Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

599. Memorandum From Parsons (FE) to Merchant¹

Washington, September 20, 1960

SUBJECT

• Possible addition of Communist China to 10-Nation Disarmament Commission

My reactions from the strictly Far East viewpoint to a U.S. proposal to add the Federal Republic of Germany and Communist China to the 10 nation Disarmament Group are as follows:

1. It has long been the United States position that Communist China must indeed be included in any effective disarmament scheme but that until it is determined that the U.S.S.R. will agree to such a scheme rather than merely making propaganda, it would be premature to bring in the Chinese Communists whose interest it is to exploit disarmament only to expose the imperialists, i.e. propaganda. We think our present stance is still sound and serviceable.

2. This position has the merit of minimizing pressures upon us as regards United Nations representation. If we think it important here and now to bring the Chinese Communists into the disarmament negotiations, we would be urged to concede that their presence in the United Nations would be important too. We could justify a seeming inconsistency in this regard if we could say we had evidence of a favorable Chinese Communist position on disarmament but our evidence is just to the contrary.

3. If Mr. Khrushchev for reasons related to his dispute with the Chinese Communists makes a big pitch to get them into the United Nations, I do not think we could one day go all out to oppose this and then turn around and propose adding them to the 10 nation group. The sophisticated nations might understand but they are in the minority.

4. If Chinese Representation problem goes routinely, point 2 applies less obviously but nonetheless importantly, I think.

5. In so far as the exacerbation of Soviet-Chinese Communist relations is concerned, I could argue for throwing the monkey wrench either way. On balance I feel that they are more likely to stick together if they are at the same table than if one is sulking in outermost Peiping. Also, if they are at the same table, the Russians will no longer feel a partial responsibility and will tell us to deal directly with the Chinese Communists.

6. In the Far East any apparent change of United States attitude toward the Chinese Communists arouses apprehension. Indeed, even the invitation to Khrushchev to come here a year ago caused consternation. The Thai are already jittery and critical as you know because we have been allegedly less anti-Communist and firm in Laos than we should have been. The Vietnamese and others in some degree share this concern.

7. I am afraid that this proposal would appear to many as a gimmick, none too sincere, at the expense of a substantive policy to which we have long consistently adhered. If some one else were to propose this, some of my misgivings would be removed but I would still suspect that we would be opening one or more boxes of Pandora with no clear sight ahead as to how to put the contents back under the lid or lids. There is little doubt that if present the Chinese would aggressively seek to blackmail the “imperialists” and try to divide them. We would be dealing across the table with two arch-obstructionists instead of one.

8. Incidentally, Chou-en-lai has said he would not take part in any disarmament conference involving countries, which have not recognized Communist China.

9. Finally, I am told the Department is putting the final touches on a Disarmament paper which rejects the idea of bringing the Chinese Communists into the group.

Copies to:

IO—Mr. Wilcox

S/AE—Mr. Farley

CA—Mr. Martin

1. Source: Possible addition of Communist China to Ten-Nation Disarmament Commission. Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1772.