Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

114. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, April 8, 1960, 6 p.m.

4930. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Brussels for Embassy and USEC. Against background of recent events and developments Embassy believes useful to assess British thinking and position at present time regarding continent with particular reference to relations between Six and Seven.

Important to remember that British have not abandoned their basic objective of establishing a Europe-wide free trade area, although they have agreed not to emphasize it for time being. In assessing their statements re support for the common market, it should be recalled that such support has been in context of a wider free trade area.

Ministers have obviously not thought through fully all implications of developments on the Continent and UK position regarding European economic integration. Ministerial thinking has accordingly been dominated by traditional opposition to single large power unit on Continent. UK concern over disadvantages to British trade likely to follow from establishment of dynamic continental economic unit was basis for proposal for Europe-wide free trade area and subsequently for attempts to work out arrangement between Six and Seven. British also feel that benefits of large common market will make participants in Six generally more competitive with consequent adverse effects on British exports to third countries. British obviously concerned that such developments would adversely affect UK balance-of-payments position.

While UK Government policy does not in our view involve serious conscious effort to break up EEC there appears be some element of hope on part both Ministers and officials that unforeseen developments may be favorable to achievement UK long-term objective as indicated above. Incidentally there is some recognition at official level that formation EFTA and Prime Minister’s alleged statements in Washington¹ have had effect of solidifying Six and enhancing likelihood of acceptance of concept of acceleration.

Adverse UK reaction to acceleration proposal based in part on Minister’s interpretation of US attitudes from conversations in December and January² but founded basically on their conviction that acceleration proposal would make less likely achievement of Europe-wide free trade area. Looked at from political viewpoint, Ministers no doubt regard wider free trade area as reducing likelihood fully effective political integration resulting from EEC. Opposition to acceleration also based on belief that any delay in reaching point of no return in EEC would buy time for the UK during which chances for building “bridge” between Six and Seven would be improved.

In assessing attitude of British toward achievement of wider free trade area, it is of interest that more sophisticated officials consider common market essential element in establishment of Europe-wide free trade area. They contend that France could never be persuaded to accept free trade except in context of EEC, and that, in consequence, it is to British interest that common market succeed, providing free trade area is attainable.

There is no doubt that from political viewpoint, and to lesser extent economic viewpoint, formation of EEC presents difficult and unpalatable decisions to British Ministers. In such circumstances they would be understandably pleased if the problems did not exist.

Embassy believes foregoing helps explain in part statements by Macmillan (Embtel 4811)³ during Washington conversations with Secretary and Dillon. Another factor behind Prime Minister’s highly colored and emotional statements is his penchant for histrionics in dealing with his American ally. When Macmillan dealing with important matter on which US and UK views differ, he is inclined to employ device of calculated overstatement with emotional overtones as means of impressing US leaders with strength of UK feeling. It will be recalled that he made similar dramatic statements in connection with Berlin crisis in early 1959.⁴ Prime Minister’s liking for historical analogy leads him on occasion into trouble. For example, alleged references to Anglo-Russian alliance in Napoleonic period attributed to Macmillan certainly have little relevancy in situation in which Anglo-American alliance is cornerstone of British foreign policy. There is no reason to doubt Prime Minister’s continuing devotion to this alliance and to NATO and in Embassy’s opinion it would be inconceivable that he would seriously toy with idea of attempting to use new Anglo-Russian alliance as counterbalance to economic split between Six and UK. Furthermore Embassy doubts British would carry out threat to withdraw BAOR in absence real balance-of-payments difficulties. FonOff officials have been critical of this type of threat.

Conservative government after its electoral triumph in October 1959⁵ appeared intent on giving high priority to improvement of badly deteriorated UK relations with Continent (Embtel 2896).⁶ Selwyn Lloyd’s Strasbourg speech in January⁷ and his strong statement of confidence in Federal Republic and its leaders during foreign affairs debate in House of Commons in February⁸ were manifestations of serious British desire to increase European confidence in UK intentions. FonOff is well aware that Prime Minister’s reported remarks in US have served to reawaken suspicions on Continent of British motives and policies and have set back efforts to improve relations with Six. Within UK itself, however, reports have had useful effect of stimulating critical reappraisal of British European policy. Number of commentators have taken line UK has missed boat in movement toward European unity and must now find some basis for association with Six. Lloyd himself in Strasbourg speech appeared to recognize that UK was perhaps mistaken in not joining Coal and Steel Community.

Final and perhaps basic factor in Prime Minister’s exaggerated and emotional statements is mood of frustration re European policy compounded by belief that Britain’s closest ally US fails to appreciate difficulty which UK faces. Solution of problem of harmonizing apparent separate interests of Commonwealth, Anglo-American alliance and UK relations with Continent still eludes HMG and there is no evidence as yet of any real imaginative thinking on subject Britain’s future role in Europe. Old ideas thus continue far too much to determine limits of UK policy re Europe, even though there may be waning confidence in their current validity.

Whitney

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, The Hague, Bern, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Oslo, Stockholm, and Vienna. Two notes appear in the margin of the first page of the telegram. One apparently by Goodpaster reads: “22 Apr 60 Discussed with President (Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon).” The second by Eisenhower reads: “Goodpaster: I am astonished at the repeated references to ‘exaggerated and emotional’ statements by P.M.???? D.” Macmillan’s account of the meeting is in Pointing the Way, pp. 188–193, 252–258.
1. For Macmillan’s comments, see Document 113. A sensationalized account of Macmillan’s views was leaked to the press and widely reported. It caused outrage reaction in much of the Western European press.
2. See Documents 81, 82, and 96.
3. Telegram 4811 from London, April 1, reported that the Foreign Office was most concerned about the effects on British relations with the EEC nations of the press accounts of the Macmillan talks in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.13/4–160)
4. During March 1959, Macmillan held talks with Soviet, German, French, and U.S. leaders on the Berlin situation. He took a very strong public position regarding the status of the city.
5. In the October 8, 1959, British general election, the Conservative Party won 365 seats in Parliament to 258 for the Labour Party and 6 for the Liberals.
6. Telegram 289 from London, December 4, 1959, surveyed recent trends in British policy toward Europe and the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.13/4–160)
7. In a January 21 address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Lloyd indicated a strong British desire to participate in European institutions.
8. During a debate on British policy toward Germany on February 10.