Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

189. Letter From the Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs (Boonstra) to the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in Argentina (Bernbaum)¹

Washington, June 19, 1959.

Dear Maurie: There are so many things going on this afternoon that I am having trouble writing memos of conversation and perhaps it will be more valuable for me to dictate instead this quick note relating to your telephone call to me a couple of hours ago.²

Immediately after your call, I spent a considerable time discussing with Dick Rubottom and other concerned ARA personnel the matters which you had brought up. I presented them against the background, which I had derived from your call, that matters had reached a most critical stage in Argentina and that any constructive action within our power should be taken immediately. During the course of our conversations Dick Rubottom talked to Mr. Waugh, and other opinions also were solicited. While we were talking, a message came in from the Export-Import Bank for our clearance in which Brand said that he would have to postpone until mid-July his visit to Argentina because of a sudden and unforeseen need for surgery on Mrs. Brand.

The upshot of all this consideration was that an immediate announcement of Mr. Brand’s visit should be made. Almost everybody concerned, however, was strongly of the opinion that (1) we could not make the announcement in a way that would commit us to large future financing, prior to Brand’s visit, and (2) that specific promise of large-scale financing related to such things as on the “shopping list” was not likely in any event to be an immediate important influence on the decisions being taken today or tomorrow by the Argentine military leaders.

I am aware that this is contrary to the Ambassador’s and your point of view and I myself did my best that your advice was clearly made known. Nobody contested the fact that we should do everything possible to support the Frondizi Government in its present difficult circumstance, but it seemed to be a question of what emergency commitments we could make and also what the real effect of such emergency commitments might be in effecting the immediate decisions being taken in Argentina.

As matters now stand, we have sent over to Eximbank for clearance an announcement of the projected visit by Mr. Brand without establishing either limitations or commitments on what may be forthcoming from his visit. We hope at least not to include in this statement any limitations and therefore the press treatment may take the larger view.

We gather that the source which you mention as having just returned from Washington, who mentioned to you his assessment on the more liberal attitude on the part of our agencies, was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Actually I don’t believe there is any difference between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and us in our evaluation of the attitude here. Everyone wants to do anything that can be truly helpful. The differences lie in whether or not we are able to announce anything meaningful with respect to future financing which will in fact have a significant impact on what is happening politically at this moment.

With respect to the matter of credit for the Navy, we are having difficulty clearing any message but I am quite sure that we can work out the solution which the Ambassador recommends.³ There is no disposition to haggle over the credit in the event that it can be demonstrated to have a real influence on political developments.

At this moment we are getting all sorts of reports on the Argentine situation from the newsticker and other sources and find the situation most confused and difficult to evaluate. We are looking forward to your messages to provide the essential clarification.

This has been dictated very hurriedly because I want to get it in the pouch and may not have time to check it over very carefully. For this reason you should not take any of my phrasing too literally as I have been trying only to convey a quick general impression.⁴

Sincerely,

C.A. Boonstra⁵

1. Source: Department of State, ARA/EST Files: Lot 61 D 386, Internal Political Affairs, General May–June 1959. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Boonstra.
2. During his telephone conversation with Boonstra and O’Connor, Bernbaum recommended, among other things, that the announcement of the Brand visit be made immediately without the conditions which the Embassy had previously attached. The full text of the conversation is ibid., Central Files, 835.10/6–1959.
3. During the telephone conversation, in which Beaulac also participated, the Ambassador, referring to credits for military equipment for the Argentine Navy, recommended that the Deaprtment not press the issue as to whether the overall credit should be reduced if the Navy planned to use cash for its immediate procurement.
4. In telegram 1686 to Buenos Aires, June 19, the Department authorized the Embassy to make a public statement indicating that Brand would travel to Argentina in the next few weeks to discuss the Argentine economic program with Frondizi and his economic ministers. (Department of State, Central Files, 835.10/6–1959) On June 20, however, the Department informed the Embassy that Brand had just learned that his wife had to enter the hospital for surgery and would have to delay announcement of the exact date of the trip. (Telegram 1688 to Buenos Aires, June 20; ibid., 835.10/6–2059) On July 8, the Export-Import Bank announced that Brand would arrive in Buenos Aires on July 20 for discussions regarding the Argentine economic program and the use of credits previously agreed upon. For additional information on the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1959, p. 117.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.