566. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test
Group1
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals
PARTICIPANTS
- See attached list. (Page 13)
Secretary Herter suggested that the discussion be based
on the memorandum, subject: “Course of Action in Nuclear Test
Negotiations”, dated June 7, 1960 (TAB A). Particular attention might be
paid to the problem of safeguarding nuclear explosions used in the
research program to ensure against their use for weapons development,
and to the problem of high altitude detection. He expressed regret at
the fact that the Soviets have seen fit to disavow the statements of
their scientists at the recent meetings of the Seismic Research Program
Advisory Groups by denying plans to take part in any coordinated
research program for the purpose of verifying or revising the
recommendations of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts. Since any
declared moratorium is conditioned on agreement as to a coordinated
research program, the moratorium concept is endangered.
Mr. Farley
summarized Soviet objections to the United States-suggested co-ordinated
research program as follows: Too large a number of nuclear tests,
especially small yield tests; study of decoupling which is unnecessary
and undesirable; lack of sufficient safeguards, such as internal
inspection, for ensuring that devices are not being exploded for the
purpose of weapons development.
Mr. Herter
remarked that these objections are much like Soviet objections to our
“Plowshare” program of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. He called on
Mr. McCone to present results of his study as to legal
means by which satisfactory safeguards for ensuring against weapons
development might be offered.
Mr. McCone
responded that the devising of a satisfactory plan presented
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considerable
difficulties. While it is necessary to operate a sophisticated array of
instruments in order to secure really useful weapons information, any
explosion will give at least a “go-no go”
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result and might to that extent
supply some information of value for weapons development. Therefore, he
continued, the possibility of opening the devices for internal
inspection has been considered. To do so, in accordance with the Atomic
Energy Act, the AEC must declassify the
needed devices. Such declassification might make the device available to
countries other than the three nuclear powers, and would thus defeat one
of the major purposes of a treaty; i.e., the prevention of dissemination
of nuclear weapons information. The use of U.K. and Soviet devices has
also been considered. But the AEC would
find it most difficult, under this alternative, to fulfill its statutory
responsibility for safety of atomic devices. Mr.
Herter suggested
that UK devices be examined internally
in the UK and, then, in transport to the
U.S. and thereafter, be handled as are our devices. Mr. McCone remarked
that this would involve quite a cumbersome disassembling and
reassembling procedure. Besides, it is doubtful whether the U.K. is in
possession of devices which could be so used with a range of yields
necessary for the research program.
Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that we declassify some
old gun-type devices of our own; such devices as would not be likely to
assist another country in achieving nuclear capability. Mr. McCone wondered whether such a device would supply
the range of yields necessary for the research program. Dr. English stated that there might be old gun-type
devices which could be specially altered for the purpose of giving the
required yield, but that such alteration would be a difficult task. They
could not be fabricated to yield less than one kiloton. Mr. McCone said that the Kistiakowsky suggestion could be considered. Dr. Kistiakowsky expressed his belief that use of
old gun-type devices, though perhaps not as ideal for the research
program as use of sophisticated small devices, might be adequate and
would be easier to defend from the political standpoint, since there
could hardly be suspicion of use for weapons development purposes. Mr. Herter asked whether the number and size of shots
planned for the VELA program was a
fixed determination from which there should be no departure. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that the Panofsky Panel
had been under no instructions to determine a minimum number and had,
therefore, selected 12 as a desirable number for an adequate program. He
quoted Dr. Panofsky as saying
that the panel would not be unanimous as to a minimum number and minimum
range of yield. Mr. McCone defined the objective of
declassification: To make available old gun-type devices, developed so
as to be of use for a sufficient number of shots (perhaps a few less
than planned for VELA) and not likely
to be of assistance to any powers seeking to develop a nuclear
capability. He expressed doubt that any nation without considerable
nuclear material resources would be able to make
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use of the comparatively
elaborate and extravagant device using large quantities of U–235 which
could be developed. He agreed that the very small nuclear explosions
were not essential, although omitting them would require some
reorientation of the program. Mr. Herter stressed the
importance of obtaining scientific advice within the shortest possible
time as to the possibilities of effective use in the research program of
declassifiable devices, and on the minimum number of nuclear tests
necessary.
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Mr. Northrup announced a meeting to take place
next week of the Panofsky Panel. It is expected that the Latter brothers
and other seismologists will also attend. They are to consider the best
distribution of yields for nuclear devices to be used in the research
program. This group can consider the question raised by the Principals.
