350. Editorial Note
Documentation on relations between the United States and Uruguay is being printed in an accompanying microform publication. A narrative summary, based on that documentation, is provided below, along with a purport list of the documents published in the microform supplement. The document numbers cited in the summary correspond to the document numbers in the purport list and microform supplement.
U.S. relations with Uruguay during the final 3 years of the Eisenhower administration, while experiencing a surprising downturn at the start of the period, improved greatly after a change of government in Montevideo at the beginning of 1959.
In March 1958, Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom noted:
“It is paradoxical but true that with no country in the hemisphere do we have more difficulty in our relations than with Uruguay— traditionally the most stable and democratically-oriented nation in Latin America/” (UR–1)
The problems, in considerable measure, stemmed from the increasingly bad state of the Uruguayan economy. The United States felt that Uruguay had to come to grips with its own sad plight for which it was itself almost solely responsible. (UR–2) The United States was concerned and willing to help, but as a first step Uruguay had to restrict imports and balance its budget.
Vice President Nixon’s visit in April 1958 was regarded as a distinct success in smoothing ruffled feelings, as he promised that the United States would not intervene in the case of American meatpacking plants recently expropriated by Uruguay. (UR–3) Later, the Uruguayan Ambassador told Secretary of State Dulles that his country bought from the United States 41/2 times what it sold there. The severe imbalance of payments forced Uruguay to seek sales of its goods to the Soviet Union, which in turn attempted to impose further demands in return for the purchases. U.S. efforts to help by providing loans and removing high duties on wool tops, a key Uruguayan export, proved unsuccessful.
[Page 916]General improvement in relations began with the advent to power at the end of 1958 of a different faction of the ruling Nationalist Party, one which favored agricultural interests. This was perceived as a requisite first step in developing agricultural exports, which would produce the foreign exchange necessary for Uruguay to acquire essential imports. The prospect made the Embassy in Montevideo generally optimistic about the future of relations. (UR–9) Early in 1959, it proved possible for the United States to remove its troublesome countervailing duty on Uruguayan wool tops (UR–10), and an aura of good feeling permeated the bilateral relationship. (UR–13)
By 1960, U.S. preoccupation in the area with the threat of Fidel Castro was more and more evident. Uruguay was sympathetic but unwilling to concede that Cuba represented a hemispheric problem any more than did the Dominican Republic. (UR–14, 16)
Nevertheless, the U.S.-Uruguayan relationship could only be described as very cooperative, in no small measure due to the change in government in Uruguay. The local economy, though somewhat stagnant, was basically prosperous. (UR–15) In the realm of politics, the United States felt that it could count on Uruguay’s support in the world arena. This was a soothing consideration, since that country maintained its longstanding reputation as the best small country in the Western Hemisphere: democratic, enlightened, and progressive. As the period drew to a close, the International Monetary Fund, with U.S. support, agreed to assist the Uruguayan economy by extending a $30-million loan. (UR–17)