Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

568. Memorandum From Twining to Gates¹

JCSM–236–60

Washington, June 13, 1960

SUBJECT

• Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests in accordance with your memorandum, dated 26 January 1960. Cognizance has also been taken of recent events such as the THRESHOLD proposal, made by the United States during February, and subsequent related actions.

2. Specific comments on the treaty itself, to include inspection and control aspects and the estimated installation and operating costs of the control system, are contained in the Appendix hereto.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their views on 21 August 1959, in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, that an adequate military posture for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat. It is recognized that if an enforceable test ban agreement is concluded and implemented the United States will not achieve such a spectrum of weapons. However, a nuclear test ban treaty which would guarantee a cessation of testing by the Sino-Soviets as well as the United States could theoretically be to the relative U.S. military advantage. The present estimated preponderance of the U.S. stockpile relative to that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the current U.S. lead in sophistication of nuclear weapon systems are factors which, if taken in isolation, could justify U.S. acceptance of an enforceable test ban from a security standpoint. Unless a test ban treaty could guarantee a cessation of testing in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, with its resultant effect on Soviet weapons and stockpile development, further U.S. testing for sophistication of the components of various existing weapon systems as well as basic development of new weapons is deemed vital. The anti-missile missile is not the least of this latter category.

4. The recent trend of the Geneva test ban negotiations offers little [illegible in the original] for a treaty that would ensure a cessation of testing in the closed society of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. An inadequately safeguarded treaty, however, would be self-enforcing in the open societies of the West. The introduction of the U.S. THRESHOLD proposal with its attendant moratorium and inadequate detection, inspection and control system justifies reiteration and re-emphasis of the dangers of such an unsafeguarded agreement to the security of the United States.

5. The conclusion of a treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests without adequate safeguards would set a dangerous precedent for the Ten Nation negotiations, particularly in respect to the proposal for cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, phased reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles and eventual elimination of the use of nuclear weapons. For the past decade, the Soviets have pressed for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, consequently, there will be a tendency to equate a nuclear weapons test ban with a ban on their use. This point the Sino-Soviet Bloc would undoubtedly pursue to the maximum in an effort to offset our present nuclear advantage.

6. Acceptance of the presently proposed test ban treaty, the provisions of which do not provide for adequate safeguards, would establish a dangerous precedent for the Ten Nation negotiations and would make it increasingly difficult to insist on adequate control for the above mentioned nuclear disarmament measures which have already been tabled. The historical U.S. position of insistence upon adequate safeguards (required by Basic National Secretary Policy) appears to be deteriorating rapidly in the interest of arriving at agreement. Although the decision to announce a unilateral moratorium below the THRESHOLD has already been made public, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a technical analysis and experimental verification of the effectiveness of the proposed control and inspection system should be made and the results evaluated before any moratorium is actually implemented. The fact that prominent and patriotic U.S. scientists insist that adequate inspection and control is impossible due to difficulties in the high altitude and underground environment is, in itself, good reason to require that such an analysis be made. The decision on a unilateral moratorium below the THRESHOLD was based primarily on political considerations which in no way removes technical difficulties involved in developing an effective control and inspection system in high altitude and underground environments.

7. As previously stated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it essential to the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent to periodically detonate weapons to test systems and techniques for the employment of nuclear weapons to ensure operational reliability, and to further sophisticate weapon systems. Unless a safeguarded treaty could ensure a cessation of testing by the closed society of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, these requirements must be fulfilled continuously in order to provide for the security of the United States. The most important matter of concern now, however, is the apparent movement of the United States away from a safeguarded treaty to one of “good faith” which has always been the Soviet approach. A prolonged moratorium without satisfactory development of a reliable control system achieves essentially the same results for the Soviets as an agreed and ratified treaty. Any test cessation agreement accepted on faith alone gives the Sino-Soviet Bloc, with its closed society, an advantage in altering the present military posture ratio. As such it would be militarily undesirable to the United States. The frustration of the U.N. truce team in Korea is an example of the danger of accepting the principle of agreement on good faith with the hope of working out the details of control during the implementation of an agreement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED TREATY FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS (U)

1. Comments on Basic Treaty Proposals.

a. Despite agreement reached thus far on the preamble, 17 articles and one annex to the treaty, the most significant issues are still unresolved. The parts agreed deal principally with broad statements of objectives and with procedural and administrative matters relating to implementation of the treaty. Moreover much of that which has been agreed is actually subject to terms and provisions of the treaty not yet agreed.

