Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

534. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Herter
• Mr. Dillon
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Kohler
• Mr. Eaton
• Mr. Stelle
• Mr. Farley

In a meeting at the Secretary’s house certain questions identified by Mr. Eaton (Tab A) as well as a number of other policy and negotiating issues were discussed at length. The following general conclusions were reached:

a. French Views. Mr. Eaton said that M. Moch had warned him that the French Government could not be expected to concur in the nuclear “cut-off” unless assured of U.S. nuclear materials or weapons. He asked whether steps could be taken to bring the French around. Consideration was given to whether we might give any specific or general assurances. It was recognized that this subject was quite highly charged politically in the U.S. and that any commitments without Congressional blessing would be of little value and also risky if word of them got back to Congress. Perhaps a determined effort by the Executive to bring Congress around would at least establish our good intentions toward the French; but it had to be recognized that such an effort ran the risk not only of bitter public controversy but even of a flat Congressional bar. It was also noted that even if we satisfied the French on the cut-off, we might still find ourselves at odds with them on the issues of force levels and strategic missiles controls. The best hope appeared to be an attempt to get the French to avoid taking issue openly with us, in view of the doubt that the Soviets would accept the cut-off and the time lag in any case which might permit French fissionable materials production to go ahead and possibly a gradual change in U.S. Congressional attitudes. If the French take the attitude predicted by Moch, then Mr. Merchant, accompanied by Mr. Eaton, might have to go to Paris in an effort to bring the French around. Before embarking on this course of action (which might be done under the cover of general summit consultations), it was necessary to ascertain the basic French position. (A telegram alerting our Embassy in Paris to the problem was decided on and subsequently despatched.)

b. Status of 5-power Working Paper. Mr. Eaton reported that a 5-power working paper (5P/WP/15(Corr.4) 2/19/60) had been approved February 19 for referral to governments. Two principal issues were whether the “ultimate goal” should be identified as “general disarmament” or “general and complete disarmament.” Our allies had tended to favor the latter formula but so far had accepted our brief version which we introduced as more realistic.

In the discussion it was agreed that the phrase “general disarmament” was more accurate and realistic and would usefully serve to distinguish in part our approach from the Soviet approach. On the other hand, the Soviet phrase was in the Camp David communique and the United Nations disarmament resolution and if our allies raised the point again we could not finally refuse. Furthermore, if the Soviets asked for the longer phrase as an agenda item—e.g., “the question of complete and general disarmament”—it would be fruitless to engage in controversy in view of the past history.

Mr. Eaton said that another question was whether the West should put up a comprehensive plan. The allies favored this, feeling that in the struggle for world opinion we had to match the Soviets in the scope of our approach. They felt that ample safeguards and check points were built into the U.K. plan, for example. The Secretary said that he had always believed we had to set forth a goal of disarmament which was as imaginative and radical as the Soviets. He doubted, however, that it was desirable to compete with the Soviets in devising elaborate plans for every future step toward that goal. Instead he preferred to concentrate on a few simple, practical disarmament steps which might be taken now and challenge the Soviets to agree to these with adequate inspection as a way to get started and build confidence.

c. Negotiating Approach. Mr. Eaton said that he did not want to get into an interminable negotiation which never got to the crucial point of agreement, like the 16-month old nuclear test negotiations. He proposed to make it clear to the Soviets from the outset that the key to substantial progress was their willingness to accept adequate verification and that if they were unwilling to do business on this point he did not propose to be drawn into interminable and fruitless discussion. He wanted to be clear that this was a reasonable line and that he would not be expected for other reasons, such as the summit, to continue talking at the conference table irrespective of progress. The Secretary said that he agreed wholeheartedly with this approach, but that we must take a positive position advancing concrete measures of disarmament, and care should be exerted not to be in the position of appearing to ask for “inspection without disarmament.” Mr. Eaton said that he recognized that this was a delicate hand of play, but that it was his intention to agree in general to disarmament measures which would be the subject of inspection, but to insist on a fairly detailed agreement on inspection measures before negotiating the details of the disarmament measure. Mr. Dillon said that no specific guarantee could be given in advance regarding acceptability of a break off in negotiations—particularly one before the summit. Mr. Eaton said that he fully understood this, but that the negotiating position which he would take might well require an early decision on our willingness to break off negotiations, although he would be careful not to put us in any position where we would be embarrassed by not breaking off without coming back for instructions.

d. Force Levels. Mr. Farley said that the most urgent policy issue remaining unresolved between State and Defense was possible reductions in military force levels. We wanted to put pressure on the Soviets to agree to mutual inspection and to use the argument that without inspection no one could know whether they indeed reduced their forces by 1.2 million. However, we could not effectively challenge them to accept inspection unless we were willing to say that acceptance of inspection by the Soviets would lead to reductions below levels presently scheduled by us and the Soviets. Furthermore, this had to be a direct challenge not complicated if possible by other conditions such as involvement of Communist China. Mr. Herter said that in his past discussions with Secretary Gates it appeared possible that Defense would agree to reductions below the 2.5 million ceiling accepted by the JCS. After a good deal of discussion of past U.S. and Western positions, Mr. Dillon asked Mr. Farley to prepare a talking paper for him which he could use in raising with Mr. Gates the question whether we could accept reductions to a level of about 2.1 million, independent of Communist Chinese participation, provided only there was adequate inspection.

e. NATO Consultation. Mr. Eaton raised the question of timing of consultation with NATO. It was agreed that:

(1) The basic disarmament working paper should be submitted to the Council members by Friday, March 4. This would enable the members and governments to study the positions for some days prior to discussion in NAC on March 9. Special additional meetings could of course be held on the succeeding days, i.e., 10th, 11th, etc., if desired.

