Office of the Historian

216. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, March 31, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence Note: Argentine Election

In reply to your query on the results of the Argentine election of March 27 in which one half of the National Chamber of Deputies was replaced, I have the following comments:

The election results, as expected, reveal that Frondizi has suffered a reduction in popular support, reflecting general dissatisfaction with his labor policy and his austere Economic Stabilization Program, even though his party did retain a slim majority in the Chamber (106 out of 192 seats). Significantly, the blank vote, representing Peronist and Communist forces, fell far below the level it was expected to reach, greatly reducing the possibility that the nation’s military forces will [Page 626] intervene directly to “save the country from Peronism and Communism”. On the other hand, the People’s Radical Party (UCRP), which has bitterly opposed Frondizi’s programs, can be considered to have won the ballot box battle, garnering 56 of the 102 seats in contention.

The government appears determined to carry on with the IMF-backed program initiated in December, 1958, in spite of the election results, but it is likely that pressures will build up for some modifications of its labor and wage policies. The President’s opponents can argue effectively that the 78 percent of the voters who cast ballots against the government represent a voice that the government must heed. Furthermore, the election results will almost certainly give rise to deep concern among the members of the President’s party who could lose control of the Chamber of Deputies in elections scheduled two years hence if popular support is not regained.

Frondizi, an astute politician, who has faith in the ability of his program to accomplish tangible economic gains which will swing support to him in the future, will resist any attempts to scuttle his program, making only concessions necessary to contain excessive public demands and to prevent the military from taking direct action against him.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 735.00/3–3160. Confidential.↩