Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

179. Memorandum of a Conversation, President Frondizi’s Residence, Olivos, April 29, 1959¹

Olivos, April 29, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency The President of the Argentine Nation, Dr. Arturo Frondizi
• Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann
• Assistant Secretary R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

The President and Mrs. Frondizi received us at their residence at Olivos following which the President conducted us into his office for a pre-luncheon discussion, Mrs. Frondizi retiring to her quarters. I expressed to the President our pleasure at being in Argentina. Referring to his recent visit to the United States, I said that it had left an indelible, favorable impression and that from every side, the Government, the press, and the public at large, he had received resounding applause for the forthright positions he had taken on the major economic and political issues confronting Argentina and the rest of the free world.

The President recalled his trip with pleasure and expressed gratitude for the treatment he had been accorded.

The President did not seem disposed to press any particular subject and, as the following will reveal, we took the initiative in raising most of the important matters pending between the Governments of the United States and Argentina.

The President stressed the difficulties which he and his Government were facing but indicated an unfaltering determination to carry through with the programs he had espoused in searching for solutions to Argentina’s problems. He said Argentina had always had so much that it was difficult for the people to accustom themselves to an austerity program. The pinch was being felt everywhere. He said that the PL 480 program now being contemplated would be of great assistance. I told him of the word from Washington that consideration was now being given to approximately 75,000 tons of edible oil and 35,000 tons of rice. Mr. Mann said that the matter of price was a serious deterrent to any possible purchase program for wheat and/or corn, but that we would do everything within the limits of our laws to assist.

The President said that he was extremely grateful for the practical assistance which we were already giving Argentina. It had strengthened his hand and he need more if such were possible. Argentina wants nothing in the way of gifts, he said, but is prepared to repay the United States in the future for the help given now when it is so badly needed.

I told the President that we had received Dr. Frigerio and gave him ample opportunity to talk about the Argentine situation. He expressed approval and said that that was exactly what he had wanted. I mentioned the small luncheon given Dr. Frigerio by Mr. Mann and myself and said that Ambassador Barros Hurtado had been good enough to show me the copies of the letters, which he, the President, had given to Dr. Frigerio.

Next, I raised the matter of military equipment, recounting all of [the] discussions I had had with Ambassador Barros Hurtado and our first conversations when the President visited Washington last January.

At this point the three of us went into the dining room for lunch.

I said that I felt personally responsible for having authorized Ambassador Barros Hurtado to tell the President of our agreement “in principle” to furnish an unspecified amount of military equipment to the Argentine Armed Forces. This undertaking had perhaps raised the hopes of the Armed Forces to obtain more equipment than was possible for the present. I referred to the problem that had been created by the late entry of the Army into our consideration of the Argentine request; there was stressed also the need for Argentina to coordinate the request of its three services in such a way as to permit the Ambassador to speak for the entire defense establishment of the Government. The President nodded understanding of the situation and said that he had recently talked to Ambassador Barros Hurtado by telephone and that he, personally, would undertake to settle any future questions between the three services. He was hopeful that Argentina would be able to obtain approximately $13 million of equipment which was vitally needed to maintain the morale of the services to assure their continued loyalty, and to support minimum measures of internal security against the threat of subversion. I told the President that I had discussed this matter with Under Secretary Dillon just before leaving Washington and that I could not give him absolute assurance that the $13 million request would be approved.² I wished to avoid making any firm commitment. Nevertheless, I was hopeful. Mr. Mann expressed his intention to support the request if the funds could be found anywhere.

The President pointed out the difficulty in explaining to economic sectors and the people at large that their stake in the success of the Economic Stabilization Program is just as great as that of the Government itself. He chose this way of saying that Dr. Frigerio would probably assume the task of explaining the Program to the public at large. He traced Dr. Frigerio’s association with him—first, as a close friend and official adviser; second, as completely unofficial adviser but still known to be close to the President; and third and last, he would “go out on the street” completely apart from the Government in order to explain the meaning of the Economic Stabilization Program to the people. I interpreted this as a confirmation of the President’s oft-reported intention to downgrade Frigerio. He gave no reason other than that stated above and spoke in the friendliest terms about Frigerio.

We talked for a while of the impending Castro visit.³ The President showed no concern, but in this context mentioned the clamp-down on all activities of the Communist Party. I said that Castro and his group had behaved relatively well in the United States; that, while he had given satisfactory and rather categorical statements on most of the questions asked him, he had been evasive on the Communist question; that he had satisfied nobody with his explanations of the reasons for postponing elections to some four years hence because of the demands of “the people”. The President, himself, then phrased the question, “He is still an unknown quantity?”, to which I replied affirmatively. The President certainly revealed no enthusiasm over the prospects of seeing Castro.

Next, I turned to the Chocón project, outlining our conversations in Washington with Frigerio and then my own conversations later with Ambassador Barros Hurtado, Burk Knapp and Eugene Black. I stressed our hope that Argentina would consider carefully this project and any other of such magnitude that might have a serious impact on the country’s capacity to borrow, and on the stabilization program itself. He expressed understanding of this point of view and said that he had already communicated to the World Bank Argentina’s agreement with the position taken by the Bank, i.e., no contracts should be signed until the electric power study being conducted by the Bank had been concluded. The President said that the Italian Ambassador had called to protest this decision. He had replied to the Ambassador that Italy was a member of the World Bank and that Italian suppliers would have a chance to bid on the equipment for the Chocón project later.

I told President Frondizi that the Department was following very closely the discussions with his Government on the subject of Civil Aviation: that I had noted that the Government’s approach so far to this sector seemed less liberal than its approach to other economic matters. He acknowledged that Civil Aviation was so far an unresolved problem, as much for him as it was for the United States. He said that he would continue working on it, referring to the importance which a satisfactory solution had for Argentina’s well-being. He said that Argentina needed to strengthen its Civil Aviation, both from the standpoint of its own vast requirements in a country of such great dimensions and because of the tremendous returns from tourism that this would bring.

We discussed the problem created by his efforts to have recognized diplomas from private universities. He said he would win this issue but acknowledged that it had led to a break with his brother, Rector of the University of Buenos Aires, with whom he had not spoken in six months.

Mr. Mann and I thanked the President for his hospitality and excused ourselves at about 2:45 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, ARA/EST Files: Lot 61 D 386, US-Argentine Relations, General January–June 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Rubottom. Mann and Rubottom were part of the U.S. Delegation representing the United States on the Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States To Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation (Committee of 21) which convened at Buenos Aires on April 27.
2. At 9:12 p.m., the Department informed Rubottom in Buenos Aires that he had authorization to proceed with the negotiations of the Argentine military credit program which was not to exceed $13 million. (Telegram 1345 to Buenos Aires, April 29; ibid., Central Files, 735.5–MSP/4–2959)
3. Fidel Castro visited Argentina May 2–4.