Dr. Kistiakowsky defined the question as: The
number and yield of devices which need to be detonated in order to make
worthwhile the research program on improvement of detection and
identification methods. Part of the issue would be the essentiality of
detonation of very small devices, and whether these could perhaps be
replaced. He also suggested that everyone connected with the planning
for Project VELA be included in the
group. Mr. Northrup agreed and proposed also the
addition of Dr. Harold Brown. He expressed confidence that an answer
could be supplied within a week. Mr. Herter asked Mr. McCone whether he would be prepared to accept the
guidelines and conclusions of the group of scientists. Mr. McCone indicated
that he would accept, pointing out that he had accepted the
recommendations as to Project VELA.
Mr. Northrup reported an inclination toward tests
with a yield range from one kiloton to 50 kilotons, rather than yield
ranges beginning at a fraction of a kiloton, as suggested by the United
States at the meetings of the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group.
However, he expressed belief that the need for experimental shots to
determine the effectiveness of decoupling will be reindorsed by the
panel of scientists. Mr. McCone and Mr. Irwin
reaffirmed the importance of including decoupling in the research
program. The study of decoupling is still in the theoretical stage. Mr. McCone said that the negotiations would be at an
impasse if the Soviets do not accept the need for this.
Mr. McCone
promised to inform the panel of scientists as to the type of devices
which can be made available for modification and declassification.
Mr. Farley
remarked that the problem of dissemination of information to nth
countries could be resolved by getting Congressional relief so that
certain devices could be released for the program without being
declassified and disseminated. He said that we would be
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very vulnerable vis-a-vis
the Congress if we throw the blame for our inability to use open devices
on the limitations imposed by domestic law, without having first
consulted with Congress. Mr. McCone stated that the
suggestion was worth considering, and that he would discuss the matter
with the Joint Committee. As to the use of open devices in peaceful uses
projects, it might be possible for Project Gnome and for the Athabasca
oil project, but not for the harbor and canal projects, since these
require devices based on very advanced technology.
Mr. McCone
suggested that we dismiss the idea of using U.K. or Soviet devices and,
instead, attempt to satisfy Soviet objections by declassification or
legal action. Mr. Herter expressed belief that, when a program of
seismic improvement is being carried out earnestly and in good faith,
the scientific group in charge might well decide that a number of
detonations, additional to the minimum agreed number, might serve a
useful purpose. Therefore, the program should be as flexible as
possible, and it should be agreed on as soon as possible.
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Mr. Farley
referred to two other issues on which we hope to obtain agreement soon:
the parties article and the quota provisions. The former is designed to
ensure, as far as possible, the accession of Red China. The U.K. has
promised comment on our proposed language for both articles. Mr. Herter recalled that, based on the report of the
1958 Conference of Experts, we have put forward a proposal calling for
20 on-site inspections in the Soviet Union for events of magnitude 4.75
or above. The Rand Report, summarized at the last meeting of principals
on May 10, has however held out the hope of a reduction in unidentified
events, based on redistribution and possible addition of control
posts.
Mr. Northrup commented that the Rand Report should
only be considered as offering an interesting direction for further
research. It is merely a theoretical indication of progress which might
be made in a research program. He quoted Dr. Richard Latter, who was principally responsible for it,
as stating that no proposal to reduce the quota should be based on this
report until a research program establishes the correctness of its
conclusions. Mr. McCone advocated that the Rand Report not be
considered in any way at this time as a basis for policy changes. Mr. Herter expressed disappointment that there had been
briefings and much publicity about this report. Mr.
Farley said he
understood the Rand Report conclusions are no less certain than the
conclusions on which we based the proposal for 20 inspections on the
territory of the Soviet Union. Mr. Irwin replied
that he understood the Rand Report to indicate there might be many more
seismic events in the Soviet Union than the 100 estimate contained in
it. Mr. Northrup reported an AFTAC study as determining there are
about 120 annual seismic events. He pointed out that the efficiency of
the system advocated in the Rand
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Report would be lessened by the use of 30 element
arrays instead of 100 element arrays. A study has indicated the
impracticability of using 100 element arrays in the Soviet Union. Mr. McCone advocated that we not base policy on theory
not yet supported by experience, and that we base our stand on previous
determinations while insisting on a seismic improvement program, the
results of which may lead to adjustment of the quota.
