Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

120. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, June 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Current Practice Regarding Export of Military Equipment to the Caribbean Area

Two problems of some importance have recently arisen in carrying out our practice respecting authorization of military equipment to the Caribbean area; these are:

1. Working out mechanics with the Department of Commerce which took over licensing of civilian aircraft and spare parts from the Office of Munitions Control on June 1.

2. The question of whether we should begin to loosen some of our controls.

The problem with the Department of Commerce is principally one of providing their licensing people with somewhat more specific guidance than we gave to MC in our recent paper. Commerce is, of course, willing to accept the guidance of the Department of State on political grounds but desires to have fairly complete guidance so that their people need not refer each specific case for decision to the Department. Secondly, Commerce is especially sensitive to their relationships with American exporters and accordingly they have a strong preference for clear “yes” or “no” decisions on disposition of license applications and hence are reluctant to delay action even though we might consider it desirable to withhold a decision.

With respect to the first point we have prepared, with the clearance of the appropriate desks in ARA, a guidance which would be transmitted to Commerce, a copy of which is attached for your consideration.

With respect to the second point the licensing people in Commerce offer us only four means of dealing with individual applications: (1) denial; (2) return of application to applicant without action, suggesting that the applicant may, if he wishes, resubmit the application in 30 days; (3) a similar return without action suggesting a 60 day interval; and (4) a similar return without action disposition with a 90 day interval. MC is handling those licenses which it can not approve by returning them to the applicant with a note stating that the request cannot be approved “at this time.” This matter of handling applications which are not approved is related to the impact that the knowledge of our current practice will have in the Caribbean and on the Iron Curtain countries as a source of supply, and raises the question whether we should give more publicity on the nature of our current practices. I am inclined to believe that we should continue as we are presently doing and not give publicity, on the ground of possible Iron Curtain interest if we lay out to public view our current mode of dealing with this type of request.² I suggest that applications for civilian aircraft and spare parts ordered by the military forces of Cuba and the Dominican Republic be handled for at least the next 30 days by the fourth alternative, i.e., returning them without action suggesting resubmittal, if the applicant wishes, at the end of a 90 day period.³ Applications from other countries of the area could be dealt with, as deemed appropriate, by any one of the above-mentioned alternatives.

The second general question—possible relaxation of our practice—has been the subject of recent careful study by CMA.⁴ As a general proposition, CMA believes that we should consider relaxing our controls fairly soon, beginning at the lower end of the scale and authorizing spare parts for civilian aircraft in the hands of the military forces in, say, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. There are several reasons why relaxation, particularly of this type of equipment, would be desirable: (1) If additional shipments of military matériel are made by Western European suppliers, selective relaxation would be required to avoid a collapse of our present position of exercising close controls over shipments to the area. (2) There is some doubt whether controls over spare parts for civilian aircraft of the military services is effective; they seem to continue to fly and unless we stop exports of similar equipment ordered by civil airlines of the country the latter are a likely source of supply for civilian type aircraft of the military services. (3) The U.K. does not require licenses for civilian aircraft or spare parts for this equipment which could place us in a difficult position vis-à-vis U.S. suppliers of these items. (4) Another consideration is that administration of our current practice is time-consuming and easing of controls would facilitate this task. Tensions have increased considerably in the past month in the Cuban, Haitian, and Dominican Republic area, and in spite of the considerations mentioned above, relaxation would not appear to be a wise step at this moment. As you know, we have received reports of training of forces in the Dominican Republic to invade Cuba and there has been some interest shown in 2 C–46’s from Campo Libertad to unknown destinations. A middle ground to relax controls would be to authorize Commerce to license spare parts for civilian type aircraft of the military in these countries, on the basis of past usage experience in order to keep flying those aircraft they each have. Even this type of relaxation, however, I believe should not be taken at this time. I recommend, however, that we reexamine this as a possibility, say at the end of 30 days.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary’s Files: Lot 61 D 411, Caribbean 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Little.
2. At this point appears the following marginal notation by Snow: “I agree.”
3. At this point Snow wrote “Yes” in the margin.
4. Not identified.
5. At this point Snow wrote “OK” on the source text.