field. The principal problem connected with this movement was that of the role of the British. The French position was that the good and sensible, and probably the eventual, solution would be that the British should join fully. He recognized that this would create difficulties for the British. Thus the French wanted to leave the door open for the day when the British would decide that they indeed [Page 300] would belong to Europe, and they were accordingly being very careful not to give the British the impression that they were trying to exclude them; meanwhile they were seeking solutions to the economic problems involved in the relationship of the Common Market and the British. Of course, the French were also taking into account the interests of others, for example the U.S. It was in this light that they had strongly supported the development of the OECD. The trade problems were particularly important for the Dutch and the Belgians as concerns their trade relations with the British. However, in the last analysis the French think that there can be no real solution to the British problem unless the British really join the Common Market. In this there were differences of opinion among the Six, particularly again as concerns the Dutch.
The second problem connected with the European proposals arising with a number of countries, perhaps including the U.S., was the fear that there would be created an inner group inside NATO which would take positions agreed among themselves in advance. Frankly he felt this concern was unjustified. If Western Europe were strengthened, then NATO would surely be strengthened as well. If the Common Market in the economic field were good for all the Atlantic countries, then European unity in other fields would be good, too. As regards the military aspects and the fears that there would be a weakening of the NATO defense structure, he felt that this objection was also not a valid one. If, as he believed, the basic concept of the alliance was to bring the U.S. and Europe together for defense against the Soviets, there was surely room for the Western European countries to discuss particular problems among themselves, such as military schools, logistics and the mutual provision of military facilities. Couve interjected at this point that this was quite a separate question from the French ideas with respect to the reorganization of NATO2 which he would also be prepared to discuss at a convenient time.
The third preoccupation of some countries, Couve continued, was that the move should not weaken what had already been accomplished in the Common Market. The French, he said, entirely agreed with this and considered themselves perhaps the “most attached” among the Six to the Common Market concept. Indeed they wanted to strengthen the Common Market. The question of the Coal and Steel Community was a secondary one; some day CSC would be combined with the Common Market. As for EURATOM this was also a secondary question. The basic difficulty here was that EURATOM had been created on false premises; namely, that there would be a need for atomic energy as a fuel and that [Page 301] there would be a scarcity of fissionable materials. In the event, neither of these assumptions was justified.
Couve said that the French would now carry on with their discussions with their partners in the Common Market, particularly the Germans. The French would be visiting Bonn at the beginning of October and then later expected that there would be a meeting of the heads of government of the Six.
The Secretary thanked Couve for his presentation. He said that the U.S. had always supported the Common Market although it had been concerned that the CM should not develop in a protectionist or exclusive way. At the moment we were somewhat anxious about the difficulties with respect to agricultural products. Couve replied that the French had understood our views. He agreed that the agricultural problems were the most difficult currently. There then developed some general discussion with respect to the political role of the farmers in the more developed industrial nations. Couve commented that the situation was particularly difficult in Germany because the farmers were Catholics and strong supporters of the Christian Democrats while the industrial workers in the city tended to be Social Democratic. In reply to a question from Mr. Achilles, Couve said that the French had not yet discussed these developments and their views with the British as they had with us today. However, Deputy British Foreign Minister Heath was coming to Paris in the near future and they expected to have frank discussions with him at that time.3
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on September 22. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Astoria.↩
- See Document 120.↩
- In a September 17, 1959, letter to Eisenhower, De Gaulle demanded a reorganization of the NATO structure that would create a strategic directorate of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. For text, see Part 2, Document 45.↩
- October 10. Heath addressed the EEC Council of Ministers outlining British views on cooperation with the Common Market.↩