Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

554. Talking Paper¹

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TALKING PAPER ON THE SUBJECT OF A COORDINATED EFFORT IN THE SEISMIC IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

I. General Principles

1. The program will involve a major research, development and test effort whose objectives would be:

a. To secure maximum improvement in seismic detection and identification capabilities (for both the short and long term).

b. To determine the capabilities and limitations of any system which may be adopted.

2. Although coordinated effort by the three parties is desirable, each party must conduct such program activities as it believes essential to the program. There should be early initial coordination among the parties, so that:

a. Each may adjust its program to gain better over-all coverage, and to avoid undesirable duplication;

b. Agreement can be reached on the observation of, and cooperation in, the activities of the others.

3. It is propose that:

a. Each party will keep the others informed as to its planned research, development, and field test activities, including locations and times of tests and locations and types of seismic recording stations.

b. Each party will facilitate to the extent reasonably practical, the installation on its own soil of instruments useful to the others’ program.

c. Each party will announce well in advance any additional, significant, man-made, seismic disturbance which may be useful to another’s program.

d. Each party will provide expeditiously to the others, any basic information, results of analysis, or findings which may be useful in furthering the program.

4. Test detonations including nuclear detonations (See Appendix “A”) will be necessary to investigate seismic signals and system behavior, with firings both in coupled and decoupled emplacement, and in various geographic and geologic environments.

5. All parties will commit themselves, for any nuclear devices they may fire in connection with this program, to use only devices whose design is already proven and not to use the firings concerned to advance weapon design. To assist in assuring others of their fulfillment of this commitment, they will comply with the following provisions: allow the other parties to observe all features of device emplacement, instrumentation, and firings, except for the internal design of devices themselves; install only such minimum instrumentation as is necessary to assure safe firing and measuring of yield, and deposit immediately under general surveillance of the others the devices it will use for the purpose.

II. United States Effort

1. The United States is initiating an extensive program of research and development designed to further the possible methods of improvement described in the Berkner Panel Report and in the Report of Geneva Technical Working Group II for the improvement of the control system. This program includes the following:

a. Study of the seismicity of the earth by world-wide standardized seismic instruments, study of the generation and propagation of seismic waves of all types and frequencies from earthquakes and explosions in various media and geographical locations, investigate the frequency characteristics and directional spectrum of microseisms, investigate the transfer functions of typical crustal structures, conduct model studies of radiation around simulated faulting and explosive sources, investigate cross-correlation techniques for determining direction of first motion of P waves from earthquakes and explosions, investigate extensively crustal structure by refraction shooting, study inverse transforms for long period waves.

b. Study microseismic noise on the ocean bottom and in deep wells, develop improved long period detectors, develop digitalized recording techniques, study deep hole seismometers, design and test large arrays and other improved seismometers.

c. Design, construct and test a complete Geneva-type seismic station and include as appropriate improvements to such station. Develop detailed specifications for a world-wide system to control underground nuclear tests.

d. Conduct such nuclear and HE tests as are needed to obtain fundamental seismic data which are needed to develop more sophisticated techniques for detection and identification and to test performance of system components and the final Geneva system.

e. Investigate the feasibility and reliability of unmanned stations.

f. Determine the relationship between magnitude and equivalent yield of seismic events.

2. Initial U.S. field installations which can be ready by September 1, 1960, to further the research and development program described above will include one Geneva-type station, and twenty simpler stations at various locations in the U.S. (Each containing one three-component, one second period seismometer and one three-component, 25-second period seismometer and some containing 1–10 second seismometers and 2 to 2½ second seismometers).

3. As soon as the above are ready we would propose to fire at NTS three test explosions of equal yield (5 Kt), one nuclear in hard rock, one nuclear in tuff, and one HE in tuff. From these, very useful (though recognizably incomplete) information should result relative to: behavior of a single Geneva station; the contrast in behavior of HE and nuclear detonations in one rock; and behavior of equal nuclear detonations in two different rocks. These experiments will provide at an early date basic data essential to the planning and execution of the more complicated analytical studies described above. These studies hopefully could result in significant technological progress toward improvement of the system by providing knowledge of possible characteristic difference between signals from explosions and earthquakes.

4. The U.S. is considering the installation of five additional Geneva-type stations and some 10–15 of the simpler stations. These would come available progressively over the period 6–18 months from now. The U.S. would intend to operate continuously the Geneva stations and some of the simpler stations, to acquire information on background and on signals from natural events. This information is intended to improve our basic knowledge required for detecting and identifying seismic events, so as to make possible improved system capabilities.

5. The U.S. is also considering the installation of 15 unmanned seismic stations in a grid of 100–200 kilometers in a region of high earthquake activity to study the behavior of natural events and smaller HE shots.

6. In addition, when the network mentioned above has been installed, further high explosive and nuclear detonations will be required to confirm the more sophisticated techniques which should be available at that time and to obtain a test of the improved instrumentation and system response of the six Geneva stations, as well as to determine the effect of different locations and/or conditions of firing. An estimated 5 nuclear detonations, together with several large HE detonations, probably would be needed and timed to be fired at the end of the 18 month period referred to in paragraph 4 above. The earlier Plowshare experiment, GNOME, and any other Plowshare experiments should be beneficial in this regard.

III. Results Possibly To Be Achieved Through This Effort

It is certain that an 18–24 months program along the lines of that described, with the United Kingdom and Soviet programs, will give a more definite indication of the capability of a Geneva-type system. It should provide us with much basic information on possible seismic detection and identification techniques and equipment not now known. This should enable the efforts at improvement to be directed in realistic and effective avenues. It should lead to useful developments which will improve the detection and identification capability of the Geneva or improved Geneva system. It, however, may show added difficulties or limitations not now recognized or properly evaluated. It is not now possible, therefore, to estimate whether the overall effect would be that of showing the system to be more reliable than now believed.

Appendix A

THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR DETONATIONS IN A SEISMIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

A limited number of nuclear detonations is considered an essential element of a vigorous seismic research program for the following reasons:

(1) There exists a substantial uncertainty as to the relative amplitude of seismic signals from nominally equivalent (e.g. 5 KT nuclear and 5000 ton HE) detonations.

(2) There exists a strong possibility that the frequency spectra of seismic signals from nuclear and HE explosions are different and there may be other differences as yet unknown.

(3) The decoupling of explosions by carrying them out in large cavities may be substantially different for HE and nuclear charges and lead to different signals.

A comparison of new HE shots with the already existing seismic data from the Rainier shot and other underground nuclear tests of the Hardtack II series would not meet the requirements of the research program because of the limited seismic instrumentation which was previously used.

An additional consideration is the very high cost of and substantial transportation and hazard problems that will be involved in carrying out HE shots involving thousands of tons which are considered essential to obtain strong signals in the second zone. For instance, a 5 KT shot would require placing underground 200,000 cases of TNT.

Thus, the use of HE explosions alone will inhibit the research program and will prevent the realization of full capabilities of the advanced seismic detection systems which could be developed if detailed information on seismic signals from nuclear explosions were obtained.

1. Source: Coordinated effort in the seismic improvement program. Confidential. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II.