Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

340. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence, San José, Costa Rica, August 16, 1960, 4 p.m.¹

San José, Costa Rica, August 16, 1960, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Secretary Herter
  • Mr. Rubottom
  • Ambassador Dreier
  • Ambassador Willauer
  • Mr. Barnes
• Mexico
  • Foreign Minister Tello
  • Ambassador Sanchez Gavito

SUBJECT

• Meetings of Consultation²

Minister Tello began by expressing the hope that he would see Secretary Herter in Mexico in September for the independence anniversary celebrations. He said that at no time had there been a question of Mr. Khrushchev attending the celebrations, since a circular had been sent out by his Foreign Ministry quite a while ago indicating that the Mexican President would be too busy to receive Heads of State.

When Secretary Herter asked him how he viewed the meeting, Minister Tello said that it was very clear that the Trujillo Government was responsible for the attempt on the life of President Betancourt, that the report prepared by the Venezuelan Government was conclusive and the Dominican defense was weak. He said that Mexico had suffered many affronts from the Dominican Republic, notably the disappearance of a Mexican businessman in Ciudad Trujillo, Pereña, and the killing of a naturalized Mexican, Almoina, as well as many attacks on the Mexican Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo, the latest of which had taken place only three days ago. He said that Mexico had not reported these event to the Peace Commission so as not to pour fuel on the flames but that it had come to the conclusion that the attack on President Betancourt was a case of aggression by the Dominican Government. He was also convinced that Generalissimo Trujillo had spoken with the would-be assassins. He said that Mexico would approve any collective measures that might be adopted, but that it had no resolutions of its own.

Secretary Herter asked if he meant sanctions as provided for by the Rio Treaty.

Minister Tello said that last year he had spoken with Secretary General Mora, and had told him that Mexico was one hundred per cent against intervention, but that the Rio Treaty provided for measures against intervention, which might be called counter-intervention. He cited the example of Italy and the sanctions that the League of Nations had taken against it because of its attack on Abyssinia, saying that the sanctions had failed.

Secretary Herter asked, if diplomatic relations were broken under the Rio Treaty, would that mean that the break would continue until the OAS voted to renew them.

Minister Tello said that this would probably be the case.

Secretary Herter said that the OAS should have the means to observe the situation in the Dominican Republic to see if a new government was following the principles of the Santiago Declaration and other resolutions and to determine whether a new government should be recognized.

Minister Tello gave a detailed account of the League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy, including the setting up of a Coordinating Committee to receive reports from the various governments as to how the sanctions were being applied. He said that it might be possible to establish a similar Committee in the case of the Dominican Republic, or perhaps to use the Peace Committee, to coordinate information.

Ambassador Sanchez Gavito said that in the event of a break of relations, it would be up to each individual country to establish relations with a new government.

Secretary Herter said that it seemed to him that the recent events in the Dominican Republic were nothing more than a facade. He said that would it not be true that if two-thirds of the OAS voted for a break, it would require two-thirds of the OAS to establish relations with a new government.

Mr. Rubottom said that the United States had already taken positive action against the Dominican Republic by not allotting to it a sugar quota that it otherwise would have received, and that this certainly was a more important sanction than a break in relations.

Minister Tello said that he had spoken with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Arcaya and had received the impression that the latter would be satisfied with nothing less than two or three strong sanctions.

Ambassador Dreier said that perhaps a general statement might be appropriate, which would say more or less that the conduct of the Dominican Republic was outside of what the conduct of a Member State of the OAS should be, and recommending that the Member States take such action as they considered appropriate, then listing possible action that might be taken.

Secretary Herter said that some countries were faced with the problem of obtaining Congressional approval for certain measures.

Minister Tello said that he had advised Minister Arcaya not to try for anything that he was not sure of getting, and that the latter had replied that the “die was cast”.

Ambassador Dreier asked whether Mexico would have any constitutional problems in applying economic sanctions. Minister Tello said that Mexico had not signed any trade treaties with the Dominican Republic, and that he doubted any serious legal problems would arise.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the U.S. would face such problems regarding economic sanctions in general, but said that there were none in the case of a break of relations. However, the United States had certain reservations about this step, because it felt it was necessary to observe events in the Dominican Republic because of the possibility of a government of Castro or Communist domination replacing the Trujillo regime. He said that he realized that the United States took more seriously than did Mexico the possibility of Communist infiltration in Cuba, and that it would be unhappy to see Trujillo replaced by a Castro.