(2) There should be at least one representative of the disarmament group present and authorized to reply to questions and enter into the discussion. This might well be Mr. Eaton, who had chaired the five-power group here.

f. Policy Questions Raised by Mr. Eaton. (Tab A).

(1) We will use all possible ways (Canadian good offices in NATO, Norstad approaches to de Gaulle and Adenauer, talks with Adenauer during his visit here in March) to get French and German agreement to the Norstad plan. However, if persuasion fails and particularly if Adenauer is adamant and suspicious of our motives, we will not press the plan over such opposition.

(2) We do not at present have any specific consideration we can give in return for Soviet acceptance of the Norstad inspection zone proposal. The “no nuclear arms to indigenous forces in Germany” example again involves the question of Adenauer. Moreover, this represents an important objective for the Soviets, who are not likely to give nuclear arms to the Poles and Czechs anyway.

(3) We are already barred by our domestic legislation from transferring nuclear weapons to other counties. We should not undertake a commitment with the Soviets in this regard—since they are not likely to trust other bloc members sufficiently in any case to make such transfers—except as a consequence to agreement on the nuclear cut-off.

(4) There was no conclusive position reached on IRBMs since the question of European combined production of second generation IRBMs is currently under active study. It was noted that in the past the President has been willing to envisage agreement not to station IRBMs in Germany, where there is no NATO need for weapons of this range.

(5) There was little interest in negotiating withdrawal from U.S. bases, in view of the importance of these to our strategic deterrent and the lack of symmetry between the U.S. and Soviet strategic positions which made base withdrawal difficult to match with a corresponding Soviet quid pro quo.

(6) There was little interest in non-aggression pacts, both because they are paper pledges and because the UN Charter already provides the necessary commitment. Such pacts also had undesirable overtones of parity. The suggestion was made that we might counter any future Soviet proposal by saying we could accept a non-aggression clause as part of an agreement for open skies inspection which would really do something to safeguard against chances of surprise aggression.

(7) Little prospects were seen of Soviet agreements on limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it seems likely the Soviets will seek to frustrate any use of tactical nuclear weapons by refusing to accept any distinctions. Hence this is clearly not a field for initiatives.

(8) U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe is unthinkable if we are to maintain our alliances. We have no reservation about the desirability of having Soviet troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe, but in view of the proximity of the USSR this is not worth much in the way of concessions.

(9) Agreements for limitations on arms traffic are primarily political measures and are under consideration with regard to the summit in the East-West relations working group in Paris.

(10) Elimination of strategic trade controls is really not an important bargaining card nor very relevant.

(11) Any world police force would have to be related to the UN in view of the responsibilities of the UN under the United Nations Charter. While we should not disown the UN or its role here, preliminary discussion might relate to the composition, functions, etc., leaving aside the question of relationship to the UN for the time being.

(12) The proposal gestures were more relevant to the summit than to the 10-nation talks. Publicity attending the 10-nation meeting should in fact focus on disarmament questions.

(13) Not discussed.

(14) Not discussed.

(15) See a above.

Tab A

Policy Questions Proposed by Eaton

POINTS FOR POSSIBLE EXPLORATION WITH TOP POLICY MAKERS

1. If deGaulle and Adenauer, even after careful softening-up tactics, should oppose the Norstad Plan, do we consider it a dead issue? Are there other weapons of persuasion at our command? If not, are we prepared to press it against their combined opposition or against the opposition of Adenauer alone?

2. If the Soviets should indicate willingness to accept the Norstad proposal if linked to some measure of disarmament, do we have any latitude? Can we, for example, promise troop reductions within specified time period—say, one year—if inspection is working satisfactorily? Can we promise to accept under similar conditions (or accept) a Rapacki first stage (i.e., no nuclear arms to indigenous forces in Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).

3. What are the conditions under which we would be prepared to enter into commitment with the Soviets not to transfer nuclear weapons—to all other nations? to specified allies? to countries on Soviet bloc periphery? to Germany?

4. The same question with regard to IRBMs? Also, what are our present plans for IRBM installations in Europe?

5. Are we prepared to negotiate elimination of certain bases on Soviet periphery—for example, IRBM bases in Italy, air and naval bases in Turkey? If so, what should be our price?

6. Under what conditions would we agree to a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact? between U.S. and USSR?

7. Are there any commitments on the use of nuclear weapons which we would be prepared to negotiate with the Soviets? For example, upper KT limit on weapons in a limited war? Ban on use of nuclear weapons against population centers in a limited war? Ban on use of any but short-range missiles in a limited war?

8. Have we a price for U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe? Do we in fact want complete Soviet withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, bearing in mind the possibility of another Hungary and its implications for the West?

9. Are we prepared to enter into commitment not to traffic in arms? in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America?

10. Are we prepared to use elimination of strategic trade controls as a bargaining tool? If so, what is the range of prices?

11. Re a police force, do we favor one under UN auspices or separate from the UN, perhaps linked with Disarmament Control Organization, as at one time suggested by the British?

12. Should U.S. make some sort of well-publicized gesture on eve of talks to put Soviets on defensive, such as:

a. Announcement of unilateral lifting of closed travel areas in the U.S.?

b. Invitation to high-ranking Soviet military to “tour” selected U.S. defense installations to “see for themselves” that U.S. military posture is “strong,” but not “threatening to attack anyone?”

13. Are there any political implications of the Berlin and German issue which tie in with the work of the Ten Nation group? What posture should we take prior to May Summit Meeting?

14. What specific political solutions are required before we enter advanced stage of disarmament?

15. What positions should we take on the French position that they cannot accept our position on the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes unless their allies can supply them with fissionable material for weapons purposes?

1. Source: French view on cut-off; five-power working paper; negotiating tactics for ten-power talks; military force levels. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.