In reply to Mr. Irwin’s question as to the status of the formula by which
we arrive at our quota of 20, Mr. Herter replied that the
number we adopt would bear a relationship to probable number of events
even though the relationship might not be explicitly agreed. Mr. Farley said that we planned to write a specific
number into the treaty, but that this would be subject to revision at
the end of two years and periodically thereafter on the basis of
recalculation of number of events and other factors.
Dr. Kistiakowsky advocated that the Rand
Corporation be requested to supply an explanation as to the reliability
of the conclusions in their report. His suggestion was supported by Mr. Herter and Mr. Gates. Dr. Romney suggested that an independent
evaluation of the Rand Report be made by a capable group. Mr. Herter replied that he would prefer to have Rand’s
own evaluation first. Mr. McCone repeated that the Rand Report should not
be considered in any way. He expressed regret that it had received so
much publicity before the Joint Committee and in private conversations
with the British. Mr. Herter stated what he believed to be the
conclusion of the group: That we await an evaluation from
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Rand
Corporation before giving any more consideration to possible use of the
figures in the report as a basis for negotiations.
Mr. Herter
recalled the cost estimate of one to five billion dollars for
installation of 22 control posts in the Soviet Union, mentioned by Mr.
Northrup at the May 10th meeting of principals. Mr.
Northrup said that this estimate had been presented by United
Electrodynamics Corporation at the Joint Committee hearings in April.
The corporation has since made a brief restudy and now estimates that
installation on the territory of the Soviet Union will cost 750 million
dollars, and the entire 1958 Geneva system, exclusive of high altitude,
up to 3½ billion dollars. The corporation is now undertaking a careful
90-day study and will present a final estimate in July or August. The
AFTAC cost study of last year,
which arrived at a figure of 1½ billion dollars for installation, is now
believed to have been an underestimation. Mr.
Gates stressed the necessity of securing careful cost
estimates.
Mr. Herter, Mr. Gates and Mr. McCone agreed that the time has come to make a
determination whether the Geneva negotiations are in range of agreement.
Such a determination is inherent in the National Security Council
directive, Mr. McCone said. It would be wrong to launch
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a seismic
improvement program, costing 75 to 100 million dollars, if its results
were to be rejected or to have no practical use. He advocated that the
principals meet again by the end of the month in order to decide on
alternative courses proposed in Section III of the memorandum (TAB A) in
light of the Soviet attitude.
Mr. Irwin reported that the study on possible
alternatives to the high altitude system proposed by the Geneva experts
has been completed but, pending review by a working group, it is not yet
ready for the principals. Dr. Kistiakowsky remarked that,
while the Rand Report may have been a bit too optimistic about
improvements in the system, the report on high altitude delivered by the
Department of Defense specialists, at the meeting of principals on May
5, may be too pessimistic. An ad hoc study group reporting to General
Betts has concluded that a simplified x-ray system for use in
satellites, having a capability up to 100 million kilometers, might be
available much sooner than a system having capability up to 1 billion
kilometers. Also, a preliminary study by Lockheed Corporation appears to
indicate the feasibility of replacing satellites at 60,000 km as
recommended by the Geneva experts with low altitude satellites (perhaps
at 300 km) having a capability from 50 km out to distance of capability
of the x-ray system. The significance of these developments are a
substantial reduction of costs and saving in time, deriving from
elimination of a sophisticated system of satellites in far space, and,
possibly, elimination of ground-based equipment for detection of events
occurring at high altitude. He suggested that the decision of the
principals as to high altitude alternatives be delayed a week or so, in
order that it may be based on consideration of all studies. Mr. Herter recommended that another meeting of
principals be held within two weeks.
Mr. McCone
recommended certain revisions to the memorandum concerning courses of
action, and these were approved. Agreed revisions are contained in TAB
B.
Tab A
Paper Prepared for Principals of Geneva Test Group Meeting
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Course of Action in Nuclear Test
Negotiations
The meeting of Principals Thursday at 10:15 AM will consider the
course of action to be pursued in the nuclear test negotiations,
considering specifically (a) the current status of negotiations, (b)
US tactics in the period immediately ahead, and (c) the course of
action to be followed pursuant to last week’s NSC decision, namely that we should
make clear these negotiations and the US moratorium cannot go on
indefinitely without a decision, and that the US should determine at
what time or at what stage it should seek to place a time limit on
its duration.
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I. Current status of
negotiations.
