182. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Beaulac)1

Dear Willard: The approach for a new round of assistance which was made last week by Barros Hurtado here, and paralleled in some measure by Frigerio in Buenos Aires, obviously adds a new and significant dimension to relations. While it could not have been unforeseen under the circumstances, I must admit to some disappointment that our Argentine friends came around again so very soon. It shoots a couple of holes in the very useful picture of Frondizi’s Argentina which we have had for exhibition to the rest of the hemisphere as the nation determined to stand on its very own two feet. In making this comment I do not overlook the very considerable courage which Frondizi has displayed and is displaying, the mountains of problems which face him, or our own interest in the success of his administration as it is presently oriented. From here it appears that things have taken a substantial turn for the worse, with the pressures against Frondizi’s economic program mounting in terms of genuine public reaction to austerity in addition to standard political opposition.

This all adds up to the fact that we will all of us have to do some solid thinking and consulting on just what it may be possible and sensible to do to meet the new Argentine request. It goes without saying that we will do all we can to help, but it clearly is not a question of accepting their own judgment as to what they want and what they think best for themselves. The IMF position in the stabilization picture has to be taken into account, and the developmental interests pushed by Frigerio do not precisely square with the realities of stabilization. Hotel and airport projects, for example, convey some sense of unreality in the economic context in which the matter of further assistance has to be approached whatever may be the political and labor factors involved.

I would guess that Frigerio himself was the author of the unofficial memorandum which Barros left here when he called on Tom Mann and me, a copy of which I understand has been transmitted to you. It is of course no more than a generalized shopping list. Barros took the tack of asking us to look into what could be done for his government and of offering to come in and discuss things further when we had our ideas straightened out. We will naturally want to [Page 569] turn that around at an appropriate point and ask the Argentines to make really specific proposals for consideration as the practical way of coming to grips with the problem.

As Vance Brand has cabled you, the question of his making a trip down at this time will be taken up next week when Sam Waugh returns from Europe.2 Such a visit would in itself have obvious substantive implications, no matter what formula of public explanation were devised. It could also serve to impel the Argentines to sharpen both their thinking and their lines of authority and channels. You know our views and reservations here about these latter. It is difficult and somewhat confusing to have official and unofficial, open and confidential, lines of communication, particularly when there are differences of emphasis, if not of actual points of view, involved; and Frigerio’s contacting you to talk like a continuing spokesman for Frondizi so soon after their public cutting of ties suggests that this dualism may continue. [1 sentence (3 lines of source text) not declassified] What is cause for some concern is that we are involved by them to some extent in these domestic politics by being asked—with some lack of consideration, it seems to me—to accommodate ourselves to dealing in the top reaches of our relations on an irregular basis and with a highly controversial individual. I understand the political realities involved, of course, but it is the same appreciation of political realities which makes me feel that we are perhaps not fully covered in so doing. That is particularly true at this point, when Frigerio appears to be moving out of the role of an economic technician, in which he has accomplished about all he could, and into the role of an operating politician. Perhaps this is the time for disengagement.

I recognize Frigerio’s contributions to the Frondizi economic program and, indirectly, to the advancement of US interests, and I do not question his value as a shrewd individual who can get things done unencumbered by bureaucracy. Against this I balance such considerations as the following: in the wake of Frigerio’s US trip we have a situation in which “commitments” can be quoted to us by a prima facie free agent whose principal, Frondizi, refrained from giving his mission public endorsement and has now, insofar as the public and the record is concerned, cut the links between the two men in definitive fashion. That is a one-sided arrangement which places a premium [Page 570] on the most complete good faith. I have no specific reason to doubt Frigerio’s good faith toward us, but the manner in which his visit was staged and managed on the ground here could fairly be described as not absolutely straightforward.

Incidentally, Frigerio’s statement to you during his May 21 conversation3 that the Government’s plans to drop 120,000 employees on a continuing salary basis had been “approved” here in Washington is startling and perhaps illustrative of the dangers we may run in this sort of relationship. This matter was never discussed with me, and I cannot conceive that any responsible individual here would have committed himself on such an issue. Frigerio’s view that we did is an explosive idea.

Frigerio was apparently very happy with his US trip (except perhaps for having the aftosa ban tread on the heels of his departure) and Barros reported Frondizi as grateful, too. I consequently wonder if this is not the time for the disengagement from Frigerio which I have already mentioned. The move into a new phase of relations with the Frondizi Government which the approach for additional assistance provides, coupled with Frigerio’s own change of status, would seem to offer an ideal line-drawing point. I do not mean that contact with Frigerio should be abandoned, but rather that he should no longer be accepted as an agent of Frondizi for discussions of policy and negotiations. I am not sure that Vance’s trip would be really productive unless there were some squaring-away beforehand on the question of who would speak authoritatively for Argentina during his visit. I myself do not think that Frigerio should be in the picture, since his presence in addition to that of official figures would only serve to perpetuate the lack of clarity which we have seen in some other recent Argentine approaches, to their own damage. Whether disengagement is practical at this time and how it could be accomplished is a matter which you would be best qualified to decide. I realize that I speak at long distance, but I do not rule out the advisability of a frank talk with Frondizi, who has himself indicated a preference for frank relations.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

R.R. Rubottom, Jr.4
  1. Source: Department of State, ARA/EST Files: Lot 61 D 386, US-Argentine Relations, January–June 1959. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by O’Connor.
  2. Telegram 1524 to Buenos Aires, May 26. (ibid., Central Files, 835.10/5–2159) On May 26, Beaulac recommended that if the Export-Import Bank and the Department agreed, it might be a good ideal to have Vance Brand visit Argentina in the near future. The Brand trip, the Ambassador noted, would provide support to those determined to implement the stabilization program and might lend prestige to the Frondizi regime. In order to avoid public speculation that the Bank was in the process of considering new loans, Beaulac added, Brand might indicate that the purpose of his trip was to discuss the utilization of old credits and not the consideration of new ones. (Telegram 1789 from Buenos Aires, May 21; ibid.)
  3. The complete text of Frigerio’s conversation with Beaulac on May 21 was transmitted in despatch 1745 from Buenos Aires, May 27. (ibid., 835.2553/5–2759)
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.