351. Editorial Note

Documentation on relations between the United States and Venezuela is presented in an accompanying microform publication. A narrative summary based upon that documentation and a purport of the documents included in the microform supplement are provided below. The document numbers cited in the summary correspond to the document numbers in the purport list and the microform supplement.

The overthrow of Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez on January 23, 1958, ushered in a more hopeful period in Venezuelan politics. The United States, though it had maintained friendly relations with Venezuela during the Pérez period, swiftly recognized the new interim government on the grounds that it was in full control of the governmental machinery, enjoyed wide popular as well as military support, and had pledged to hold free elections as soon as possible. (VE–1) At the same time, the United States admitted Pérez in accord with its customary practice of receiving exiled Latin American leaders “in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,” just as Rómulo Betancourt, a Pérez opponent and leader of the Acción Democrática Party, had been admitted when Pérez took power. (VE–2) In elections held in December 1958, Betancourt won a near majority of the vote and took office as President of Venezuela in February 1959.

The United States fundamentally approved of the Betancourt government. Support deepened as Betancourt gradually emerged as a leader of the anti-Communist left in Latin America, and thus potentially a solid counterweight to the steady leftward march of the Castro government, which took power less than 2 months before Betancourt’s inauguration in Venezuela. Nonetheless, there were sharp conflicts between the two nations over several issues, chief among them petroleum and the status of former President Pérez.

One of the last acts of the interim government was to raise taxes on petroleum. This act had worldwide implications because it effectively exceeded the 50–50 split in revenues between a host country and international oil companies which had become the norm since the [Page 918] late 1940s. Although the United States vigorously protested, neither the interim government nor Betancourt rescinded the action. (VE–16–19)

In March 1959, President Eisenhower, by an Executive order, made mandatory a previously voluntary oil import control program. This action was the result of lowered worldwide demand for oil and was an attempt to protect the interests of U.S. domestic producers. (VE–21) Although Venezuela did not like the action, it did not formally protest. (VE–22) Venezuelan patience was further strained when the United States, through a technicality, exempted Canada from the operation of the quotas. (VE–22, 26, 28) It was the U.S. view that this loophole had little actual deleterious effect on Venezuela, since increased shipment of Canadian oil overland to the United States would help to maintain Canadian waterborne imports of Venezuelan oil. (VE–29) At the end of 1960, President Eisenhower, at the urging of Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton and over the protests of the Department of State, made a change to the Executive order giving Seaton power to adjust oil imports more closely to domestic consumption, thus posing the possibility of further reduction in Venezuela’s sales. (VE–53)

While insisting on U.S. freedom of action with regard to the oil quotas, U.S. officials gave some thought to means of assisting Venezuela economically. With its large revenues from oil, Venezuela was not as starved for foreign exchange as many developing countries. Nonetheless, Venezuelan reserves plummeted in 1958–1959 in response to decreasing worldwide demand for oil—the same consideration which led to the tightening of U.S. import quotas—and Venezuela was forced to declare quantitative restrictions on luxury items, and eventually full exchange controls. The United States supported these moves as well as Venezuela’s increased willingness to work with the International Monetary Fund. (VE–38, 39, 47) The Department worked to keep technical assistance programs alive, while the Embassy urged toward the end of 1960 that if Venezuela’s inexperience in applying for assistance made it impossible for it to meet normal economic criteria, then assistance should be provided on political grounds. (VE–36, 37, 47)

Pérez’ residence in the United States was deeply resented by Venezuelans and may have stimulated some of the violence which marred Vice President Nixon’s trip to Venezuela in May 1958. In March 1959, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an expulsion order against Pérez, who then pursued legal remedies. The Department of State acquiesced in the ruling, but its officials complained that the Department had not been consulted. (VE–24) In August, the Venezuelan Government informed the Department that it would ask for extradition on charges of murder and embezzlement, [Page 919] and late in the month U.S. authorities carried out a preventive arrest. Venezuela filed a formal extradition petition in September, and extradition procedures were completed in August 1963.

One of President Betancourt’s overriding objectives was to rally hemisphere opinion against Generalissimo Hector Trujillo Molina of the Dominican Republic, who had harassed him and other democratic leaders in exile and who was probably behind an assassination attempt against Betancourt in June 1960. In August 1960, Venezuela succeeded in obtaining a unanimous vote at the Sixth Meeting of Consultation of the American Ministers, held in San José, Costa Rica, condemning Dominican acts of aggression and intervention. The Foreign Ministers resolved to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and also to interrupt partially economic relations with it. (VE–43, 46)

The United States, while supporting these initiatives, vigorously urged Betancourt to combine his initiatives against Trujillo with similar actions against Fidel Castro of Cuba. With equal firmness but in a friendly spirit, Betancourt consistently refused these requests. In the words of Ambassador Sparks, “President is convinced Venezuelan people are on his side in this matter and from standpoint his own personal honor he cannot enter into any action against Cuba until Trujillo regime is forced out of power.” (VE–41, 49, 51) Betancourt’s refusals did not lessen the U.S. tendency to regard him as a natural leader in the developing anti-Castro struggle. Again, according to the Embassy: “He stands for what we stand for. He recognizes the dangers of Castroism and can be counted upon to assist in blocking its spread. He has come long way in being able be openly critical in his November 1 [1960] speech [on] what is happening in Cuba.” (VE–47) Thus, as the period drew to a close, the two countries had overcome or partially dealt with several hurdles and were considering how ties could be further strengthened.