Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

573. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 23, 1960

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Principals on Disarmament and Nuclear Testing Conference

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by asking whether there were any comments on the latest draft of the “Program for General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control”. The Secretary said he understood the paper had been fairly well staffed out. He felt there might be a problem with some of our Allies as to the provision for establishment of zones of inspection but felt this provision should be left in the paper; it might prove to be a good trading point.

Mr. Gray felt that the U.S. might be making a mistake in adopting certain Soviet phraseology for inclusion in the revised disarmament plan and mentioned, as an example, the phrase “security of citizens”. He felt that we should be careful not to include in the new plan concepts which are alien to U.S. traditions.

Ambassador Eaton agreed that some language from the Soviet papers had been incorporated in the new draft where it was acceptable to us. He noted that the Soviets use the term “security forces” while the term “security of citizens” was U.S. phraseology. Ambassador Eaton felt that we should not be obdurate and refuse to accept any Soviet terminology, even when acceptable to us.

Secretary Gates stated that he had an opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the latest draft plan, the substance of which was that the plan was acceptable militarily. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also pointed out that the U.S. would be under pressure to modify the new plan and that the U.S. should stand firm with this plan. Secretary Gates added that Defense thought the sentence in the new plan referring to “blank number” of kilograms of fissionable material for the transfer from past production to peaceful uses should be deleted. At a later date, after Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the AEC had studied this matter further, a specific number could be transmitted to Ambassador Eaton for his use in explaining the plan. It was preferable, Secretary Gates commented, for Ambassador Eaton to specify the quantity of kilograms in a speech rather than to include this number in the plan itself. Mr. Allen said he felt it would be well to have a definite figure in the plan when it is presented in Geneva. Secretary Gates thought it would be possible to arrive at a definite figure by the middle of the following week, but he would prefer that the sentence not appear in the draft given to the Allies. The Principals agreed that the sentence in question would be deleted.

Chairman McCone mentioned that the term “fissionable materials” involved both uranium 235 and plutonium. The U.S. could transfer uranium, but because of the military needs for plutonium, we could not agree to transfer that material. He had, therefore, suggested to Ambassador Eaton that the term “weapons grade highly-enriched uranium” be used in the draft plan in place of the term “fissionable materials”. Chairman McCone recalled that Ambassador Eaton had not wished to change the terminology which had been used for some time. Ambassador Eaton replied that, if a sentence referring to specific quantities of fissionable material to be transferred were, at a later date, inserted in the draft plan the AEC wording might then be used. Mr. Smith suggested that it might be desirable to use the singular form of the term “fissionable materials” when referring to transfers but to make the term plural when referring to the cut-off, since the cut-off would include all fissionable materials. Chairman McCone thought this might be one way of handling the problem. Secretary Gates remarked that, if his suggestion were followed, the sentence regarding quantities to be transferred would not appear in the plan at all, but would appear in a speech to be made by Ambassador Eaton.

Secretary Herter stated that, while there might be difficulties with our Allies on the plan, a paper reflecting the lowest common denominator would not be worth having. He felt that the U.S. should move. The Secretary noted that a copy of the plan had been sent to the President, as a draft which was to be considered by the Principals. There had been no reaction as yet from the President. Pending that, The Secretary concluded that he understood the Principals were now in agreement on the text of the plan and that Ambassador Eaton could proceed to consultations with the Allies on the basis of the revised plan (TAB A).

Secretary Herter then turned to the question of a resolution to be presented to Congress requesting relief from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (TAB B). The resolution would permit the inspection of the interior of a nuclear device by representatives of the three original parties to the proposed treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. Chairman McCone reported that he had undertaken consultations with Congressional leaders and, while he could not guarantee favorable Congressional action, the reaction of the people he had consulted had been encouraging. He recommended that the draft resolution be sent at once to the President if the Principals agreed with the text.

Chairman McCone then stated that this resolution involved the question of the conduct of the negotiations on testing from this point on. He felt that, if the Soviets rejected an offer by the U.S. to open certain nuclear devices to inspection in connection with the seismic research program, it would clearly indicate that the Soviets were following a policy of placing one impediment after another in the path of negotiations. Secretary Herter agreed that, if Congress acted favorably on this resolution and the Soviets did not accept the proposal, it would seem virtually impossible to reach an understanding with them on a research program. Chairman McCone said he felt the U.S. should break off the negotiations on testing if the Soviets turned down this proposal. The Secretary remarked that certainly the justification we had given for a moratorium would break down if the Soviets refused to join with us in a coordinated research program to improve underground detection of nuclear tests.

Secretary Gates felt that the resolution also might create problems with our Allies, since information is withheld from them on the type of device we propose to disclose to the Soviets. Furthermore, Secretary Gates said, if the precedent of disclosing the interior of a nuclear device were extended to the Plowshare program, the U.S. would be in difficulties for the reason that in the Plowshare program it is proposed to use very sophisticated types of nuclear weapons. He felt strongly that, if we agreed to open the “black boxes” to be used in the research program, and if the proposal is still not accepted by the Soviet Union, the U.S. should walk out of the test talks.