A chronology of major developments in the negotiations during the
past six months is attached. At present, the focal point of
Conference discussion is an effort by the US and UK Delegations to seek clarification of
the Soviet position on the coordinated research program. Although
the Soviet Delegation has reaffirmed the May 3 declaration,
accepting the idea of a strictly limited number of nuclear
detonations for research purposes, their statement that they will
not conduct the chemical explosions discussed by their scientists
nor begin coordinated research until signing of the treaty leaves
important ambiguities in their position which should be clarified to
assist us in determining the prospects for any meaningful
coordinated program. For example, we do not know whether the Soviet
position is (a) that national research programs should begin now and
their coordination begin when the treaty is signed; or (b) that
coordinated research should begin now insofar as it involves Soviet
observation of US tests and programs but should not involve US
observation in the USSR until
treaty signature. Moreover, we do not know whether they have
cancelled the entire Soviet component of the research program or
only the four or five chemical explosions in it.
II. Objectives and
Tactics in negotiations during current month.
The following course of action is recommended as a basis for
discussions at the meeting. It sets forth certain steps and
objectives to be carried out during the month of June to lay the
basis for decisive action, and suggests alternative courses that
might be pursued at the end of the month.
In general, the objective during the current month should be to lay
the basis both for governmental determination and public acceptance
of a course of action that will achieve the purpose defined by the
NSC decision to, in effect,
place a time limit on the duration of the US test moratorium.
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The following steps are recommended:
A. The U.S. Delegation should be instructed to stress that the US
position as set forth in the White House announcement of March 29
and subsequently in the conference is that a moratorium on testing
below an agreed treaty threshold is conditioned upon prior agreement
on a coordinated research program. The U.S. Delegation should also
stress the corollary of this position, namely that if no agreement
can be reached at an early date on treaty and on a coordinated
program of research, there can be no such moratorium.
B. The U.S. Delegation should press urgently for clarification of the
Soviet position on the coordinated research program.
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C. The US should seek to deprive the Soviets of any argument that
Project VELA explosions might
involve weapons development and to lay the basis in public opinion
for the conduct of such explosions. Two alternative possibilities
for accomplishing this purpose might be (a) if a fuller technical
justification for the present US position on safeguards to
demonstrate conclusively that it would not permit weapons
development cannot be found, to find methods consistent with the
Atomic Energy Act for constructing devices that might be opened to
inspection or opening existing devices, and indicating willingness
to have observation by qualified scientists on a world-wide basis,
or (b) to state US willingness to employ UK devices which would be open to inspection by the
three parties before their importation into the US. We understand
from the AEC that there are various
legal, practical and safety factors which would make the latter
course extremely difficult.
D. The U.S. Delegation should seek to ascertain promptly whether the
harder Soviet line regarding research has affected the prospects of
early agreement on other issues before the conference. In this
connection, we should press, in particular, for Soviet responses to
the various proposals we have tabled prior to the summit, i.e.,
quota, staffing, criteria, definition of magnitudes, flight routes,
observers and phasing. In order to increase pressure on the Soviets
to be specific about the quota, the US might indicate that if the
Soviets are unwilling to discuss quota apart from the question of
duration of a moratorium, we are prepared to consider these
questions simultaneously.
E. In order to assess and demonstrate decisively whether agreement
within a reasonable length of time is possible, the US should seek
to define and bring to public attention, as quickly as possible, the
full range of remaining issues which would have to be resolved if
agreement is to be achieved. Specifically, the questions of high
altitude and parties should be brought to the fore by the tabling of
US proposals. We should also, within the month, in order to complete
the process of bringing the
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negotiations to a decisive focus, fill in all
significant gaps in the Western position by tabling the quota
article, the definition of nuclear detonations and the revision of
Annex I.
III. Alternative
courses of action at the end of June.
On the basis of the issues and Soviet attitudes defined by the
foregoing tactics, the US should, at the end of the current month,
decide upon one or more of the following steps which serve to define
with varying degrees of exactness a time limit on the US
moratorium.
A. In the absence of substantial agreement in the coordinated
research program, the US should (a) announce specific dates for
several shots in the VELA series,
(b) indicate that we are still hopeful that agreement on safeguards
and coordination can be reached before these
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dates, but the
conduct of the explosions will not be dependent upon such agreement,
and (c) reaffirm the December 29 position on nuclear weapons tests.
This US may also wish to announce one or more Plowshare shots at
this time since these, like VELA
shots, are unrelated to the moratorium.
