Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

571. Letter From Caccia to Herter¹

Washington, June 22, 1960

Dear Chris,

Selwyn has asked me to send you the enclosed personal note about disarmament.

I think that it speaks for itself. But he has asked me particularly to say that the last thing he wants to do is to throw any monkey wrench into any works that may be in hand. Hence the very personal form of his letter.

At the same time he does feel strongly that we shall need to play this hand with great care as this is the area in which we and the Communist bloc still have business dealings, and unlike last year there will not be the same prospect of a Summit meeting as there was when the Assembly met in 1959. From long experience he knows, as you do, that it is not possible to set the stage for disarmament discussions at short notice. It is for this reason, amongst others, that he would value your views on how this problem should be handled with the object of our having a good position and the initiative when the Assembly meets.

I have an appointment to see you tomorrow and shall be most grateful if you can give me at least some preliminary reaction at that time.

Yours sincerely,

Harold Caccia

Enclosure

Message From Lloyd to Herter

TEXT OF MESSAGE

My dear Chris,

It seems to me that over the next nine months or so the struggle between East and West for world opinion may well be concentrated in the field of disarmament. This is the one area in which the free world and the Communist bloc are now seriously in contact and discussion, and the way in which each side conducts itself will be watched with the closest attention all over the world and especially in the uncommitted countries. As you know, I have always argued that we need to conduct our disarmament discussions with two main objectives in mind. First, to achieve some concrete progress by the implementation of some specific measure or measures which would increase confidence and open the road to further progress. Nuclear tests come in this category. Secondly, to retain or win the support of world opinion for our standpoint on disarmament. This seems to me best done by demonstrating that we are absolutely genuine in our desire to bring about substantial and far-reaching disarmament, provided always we can assure ourselves with regard to our own security through a system of international control and verification together with the establishment of effective peace-keeping machinery. Under these conditions we at least are prepared to go to the end of the road. If the way seems blocked, it must be clearly seen to be because the Communists refuse to accept these reasonable and necessary conditions and not because of any reluctance of the part of the West.

I have always felt that this is the posture that we must constantly try to maintain and it is in this context that I wished to let you have my private thoughts on the present state of play in the disarmament discussions.

Since we last talked together, the Russians have come forward with their new proposals. They are for obvious reasons quite unacceptable. It was also perhaps fortunate that Mr. Khrushchev put up such a deplorable exhibition in the press conference at which he introduced them, so that it was widely interpreted as indicating that the Russians were not very serious about them. Nevertheless, the proposals do contain, for the most part in quite the wrong sequence, virtually every measure put forward in the Western Plan. In addition Zorin has been saying that he is fully prepared to consider any suggestions and amendments that the West cares to propose. This superficially flexible and reasonable approach is, I am afraid, bound to make an increasingly favorable impression and will gain them much undeserved support outside and in the United Nations. This impression will be reinforced if the West after three months of negotiations are unable to point to any move that they have made since tabling their plan in March. In these circumstances the Russians having by their new proposals gained the initiative, will succeed in exploiting it to our disadvantage. I regard this as a serious and major danger to the overall Western position at this stage in East-West relations.

How are we to prevent this? The alternatives seem to me to be the following:

(A) We stand by our existing plan and make no move; we restate its advantages and do our best to discredit the new Russian proposals. This would be a rational course but I think our position would steadily deteriorate the longer the talks in Geneva continued and when we came to the United Nations we might find our position more vulnerable. We would be thoroughly on the defensive.

(B) We could try and refurbish the Western plan and submit it to the conference as a new Five-Power proposal. The trouble is that this might prove quite a lengthy proceeding and indeed once we re-opened the whole discussion between the five Western Powers, and presumably in NATO, it is by no means certain that we could reach unanimous agreement in time to be of any use. On the other hand, we might be able to do this in time for the Assembly.

(C) One or two of the Western partners might introduce another set of proposals perhaps in outline rather than in detailed form. This would, of course, be worked out with the full knowledge of your people, if in the end you preferred not to be one of the authors. It would be in such a form that you could give it a general welcome and promise it the most sympathetic consideration, but you would not be committed to it. I have in mind the same sort of procedure we adopted over the Anglo-French plans of 1954 and 1956 and over our plan at last year’s Assembly. In each case you made sympathetic noises but were not committed. I think that the last exercise at the United Nations served as quite a useful counterweight to Mr. Khrushchev’s much publicised plan put forward the following day.

Weighing up the alternatives I see some advantages in course C and I would very much like to hear how it strikes you. If you felt that it had some merits it would then be important to decide on the timing. Here there would seem to be two alternatives:—

(A) For us to work out the proposals as quickly as possible with a view to submitting them in the Ten-Power Committee in Geneva. The ideal target date might be about the middle of July on the assumption that the conference is likely to have to adjourn at the end of July in order that a report can be prepared for the Disarmament Commission and that all concerned can have some break before the General Assembly. The objective would be to regain the initiative from the Russians before the recess.

(B) To take a little more time to work out the new proposals with a view to introducing them in the United Nations forum in September. Again the objective would be to regain the initiative for the West before the United Nations began its debates on disarmament. At the same time a drawback to this alternative might be that we would appear to be leaving ourselves in a bad posture throughout the Geneva talks and it would almost certainly be necessary therefore to agree to take some smaller initiatives in the committee in order to indicate that the West was not entirely rigid and inflexible. I have in mind minor amendments to the Western plan and proposals for joint studies of those measures on which both sides agree.

I have been turning these matters over in my mind and in the absence of an opportunity to talk them over with you personally, I thought I should send you my private thoughts in strictest confidence. None of our partners knows anything of this. Please let me know frankly what you think of all this.

In the meantime, we are putting together some ideas for an initiative such as that suggested in paragraph 4(C) above.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Selwyn

1. Source: Transmits a message from Lloyd to Herter on Western position in disarmament talks. Personal and Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.