Chairman McCone felt that our position with respect to our NATO Allies could be defended. However, as regards opening up the “black boxes” the staffs of both the Defense Department and the AEC were quite worried, because of the possibility of opening nuclear devices in the Plowshare program. For example, the theory of the “Ditch-digger”, a device which might be used to dig canals, would have to be tested in Nevada. This was such an advanced theory that the interior of this device could, perhaps, not even be exposed to the U.K. (Chairman McCone noted, in passing, that the Vice President had told Secretary Gates and himself on the preceding day that the Plowshare program should go forward without delay.)

Chairman McCone then stated that, with respect to the resolution, its provisions fell short of what Tsarapkin was requesting. Tsarapkin was insisting on the right to sample materials that went into the assembly of the nuclear devices and also wanted to have the blueprints, Chairman McCone felt this was a ridiculous request.

Secretary Gates reiterated that he felt we would be under pressure from our Allies after making this offer of opening a nuclear device for the Soviet Union. Mr. Smith felt that the French would not try to get information through the medium of the test talks, since they wanted to have nothing to do with the talks.

Chairman McCone asked whether the Principals were agreed that the negotiations on testing were finished if the Soviets did not accept the offer which the passage of the resolution by the Congress would make possible. The Secretary remarked we seemed pretty close to the end of the negotiations even now, and that we had no obligation at the present time not to test. Mr. Smith referred to the resolution and asked whether it was necessary to use the word “representatives”, which implied many people would be looking into the nuclear devices. He felt the wording should be a “qualified representatives.” This would strictly limit the number of people who would be participating in the exercise. After some discussion, it was agreed that the word “representatives” might be modified by the addition of the words “limited” or “qualified”. Chairman McCone felt that the number of representatives could be controlled.

Chairman McCone added that he felt the conversations with Congress should be kept in the closest confidence. If the resolution were not acceptable to Congress. This fact could be used against us by the Soviet Union. Mr. Gray agreed and thought everyone in the room should be cautioned to be very careful about discussing this matter.

The Secretary asked Mr. Keeny what progress had been made by the panel of scientists working on the problem of the minimum number of nuclear explosions to be conducted in the seismic research program. Mr. Keeny replied that there had been no agreement on what a minimum program of nuclear shots should be, due in part to the unclarity as to what was meant by the term “minimum” and due, also, to some technical problems. He thought it was significant that not too much disarmament had appeared with regard to the general program as it had previously been drawn up. Everyone had agreed that the decoupling phase of the program should be included, but there had not been agreement on the exact number of the shots to be conducted. The Secretary inquired whether the committee would be definitive as to the number of shots required. Secretary Gates answered that the exact number of explosions needed would not be definitely known until the program had gotten underway. The Secretary expressed the hope that the scientific community would reach unanimity on this problem.

Mr. Keeny said that the committee had not been certain whether the time required for the conducting of the seismic research program should be considered as 18–24 months or three years. With larger yield shots and a three-year period of research, fewer nuclear explosions would be required. Mr. Keeny and General Starbird pointed out that with larger shots, problems of a technical and engineering nature arose, such as the problem of larger excavations, which would prolong the period of research to three years.

Chairman McCone brought up another matter—that of Soviet insistence that the research program be agreed among the three parties in the negotiations. Chairman McCone felt an “agreed” program was nonsense; it should rather be carried out in a “coordinated” manner.

Secretary Gates asked if the record of this meeting of Principals would show that the Principals were agreed that if the Congress passed the resolution being presented to it, and if the Soviets did not accept the U.S. offer made possible by the passage of the resolution, the negotiations on discontinuance of nuclear tests would be broken off.

The Secretary repeated that the justification for a moratorium on nuclear testing would be lost if the seismic research program did not go forward; the final decision on such a step as a break-off of the negotiations would, of course, be up to the President.

Mr. Gray said that, if the program offered to the Soviets were rejected out of hand, the U.S. should then be in a position immediately to carry out the steps necessary to give us the type of posture we want globally. Since an outright rejection of the program by the Soviet Union was at least a possibility, we should make advance preparations as to what steps we would take. Mr. Dillon said the most likely outcome was a fuzzy reply by the Soviets which would be neither outright rejection nor acceptance. In this case, the Principals would have to meet again to settle the problem.

Both Secretary Gates and Chairman McCone wanted it made clear as to what would happen if the Soviets did not accept the research program proposed to them by the U.S. Chairman McCone added that everyone he would be consulting in Congress would want to know whether the negotiations will be broken off, if Congress passed the resolution and the Soviets rejected the program. The Secretary replied that he would think they would be; he thought the President would think so too. An outright Soviet rejection would give us good grounds to break off negotiations.

PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING OF PRINCIPALS ON JUNE 23, 1960 AT 8:45 A.M.

• • Department of State:
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Assistant Secretary Kohler
  • Assistant Secretary Smith
  • Ambassador Eaton
  • S/S—Mr. Mau
  • SOV—Mr. Dubs
  • S/AE—Messrs. Sullivan, Spiers, Baker, Toon, Goodby
• • Department of Defense:
  • Secretary Gates
  • Under Secretary Douglas
  • Assistant Secretary Irwin
  • General Dabney
  • General Fox
  • Mr. Lanier
• • Atomic Energy Commission:
  • Chairman McCone
  • General Starbird
  • Dr. English
• • Central Intelligency Agency:
  • Deputy Director Cabell
  • Deputy Director Amory
• • White House:
  • Mr. Gray
  • Mr. Keeny
• • United States Information Agency:
  • Mr. Allen

1. Source: Disarmament and nuclear test conferences. Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, ’60.