308. Editorial Note
Documentation on relations between the United States and Guatemala is presented in an accompanying microform publication. A narrative summary, based upon that documentation, is provided below, along with a purport list of documents published in the microform supplement. The document numbers cited in the summary correspond to the document numbers in the purport list and the microform supplement.
The assassination of the pro-American and anti-Communist President of Guatemala, Carlos Castillo Armas, in July 1957, threatened Guatemala with political uncertainty. In fact, a relatively orderly transition emerged. An interim government arranged a new Presidential election in which Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes won a plurality but not a majority vote. Through popular pressure and political dealing, Ydígoras won approval of the Guatemalan Congress to which responsibility for naming the President devolved when no Presidential candidate won a majority in the popular election. An upper-class, authoritarian, former professional soldier who represented Guatemala’s traditional classes and conservative forces, Ydígoras assumed the Presidency in March 1958 without enjoying firm support in the new Congress where his political supporters made up only 16 of the 66 members. (GT–5)
Ydígoras compensated for his political vulnerabilty by engaging in a series of high-profile quarrels with his neighbors—with Great Britain over Guatemala’s claims to British Honduras and with Mexico over a supposed invasion and, later in 1958, over shrimp fishing. (GT–6, 7, 14) The United States disapproved of this adventurism, but continued to provide Guatemala with economic and military assistance as well as development loans. (GT–8, 9, 10, 13) In early 1959, the Embassy reported that Ydígoras’ political situation had deteriorated rapidly and his overthrow was a real possibility. (GT–15) When Ambassador Lester D. Mallory returned to Washington in June 1959 for consultations, the Department of State decided that despite Ydígoras’ volatility and his government’s apparent swing to the left, he was still worthy of [Page 816] U.S. support. (GT–20) The Department understood that if Ydigoras was to rule Guatemala he would have to, in effect, play to the left. The leftist traditions of Guatemalan politics established during the years of the Arévalo and Arbenz Presidencies of 1944–1954 gave such a posture considerable popular appeal. Unfortunately, Ydigoras did not make the kind of economic decisions and reforms required to place his government on a sound fiscal basis. In July 1960, economic problems, labor unrest, terrorism, and an abortive military coup convinced Ydigoras to declare a “state of siege” which suspended civil liberties and established temporary military control. (GT–29)
Concern about the survivability of the Ydigoras government took on added significance given the threat that Fidel Castro’s revolutionary regime in Cuba posed to the rest of Central America. When a group of dissident military officers attempted to seize power on November 13 in Guatemala City and two provincial capitals, Ydigoras charged that the revolt was Castro-inspired and asked for U.S. support in preventing possible Cuban invasion or intervention. (GT–33, 34, 35) On November 14, President Eisenhower discussed the situation with Secretary of State Christian Herter. Herter noted that the situation looked “very serious” and suggested that “the Cubans have had a hand in this.” Eisenhower agreed that the United States should be prepared to get from Guatamala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica requests for U.S. military surveillance and possible assistance in the event of an overt Cuban intervention or attack. (GT–36)
There was no Cuban aggression nor any proof that the Guatemalan rebels were supported by Castro, but Guatemalan forces loyal to Ydigoras were unable immediately to reestablish control. Guatemala and Nicaragua had requested surveillance, while Costa Rica had not. Herter therefore recommended to Eisenhower that the United States continue naval surveillance of the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan coasts. The only matter still to be decided was whether or not this naval surveillance force should have a U.S. Marine battalion on board. Eisenhower decided that the Marines should remain at the nearest suitable station. (GT–42) By November 16, loyal forces put down the rebellion.