Secretary Herter asked what would happen if all countries recognized a new government, after the members of the OAS had broken with the old one as the result of OAS recommendations. Should not the OAS be the one to decide when a new government should be recognized? He said that this was a very serious problem.

Minister Tello said that a government that was not supported by the people would not be democratic, and that the existence or nonexistence of diplomatic relations would not prevent the people from making their own decision.

Secretary Herter said that it was one thing to have a decision by revolutionary means, and another to have one by constitutional means.

Mr. Rubottom said that when the United States saw a people getting rid of its government, it hoped for an improvement. In Cuba, without elections or freedom of expression, it was not possible to know what measure of popular support the government had. He said that Cuba violated all of the principles approved in Santiago. This was a very delicate situation because of its being a precedent, and that it would be very risky to force a government out with no responsibility over what might follow.

Minister Tello said that the maintenance by the United States of diplomatic relations with Cuba had not prevented the events that had taken place there. He said that Colombian Foreign Minister Turbay had mentioned the possibility of maintaining consular relations.

Ambassador Dreier said that it would be of interest to observe what went on in the Dominican Republic, and that consular personnel did not have diplomatic immunities with the corresponding privileges of communication.

Mr. Rubottom said that the United States had exerted no pressure to have relations with Cuba broken, although Cuba was intervening in other nations’ affairs more than the Dominican Republic. From the point of view of American public and congressional opinion as well as of the responsibility of the Executive Branch, any action against the Dominican Republic had to be considered in relation to action regarding Cuba.

Secretary Herter said that there was no difference between a dictatorship of the right and one of the left, to use the words of the Santiago Declaration. Speaking frankly, he said that no member of the OAS was afraid of Trujillo, but that many were afraid of Castro, and were afraid to get tough on Castro.

Minister Tello said that Mexico feared neither Trujillo nor Castro, and that ten days before Mexico had expelled two Cuban agents.

Secretary Herter said that with regard to Cuba there were two interconnected factors that the inter-American system had to recognize: First, the involvement of Khrushchev and the matter of Cuba’s relationship with Russia and Red China; and second, Cuba’s violation of all of the resolutions it voted for in Santiago.

Minister Tello said that Mexico was prepared to vote for the strongest possible resolution against Russia’s intervention in the American States. He believed however that a resolution against Cuba would strengthen Castro’s position in Cuba and in Latin America, because of the tendency of people to unite against outsiders. He said that this had happened in the case of Perón in Argentina, of Mussolini in Italy, and of Hitler in Germany.

Secretary Herter asked whether this would really be an attack from the outside or was it rather a family matter.

Minister Tello asked whether the Secretary believed that Cuba would vote in favor of a strong resolution, and the Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Minister Tello said that Mexico was prepared to vote for a strong resolution against the Soviet Union.

When Secretary Herter asked whether this included Soviet infiltration in Cuba, Minister Tello said that he meant it to apply everywhere.

Mr. Rubottom said that there was also the question of Cuban intervention in other countries, and that it was important for the OAS to take this into account, as well as Cuba’s contempt for the OAS. President Dorticos had publicly expressed his contempt for the OAS, and had said that the American people would not be represented in San José except by the Cuban Delegation.

Secretary Herter said that the United States felt that the San José meetings were a real test for the OAS, and that the United States believed strongly in the OAS, but that the latter should be consistent in dealing with the Dominican and Cuban problems.

Minister Tello said that Mexico was prepared to approve any resolution that would strengthen the inter-American system and hemispheric solidarity.³

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Donald F. Barnes, Division of Language Services, on August 17, and approved in S on August 18.
2. The Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics met in San José, Costa Rica, August 16–28, to consider, respectively, Venezuelan allegations of Dominican complicity in the assassination attempt on President Rómulo Betancourt and the dispute between Cuba and the United States. See vol. VI, p. 1060.
3. On August 20, the Foreign Ministers approved a resolution condemning the Dominican Republic for acts of aggression against Venezuela and calling on all members of the OAS to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. On August 26, the Foreign Ministers approved a resolution, known as the “Declaration of San José,” condemning any threat of extracontinental intervention in the affairs of the American Republics.