The enclosed memorandum from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the
attached study on the subject,2 prepared by the
Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with
appropriate participation of the Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to
the plan concurred in by NSC Action No.
1881, are transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security
Council at its meeting on Thursday, June 26, 1958.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Attachment
Memorandum for the National Security Council From McElroy and John Foster Dulles
Washington, June 17,
1958
[Facsimile Page 2]
SUBJECT
- Study relative to the Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military
Operations in Response to NSC
Action No. 1881
1. There is submitted herewith a coordinated study of United States and
allied capabilities for limited military operations to July 1961,
prepared by the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, with appropriate participation of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
2. We wish at the outset to stress the limitations of this study.
a. It does not examine capabilities for limited
military operations against Soviet armed forces. The study was
undertaken within the framework of our current strategic concept which
holds that a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and the United States are overtly
engaged is a general war.
b. It does not examine capabilities for limited
military operations against an enemy using nuclear weapons. The study
assumes that enemy use of nuclear weapons to 1 July 1961 would be
construed as overt employment of Soviet armed forces.
c. It does not examine capabilities for covert
limited military operations.
d. The study’s approach to limited military
operations in the Far East is based upon an assumption—i.e., “that the
United States could engage in effective military action against mainland
China without undue risk of initiating general war”—which the NSC observed in
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Action No. 1881–c was “to be
regarded only as a working assumption for the purposes of this
study.”
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e. The study is not a complete and final analysis
of limited military operations upon which the size and nature of United
States forces required for limited military operations can be determined
for future years. Estimates of enemy action were, of necessity,
hypothetical and thus are not a basis for military planning. None of the
situations studied have been war-gamed. The conclusions and
recommendations, based as they are on hypothetical but possible
situations, should not be considered as definitive.
3. We consider the significant findings of the study to be as
follows:
a. U.S. Capabilities
(1) Within the limitations set forth in paragraph 2 and if the use of
nuclear weapons as required to achieve military objectives is
authorized, United States capabilities for limited military operations
are adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations of the nature
examined.
(2) In many such limited military operations, the use of nuclear weapons
would be required only as an unlikely last resort.
(3) In the Far East, however, the United States does not now have a ready
non-nuclear capability which alone could cope satisfactorily with
limited military operations against overtly engaged substantial
Communist forces. The selective use of nuclear weapons against such
forces and the facilities supporting them would be necessary.
(4) The withholding of authorization to use nuclear weapons for limited
military operations against overtly engaged substantial Communist forces
in the Far East would be likely to entail requirements for additional
overseas deployment of United States forces, the construction of bases
and other facilities overseas, augmentation of sea/airlift in being and
expanded logistic support capabilities and “pipelines” both overseas and
in the United States.
(5) The burden of the initial military response will fall on the U.S.
forces deployed in or near the area involved, regardless of Service.
Prompt and vigorous response by these forces may obviate a requirement
for major reinforcements.
(6) The effectiveness of United States limited military operations will
be affected by the timely availability of sea/airlift for the provision
of logistic support to our own and friendly forces and particularly for
the movement from the United States of ground forces committed to
action. To the extent that the limited military operations examined in
this study are expected to affect adversely our posture for general war,
the temporary diversion of transport from general war tasks is usually
cited as the principal adverse factor.
[Facsimile Page 4]
(7) Only small numbers of “clean” nuclear weapons, which will be in the
high yield category, will be available to United States forces to 1 July
1961.
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b. Allied Capabilities
(1) The indigenous forces which we might find it necessary to support in
limited military operations will have widely varying capabilities. Some,
such as the GRC and ROK forces, have significant capabilities on the
ground. Practically all have marked deficiencies in air and naval
capabilities.
(2) Very few of our allies could or would provide significant forces for
limited military operations outside their national territory. Most lack
capability. Some, e.g. Pakistan facing a real or assumed threat from
India, would be loath to send substantial forces abroad. The provision
of forces by others, e.g. France in the Middle East, would be
politically disadvantageous.
(3) Our allies can provide base and other facilities that will ease and
lend flexibility to the application of United States power in limited
military operations.
c. Political Considerations
(1) Failure by the United States to undertake effective limited military
operations in support of other free nations in situations such as those
examined would have seriously adverse consequences throughout the free
world, particularly among our allies, and would encourage the Communists
to adopt a more aggressive posture.
(2) Anticipation of the need for United States limited military
operations in developing situations and the earliest possible decisions
(i) to intervene if necessary and (ii) on the nature and objectives of
the intervention are essential.
(3) We need the political support of our allies for United States limited
military operations. We should also ensure that appropriate regional
collective security organizations and their members have some military
role, no matter how minor, in such operations in order to maintain the
solidarity and raison d’etre of these organizations.
(4) Emotional aversion to nuclear weapons is widespread in the free
world, particularly among Asians, and our use of these weapons in
limited military operations would incur seriously adverse political
consequences.
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4. We make the following additional observations.
a. The study understandably devotes relatively
little attention to the deterrent aspects of United States capabilities
for limited military operations. Deterrence of local aggression
undertaken or inspired by, or serving the interests of, the Communists
is a major aim. As the study suggests, timely political action supported
by capabilities for limited operations can frequently avert the need for
the commitment of United States forces in combat.
b. The determinative factors in decisions as to
the initiation and conduct of United States limited military operations
are political rather than military. In practically all likely
situations, it is the political
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consequences for our general position in the world
of inaction or action, and the nature of our action, that will govern
United States decisions.
c. Selective nuclear strikes deep into Communist
China, as contemplated in the Quemoy and Matsu, Taiwan and Korea
hypothetical situations, could elicit a Sino-Soviet nuclear response.
Serious consideration would, therefore, have to be given to the
proclamation of at least a limited national emergency if the United
States were to undertake limited military operations of this nature.
d. The increased possibility of general war
inherent in most limited military operations requires precautionary and
alerting steps. Even one limited military operation requiring heavy
logistic support and deployment of major forces from the United States
might necessitate partial mobilization.
e. Additional comments which should be taken into
consideration in any possible further use of this study are contained in
the Annex immediately hereunder.
5. We make the following recommendations.
a. The Director of Central Intelligence should be
asked to initiate the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates on
(i) world reactions and (ii) Sino-Soviet military reactions to United
States use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations against
Communist (non-Soviet) forces in the Far East.
b. The findings of the present study with respect
to the availability of allied forces for employment outside their
national territory should be taken into account among other factors in
the review of 1962 force goals for nations receiving United States
military assistance directed by NSC
Action No. 1908.
[Facsimile Page 6]
c. Greater efforts should be made to clarify to
the free world United States intentions with respect to the use of
nuclear weapons and to inform the free world of the radiation effects of
low yield weapons and their relative efficiency in certain limited
military operations.
- /s/ Neil
McElroy
- /s/ John
Foster Dulles
