Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

285. Memorandum of a Conversation Aboard Columbine III Between Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, February 25, 1960, 4:05–5:05 p.m.¹

US/MC/28

Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, February 25, 1960, 4:05–5:05 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Cuba, Inter-American Affairs, Brasilia

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The President
  • Lt. Col. Walters
• Brazil
  • President Kubitschek

President Kubitschek opened the conversation by thanking the President for inviting him to ride back to Rio with him.

Cuba

He asked what the United States intended to do about Cuba and the President said that he regarded Cuba as a problem for the OAS as a whole rather than a purely US problem. He could not foresee the US making any active intervention in Cuba. President Kubitschek said he agreed that it was a problem for all of the Americas and asked how important Guantanamo Base was to the US as the Cubans had been spreading abroad that it was vital for the US for nuclear war. The President said that he believed that we had a perfectly legal right to the base and he believed there was a missile tracking station there. President Kubitschek said that he had talked to the Cuban Ambassador to Brazil² and advised moderation. Similarly he had called the Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba³ back for consultation. Castro’s sister⁴ had taken refuge in the Brazilian Embassy during the Batista⁵ regime so that the Brazilian Ambassador was in a particularly good position to talk to Castro. President Kubitschek said that the Brazilians were also greatly concerned with Communist infiltration in Cuba and asked whether the US would welcome an effort at mediation or good offices by Brazil and other Latin American countries.

The President said he felt anything the Latin American nations could do to bring Castro to a more amenable frame of mind would be helpful.

Pan American Conference

President Kubitschek, speaking of the forthcoming Pan American conference,⁶ then said he felt it would be more useful if the meeting were held at the level of 21 nations rather than 9. Cuba was represented on the 9 and would be in less of a minority in 9 than they would be in 21. He did not feel too strongly on this but he did feel that a meeting of 21 could give a general directive and guidance to the 9 that would serve as a basis for their work. If all went well, perhaps towards the end of the year they might hold a meeting of presidents of American nations. The President said he would look into this matter and spoke of the difficulty he would have in finding time to attend such a meeting. He felt it should be held in some place other than the US or Brazil.

President Kubitschek then spoke again of the importance of the President’s journey to Latin America. He said that Brazil had excellent relations with all of her neighbors and that he was watching with great sympathy the efforts of President Frondizi of Argentina. The President also praised President Frondizi’s efforts and President Kubitschek said that anything the US could do to help and strengthen Frondizi would be a great contribution to the development of entire area and said, “do everything you can to help him.”

He then asked the President’s opinion concerning the world situation and the President spoke briefly on this subject outlining his views on what might be expected from the Summit Meeting.⁷

Brasilia

President Kubitschek then spoke of Brasilia and said that he intended to move the capital on the 21st of April. He intended to move some 6,000 government employees in the first echelon of the move and he already had 30,000 volunteers. These government employees would also bring their families with them which meant that the actual number of people who would move was much larger than 6,000. Progressively, as housing was completed, the remaining government ministries would move to Brasilia. He himself would move permanently on April 21st. He expressed gratitude for the US’ prompt action in starting work on the new US Embassy in Brasilia.

The two presidents then spoke at some length concerning their plans after finishing their terms which expire ten days apart.

There was a further brief discussion of Cuba along the same lines as earlier in the conversation.

Air Disaster

Mr. Hagerty ⁸ suggested to the two Presidents the desirability of a joint statement on arrival in Rio concerning the air crash involving a Brazilian commercial airliner and a US Navy plane, and there was agreement by the two presidents that a statement would be issued when they had ascertained the facts on arrival in Rio.⁹

Both presidents expressed their deep sorrow over the air disaster.

The aircraft then landed in Rio and the conversation by the two presidents concluded.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1596. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. The source text bears the notation: “Received from White House 3/12/60.”
2. Rafael García Barcena.
3. Vasco Tristão Leitão de Cunha returned to Brazil, February 19.
4. Lidia Castro.
5. Major General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, President of Cuba until January 1, 1959.
6. Reference presumably is to the Third Meeting of the Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States To Study the Formulation of New Measures of Economic Development (Committee of 21), held at Bogotá, Colombia, September 5–13; see the microfiche supplement to this volume.
7. Reference is to the Meeting of the Heads of Government (Summit Conference) of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Paris, May 16–17.
8. James C. Hagerty.
9. A U.S. Navy transport plane and a Brazilian airliner collided in the air over Guanabara Bay near Rio de Janeiro, killing 61 of 64 persons aboard both planes, February 25. For text of a letter from President Eisenhower to President Kubitschek, February 28, regarding the crash, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 243.