b. Obviously there is a fundamental difference between the U.S. and USSR positions to date. The United States insists upon the development of an adequate detection identification and control system first, with signing of the treaty to follow. The Soviets desire a treaty first with vague reference to later development of adequate controls. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the U.S. position in this matter reflects Basic National Security Policy of the United States.

c. U.S. efforts during February to break the negotiation stalemate by proposing the THRESHOLD² approach appear to have opened the door to deterioration of U.S. position of insistence upon adequate treaty safeguards. The moratorium below the THRESHOLD insisted upon by the Soviets and agreed upon by the United States, is a departure from adequate safeguards. However, more serious is the possibility of retreating further to include the moratorium as a part of the treaty itself and including below the “THRESHOLD” in the inspection quotas agreed upon.

2. Inspection and Control Aspects.

The technical aspects of the inspection and control system are contained in Annex I, Detection and Identification System (DIS). There are, however, important decision making and overall control type measures included in those treaty articles not yet agreed. Because of limited success in reaching agreement in both of these areas, the United States in February tabled the THRESHOLD proposal.³ This proposal presumes adequate capability now to detect nuclear explosions above seismic magnitudes of 4.75. Scientists are not in agreement that such detection is presently feasible. This was highlighted during the conference of experts held during August 1958 and later during Technical Working Group Two meetings held during November and December of 1959. The final report of the latter group reflects that there are areas of disagreement regarding the interpretation of the new data from the HARDTACK experiments and regarding the question of de-coupling. More recently, Dr. Edward Teller’s testimony before a congressional committee on 20 April 1960 indicated several different methods by which nuclear explosions can go undetected. He further testified that an adequate control system would not be feasible for at least a decade. Even Hans Bethe, a leading scientific advocate of a ban on tests, was in regretful agreement to the inadequacy of the Geneva detection system. These and other considerations indicate that technology has not yet provided a reliable system for detecting and identifying all types and magnitudes of nuclear detonations within the earth’s atmosphere, much less in outer space. The detection inspection and control system as envisioned within the treaty should be critically and carefully re-examined formally by scientific experts, both nationally and internationally, to determine the adequacy of this system.

3. Comments on Estimated Installation and Operating Costs of the Control System.

a. The Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC) estimate on the cost of the control system recommended by the Geneva Conference of experts was examined and found to be a reasonable estimate of dollar expenditure for that system. However, the addition of an outer space satellite capability for detecting high altitude explosions and the requirements which would be imposed in developing a lower THRESHOLD would raise the system cost to an amount greatly in excess of the AFTAC estimate. For example, the cost figure arrived at by AFTAC to install the Geneva system and operate it for one year is $1,643,545,756. If the number of control posts were increased by a factor of five, as has been suggested by some to insure acceptable reliability of even the Geneva system, this figure is raised to over $8,000,000,000.

b. Consideration of the additional control posts as unmanned stations may be expected to reduce the costs of installations and operation. The reliability of such installations, however, is open to serious doubt. For example recorded data is of no value until analyzed and evaluated. Transmitting such data to manned stations would have to be automatic. Also, back-up equipment with “fail safe” automatic cut-in capability would have to be provided to assure no breakdown. Stations would have to be protected against sabotage, thievery and vandalism. All of these and other problems will be aggravated because of the remote siting of unmanned posts. Failure to adequately safeguard the equipment could result in a low confidence factor for the whole system. Because of the undetermined number of unmanned stations that would be acceptable, and other variables, cost estimates cannot be made. It is believed, however, that savings in personnel and their attendant logistical support will not be in direct proportion to actual costs. The additional sophistication of the equipment, safeguarding the site, and base-to-site logistical support are expensive considerations.

c. Since a satellite detection capability is presently under study by ODDR & E, the cost of that system could not be considered at this time.

1. Source: Conveys JCS views on test ban treaty. Secret. 7 pp. Library of Congress, Twining Papers, Chairman’s File.
2. Department of State message to American Consul, Geneva (NUSUP), circular 1002, dated 10 February 1960 (DA IN 283394). [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Department of State message to the American Consul, Geneva (NUSUP), circular 1002, dated 10 February 1960 (DA IN 283394). [Footnote is in the original.]