B. Depending upon the Soviet attitude and prospects of agreement
defined by the tactics outlined above, the US may also wish to
announce at the same time or as a subsequent move the indefinite
suspension of atmospheric tests on a unilateral basis and either (a)
state that in the absence of substantial progress toward agreement,
underground weapons tests will also begin at an early date or (b)
announce specific weapons tests which would take place after the
initial VELA and Plowshare
shots.
Recommendations
1. That a decision be reached as to US tactics in the immediate
future.
2. That an early meeting of Principals be set to consider the
position to be taken on high altitude.
3. That a meeting be scheduled before the end of the month to review
the status of negotiations and determine a further course of
action.
4. That Defense be requested to expedite its assessment of the Rand
report as a basis for determining its relationship to discussion of
the quota.
Attachment
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CHRONOLOGY OF NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION
NEGOTIATIONS
December 18, 1959—Technical Working Group 2 concluded with agreement
on possible improvements in the Geneva control system, but with
disagreement on the capabilities of the control system, and on
criteria for identification of underground seismic events.
December 29, 1959—Augusta statement by the President that United
States will be free to resume nuclear weapons tests on expiration of
its voluntary moratorium on December 31, but will not do so without
advance announcement.
February 11, 1960—US proposal for:
- (1)
- Threshold treaty which would end, upon signature,
atmospheric and underwater tests, high altitude tests as far
as effective controls are agreed, and underground tests
above 4.75 seismic magnitude reading.
- (2)
- Joint research and experimentation to improve detection of
small underground tests and permit extension of the
ban.
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February 16, 1960—Soviet position on criteria for identification of
underground events shifts almost to the US–UK position in Technical Working Group 2.
March 19, 1960—Soviets propose conclusion of a threshold treaty as
proposed on February 11, but covering all outer space tests and with
the joint research program accompanied by an obligation not to
conduct underground weapons tests below the threshold.
March 29, 1960—Eisenhower-Macmillan Camp David communique declares negotiation
on remaining issues leading to a threshold treaty should be speeded
up and completed. As soon as a threshold treaty is signed and
arrangements are made for a coordinated research program, a
voluntary unilaterally declared moratorium could be instituted for
an agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold.
April to mid May, 1960—US and UK
introduce proposals on several major elements of a threshold treaty
including staffing and extension of the control system; Soviet Union
marks time.
May 3, 1960—Soviet Union agrees to proceed with working out a joint
research program which would include a strictly limited number of
joint underground nuclear explosions. Soviets agree that the
moratorium should be unilaterally declared but propose a four to
five year duration co-extensive with the program of joint
research.
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May 7, 1960—White House announces Project VELA expansion to a level of $66 million for FY 61, including such nuclear
explosions as are necessary.
May 11, 1960—Experts meet in Geneva to discuss the seismic research
program. The Soviets describe a program of fairly extensive seismic
research including a number of chemical explosions.
May 17, 1960—Scheduled Summit meeting does not occur.
May 30, 1960—Geneva Experts adjourn with Soviets opposing US plans
for studies of decoupling and for a number of nuclear explosions,
and expressing view that research program should begin only with
signature of treaty.
June 2 and 3, 1960—Tsarapkin
rejects US proposals for safeguards to insure that nuclear
explosions do not advance weapons development. Disclaims research
necessary except as US condition for moratorium; insists on four to
five year moratorium duration. States research should be joint, with
full Soviet examination of internals of nuclear devices used.
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Tab B
Revisions to Memorandum at Tab A
[Facsimile Page 11]
REVISIONS TO MEMORANDUM, “COURSE OF
ACTION IN NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS”
1. In paragraph I, insert the following after the third sentence:
Their recent statements are particularly confusing in that they
apparently renounce the statement of intentions made by the Soviet
scientists in the Seismic Research Advisory Committee meetings.
2. In paragraph II, delete the third sentence.
3. In paragraph II, subparagraph A should read as follows:
A. The U.S. Delegation should be instructed to stress that the U.S.
position, as set forth in the White House announcement of March 29,
and subsequently in the Conference, is that a moratorium on testing
below an agreed treaty threshold is conditioned upon: (a) prior
agreement on a coordinated research program; and (b) prior
satisfactory agreement on the other issues outstanding, such as
on-site inspections, control commission, control post and inspection
team staffing, voting matters and peaceful use detonations (also the
issues of length of moratorium, schedule for installation of
temporary and permanent stations and high altitude monitoring). The
U.S. Delegation should also stress the corollary of this position;
namely, that, if no agreement can be reached at an early date on all
of these treaty issues and on a coordinated program of research,
there can be no such moratorium.
