68. NSC Report1
NSC 5816
Washington, July 1,
1958
[Facsimile Page 1]
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
REFERENCE
The President, on the recommendation of the Chairman, Net Evaluation
Subcommittee, approved on June 25, 1958, the withdrawal of NSC 5728 and the issuance, on a special
limited-distribution basis, of the amended Directive enclosed herewith as
NSC 5816. The amendment consists of the
deletion of the last two sentences of paragraph 3 and of subparagraphs 3–a, b and c of NSC 5728, and the substitution therefore of a
new paragraph 3.
The enclosed Directive has also been revised in paragraph 5, to include on
the membership of the Subcommittee the Director of the Office
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of Defense and
Civilian Mobilization in place of the Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, in accordance
with Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, effective July 1, 1958.
NSC 5816, as approved by the President is
transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council,
and is being referred to the members of the Subcommittee for appropriate
implementation.
The enclosed Directive supersedes NSC
5728.
Special security precautions should be observed in the
handling of the enclosure, with access thereto limited to those
individuals having a strict “need to know” in the performance of their
official duties.
James S. Lay,
Jr.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Enclosure
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DIRECTIVE
on
A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
- 1.
- Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security Council
in NSC Action No. 1260–b (November 4, 1954) and my subsequent
approval thereof, I hereby establish the following permanent
procedure (superseding NSC 5605) to
provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to
inflict direct injury upon the continental United States and to
provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly
alter those net capabilities.
- 2.
- Each integrated evaluation should:
- a.
- Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;
- b.
- Include consideration of the several courses of action
which the USSR is capable
of executing; and
- c.
- Take into account the estimated future status of approved
military and non-military U.S. defense programs.
- 3.
- Each integrated evaluation report should estimate, from the
practical standpoint, the extent and effect of direct injury,
including radioactive fall-out, upon the continental United States,
resulting from the most probable types and weights of attacks which
the USSR is capable
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of
delivering during the nuclear phase of a general war (i.e., the
period during which the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile or means of
delivery of nuclear weapons on the United States would be
substantially expended). Military operations overseas should be
considered only in so far as they (a) require a diversion of Soviet
resources from attack on the continental United States, or (b)
affect U.S. capabilities to execute the Bravo mission and
consequently the Soviet capability to attack the continental United
States. Each report should consider, in so far as damage to the
USSR is concerned, the effects
of U.S. attacks on the USSR which
would affect their capability to damage the United States. In
addition, a general estimate should be made of the over-all effects
of the U.S. attacks against the USSR which would show the general order of magnitude of
destruction, disruption of communications and government, and loss
of life in the USSR. In arriving
at this general estimate, it is not expected or anticipated that
detailed analyses will be undertaken. An evaluation will be made
annually on the basis of an assumption or assumptions of
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conditions
under which a general nuclear war might be initiated. Such
assumption(s) should be developed by the Subcommittee after careful
consideration of the implication of the world situation, and
submitted for my approval.
- 4.
- Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Council on or
before November 15 of each year, and relate to the situation on a
critical date normally about three years in the future. In addition
to these annual integrated evaluations, an integrated evaluation
should be submitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee
feels that a change has become apparent that would significantly
alter the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury upon the continental
United States.
- 5.
- In order to prepare these integrated evaluations I hereby
establish a Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security
Council, composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
will serve as Chairman, the Director of the Office of Defense and
Civilian Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Each Subcommittee
member shall be consulted regarding and given ample opportunity to
review the following prior to adoption by the Subcommittee: (a)
subsidiary terms of reference, (b) the assumptions to be used as a
basis for each evaluation report, (c) the complete evaluation report
(less background material, which shall be made available only on a
“need-to-know” basis), and (d) any recommendations which the
Subcommittee may choose to submit. If the Director of the
Subcommittee Staff, after adoption of the evaluation report by the
Subcommittee, has any additional comments which he believes should
be presented to the
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NSC, such comments may be submitted
to the President, through the Chairman of the Subcommittee, for
consideration. The Chairman of the Subcommittee, in consultation
with the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, will prepare
regulations and establish procedures for the handling of highly
sensitive information2 required in
the preparation of an evaluation report so as to safeguard its
security on a strict “need-to-know” basis and to preclude the
assembly of an unwarranted amount of sensitive information in one
document. Such
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regulations and procedures shall not be finally
adopted until the other members of the Subcommittee have been
consulted concerning them.
- 6.
- Subcommittee members are designated to act as individuals, but
each shall have the right to consult, at his discretion and under
appropriate security safeguards, with his agency or committee prior
to Subcommittee action on matters normally within the cognizance of
his committee or agency. In subscribing to the reports and
recommendations of the Subcommittee the individual members shall not
be expected to assume responsibility for technical matters or
conclusions not normally within the cognizance of his own parent
committee or agency. Reports as submitted to the Council should
show, so far as possible by textual footnotes, any dissents by
Subcommittee members.
- 7.
- The Subcommittee will have a Staff, composed of individuals
assigned by member agencies, as required by the Director, and under
the direction of a Director whom I shall designate. The Director may
be compensated through the National Security Council from
contributions by the member agencies. Individuals assigned to the
Staff from each military service and by the Central Intelligence
Agency should normally serve for two years and be so appointed that,
to insure continuity, not more than fifty per cent will vacate each
year.
- 8.
- The Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established is empowered
under the terms of this Directive to call on any agency of the
Government for relevant information, evaluations, and estimates,
subject only to establishment of appropriate security regulations
and procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as
provided under paragraph 5 above.
- 9.
- Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report will be
determined at the time by me.
