Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

539. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 8, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Amb. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
• Mr. Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Ambassador Menshikov began by saying he had been instructed by Mr. Khrushchev to see the President and to hand over a personal message. The Ambassador then read from his own English translation the text of Mr. Khrushchev’s letter dated March 3.

The President said he would have the message translated and would study it. He added that he would like to express the following preliminary thoughts which the Ambassador should transmit to Khrushchev. First, the President appreciated this personal message and Mr. Khrushchev’s thought in sending it. Secondly, the President said he shared the uneasiness, if not dismay, if such a situation should arise as Mr. Khrushchev described in his message. But he would like to recall that at a time when the United States had a monopoly on atomic weapons it had tried in 1947 to give it to the United Nations. United States policy had never changed. Now we know, the President continued, that the Soviet Union has great nuclear power. We do not know what distribution the Soviet Union may have made of its nuclear power nor do we know how the members of the Warsaw Pact are armed. The President expressed readiness to study the message and to reply in due time. As he had repeatedly stated, he was ready to do anything to make a better, more peaceful world. Now we have four nations which dispose of nuclear weapons. It was easier to make them now and knowledge of how to do so was getting to be a common thing. We don’t know when other nations may develop nuclear weapons.

The President expressed agreement that we must move rapidly on this problem and, as he had said at his Camp David talks with Chairman Khrushchev, the most important thing was agreement on reliable controlled disarmament. This was a very serious matter and while we agree on general principles, we must find the means to carry them out.

Ambassador Menshikov expressed the hope that progress would be made at the ten-nation disarmament committee level and at the forthcoming Summit.

The President replied he was ready for any practical forward step which would take the uneasiness out of the minds of mankind, that he would continue to strive for this goal.

Ambassador Menshikov asked what he might say to the correspondents who were waiting outside, to which the President observed that there was always this problem when he delivered a message in person to the White House. Ambassador Menshikov said it was the same at the State Department and suggested he might merely say that he had delivered a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev. Ambassador Menshikov said he was not instructed whether the letter was to be published.

The President in agreeing to Ambassador Menshikov’s suggestion said that if the letter were not published he would merely reply to any press inquiries that he never revealed his personal correspondence with Chiefs of State without their concurrence. If the Soviet Government decided to publish the letter, the President requested prior notification.

NOTE: General Goodpaster informed Mr. Davis after Ambassador Menshikov departed that the President had instructed him to inform the Department that the contents of Mr. Khrushchev’s message should be held closely on a need-to-know basis.

1. Source: Menshikov delivers Khrushchev’s letter on nuclear arms for NATO. Secret; Presidential Handling. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 600.0012/3–860.