4. In paragraph II, the following second sentence should be added to
subparagraph B:
However, in so pressing, it should avoid as far as possible any
implication that it is the U.S. which will gain by Soviet acceptance
(and, hence, the U.S. would be expected to compromise on other
essential issues).
5. In paragraph II, subparagraph C should be deleted and the
following subparagraph C and D should be substituted:
C. The U.S. should seek to deprive the Soviets of any argument that
Project VELA explosions might
involve weapons development and to lay the basis in public opinion
for the conduct of such explosions. Note: Due to the technical,
legal, safety, and other problems involved, the alternate
possibilities of using USSR or
U.K. devices for Project VELA
nuclear shots are deemed an unworkable solution. Other possible
alternatives for accomplishing this purpose might be: (a) to develop
and fabricate suitable U.S. gun-type designs, and in the necessary
yields, which might be declassified; and (b) to secure necessary
legislation or Congressional sanction to reveal to the U.K. and the
USSR the internal design of
the classified device presently planned for the VELA
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program.
(It should be noted that an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act or
Congressional sanction to permit the U.S. to reveal the internal
design of the classified device to the U.K. and the USSR would present serious
difficulties with respect to certain U.S. Allies,
[Facsimile Page 12]
particularly France.)
The AEC believes that one of the
above two alternatives may be possible and has agreed to further
examine these two possibilities as a matter of urgency in order to
determine if either is practical. Consequently, the AEC will promptly prepare a study
which will outline the legal, technical and other considerations
which would have to be resolved. The AEC position will be determined after such studies have
been carried out and further considered.
D. The U.S. should emphasize publicly and in the Conference the facts
that: (a) the proposed safeguards are adequate to give assurance to
the Soviets that no significant weapon progress will be made. This
is possible if the proposed U.S. safeguards are carried out by both
sides or by an international team; and (b) under existing U.S. law,
it is impossible to open our devices to the Soviets without
declassifying them and, hence, making weapons information available
to all countries.
6. In paragraph II, subparagraph D should be deleted and the
following subparagraph E should be substituted:
E. The U.S. Delegation should seek to ascertain promptly whether the
harder Soviet line regarding research has affected the prospects of
early agreement on other issues before the Conference. In this
connection, we should press immediately, in particular, for Soviet
responses to the various proposals we have tabled prior to the
Summit; i.e., quota (and the procedures under which its inspections
can be used), staffing criteria, definition of magnitudes, flight
routes, observers and phasing. In order to increase pressure on the
Soviets to be specific about the quota, the U.S. might indicate
that, if the Soviets are unwilling to discuss quota apart from the
question of duration of a moratorium, we are prepared to consider
these questions simultaneously, but it must be understood that
agreement to a moratorium is dependent on a resolution of all other
unresolved issues.
7. In paragraph II, old subparagraph E becomes now subparagraph
F.
8. In paragraph III, subparagraph A, the words “and other outstanding
issues” should be inserted after “coordinated research program” on
the second line.
9. Add the following recommendations, numbered 5 and 6, to the
section entitled “Recommendations”:
- 5.
- U.S. Government spokesmen both here and abroad should make
every effort to explain publicly the meaning and importance
of the issues which must be resolved, and the necessity for
prompt resolution.
- 6.
- That more attention be given to realistic cost estimates
for installation and operation of the system, and that the
U.S. Delegation in Geneva raise these matters in the
negotiations when we are prepared to give our considered
estimates.
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[Facsimile Page 13]
Participants of Meeting of Principals on
Nuclear Test Negotiations Held June 9, 1960
-
- Department of State:
- Secretary Herter
- Under Secretary Dillon
- Mr. Smith—S/P
- Mr. Dubs, SOV
- S/AE—Mr. Farley, Mr. Sullivan,
Mr. Spiers, Mr.
Baker, Mr. Goodby, Mr. Gotzlinger
-
- Department of Defense:
- Secretary Gates
- Mr. Irwin
- Gen.
Loper
- Gen.
Fox
- Gen. Denney
- Mr. Northrup
- Dr. Romney
-
- White House:
- Mr. Gray
- Dr. Kistiakowsky
- Mr. Keeney
-
- CIA:
- Mr. Dulles
- Mr. Brent
-
- AEC:
- Mr. McCone
- Dr. English
- Col. Sherrill