Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

520. Letter From Gates to Herter¹

Washington, January 19, 1960

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The report of the Joint State Department-Defense Department Study on Disarmament, prepared under the direction of Charles A. Coolidge, has been received. This report will be referred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information and study.

Since recommendations (1) and (2) involve our own defense posture, it seems appropriate that I comment on those recommendations at this time. These subjects have been under intensive review over the past several months within the Defense Department concurrently with the studies undertaken by the committee under Mr. Coolidge’s direction.

The current defense program is consistent with the recommendations made by Mr. Coolidge concerning our overall defense posture. Our strategic delivery capability is substantially in excess of that of the Soviet Union and we are taking all practicable steps to further increase the invulnerability of our strategic delivery forces. Our program relies on a whole complex of related resources, each of which in various degrees contributes to the establishment and maintenance of an assured retaliatory capability.

We are not now operating an airborne alert of any significance because we do not believe it necessary. The Air Force is planning a more extensive alert capability for the heavy bomber force and we are purchasing extra engines and spare parts to expand this program, as well as training the heavy bomber wings in the conduct of an airborne alert. This capability could be exercised if needed.

At the same time, the Department of Defense is taking steps to improve the modernization of the conventional capability of both our armed forces and those of our allies—the latter, of course, through the assistance rendered by the Foreign Aid Program. We are confident that we are in a position to deal effectively with limited wars which our strategic capabilities might not deter. We do not, of course, envisage any situation short of general war in which significant numbers of our forces would be directly involved in any conflict with those of the USSR.

I will forward to you in the near future the Defense Department comments on those aspects of the Coolidge report not concerned with our defense posture, after we have had further time to study the recommendations contained in the report.

Sincerely,

Thomas S. Gates

Attachment

January 6, 1960

Mr. Dillon will initiate preparation of 2 memos—

—1 fr Sec Def to Sec State “after [illegible in the original]

a Post not responsive to directive—[illegible in the original]

b Doesn’t agree with judgments + conclusions

—2 fr Sec State to Eaton

—refer advisory study to be available to Eaton in prep of [illegible in the original]

Bring Eaton pm before NSC—[illegible in the original]

Attachment

Draft Statement by a State Department press spokesman

The State Department has received the report of the Joint Disarmament Study headed by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge. This report was prepared by Mr. Coolidge for submission jointly to the Secretaries of State and Defense as a working paper to aid them in preparing a recommended disarmament policy prior to the forthcoming ten power conference at Geneva about March 15th. Final formulation of U.S. disarmament policy will of course be the responsibility of the President with the advice of the National Security Council. The State Department does not intend any release regarding the substance of the report and its recommendations, which are now under study.

Attachment

Report of the Joint Disarmament Study

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• Brief Summary of Report
• I. Background of Arms Control
  • A. Our Posture for Negotiating Arms Control Measures Must be Strengthened
    • Intercontinental War
    • Limited War
    • Economic
    • Conclusion
    • Recommendation No. 1
  • B. Rationale of Arms Control
• II. Nuclear Weapons
• III. Stable Balance of Deterrence
  • A. International War
    • Recommendation No. 2
    • Recommendation No. 3
  • B. Concept of Stable Balance of Deterrence Appears to Have No Significant Application to Limited Wars
• IV. Disarmament Goal
  • Recommendation No. 4
  • Recommendation No. 5
• V. Arms Control Measures for Immediate Negotiations
  • Recommendation No. 6
  • Recommendation No. 7
• VI. Fuller Consideration of Foregoing And Other Measures to Limit National Capability
  • A. Above Measures Recommended for Immediate Negotiation
    • 1. Completion of Current Negotiations to Cease Nuclear Testing
    • 2. European Zone of Inspection Against Surprise Attack
    • 3. Prohibition of Vehicles Capable of Mass Destruction from Being Placed in Orbit or Stationed in Outer Space
  • B. Other Measures Which Could be Presently Negotiated
    • 1. Mechanics for Lessening Likelihood of War By Accident
    • 2. Preparatory Steps for Limiting Force Levels
  • C. Measures Which, For Various Reasons, Should Not Be Presently Negotiated
    • 1. Limitation on Conventional Arms
    • 2. Limitation on Nuclear Weapons
      • a. Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
      • b. Limitation on Numbers of Nuclear Weapons
      • c. Cut-off or Reduction of the Production of Nuclear Materials for Weapons
      • d. Testing Intercontinental Missiles
      • e. The Nth Country
    • 3. Foreign Bases
    • 4. Budget Controls
    • 5. Chemical, Biological & Radiological Warfare
  • D. Other Measures in the 1957 Western Proposals
    • 1. Deposit of Arms in Depots
    • 2. International Control Organization
    • 3. Political Problems
    • 4. Movement of Armaments
    • 5. Suspension of Convention
  • E. Comments on Current Soviet and Allied Proposals
  • F. Red China
  • G. Inspection
  • H. Surprise Attack and Unintentional War
    • 1. Surprise Attack
    • 2. Unintentional War
• VII. Fuller Consideration of Measures to Increase International Capability Outlined in Recommendation No. 6
  • A. Development and Codification of International Law
    • Recommendation No. 8
  • B. Increasing the Jurisdiction and Prestige of the World Court
    • Recommendation No. 9
  • C. Progress Toward Effective Enforcement of International Law
    • Recommendation No. 10
• VIII. Matters Not the Subject of Representation
  • A. Civil Defense
  • B. Opening Up Soviet Society
  • C. Negotiations
    • 1. Negotiating Margin
    • 2. Joint East-West Studies
  • D. Publicity
• IX. Further Arms Control Studies

ANNEX	Subject
A	Terms of Reference, List of Joint Disarmament Study Personnel, etc.
B	Stable Balance of Deterrence and Arms Control
C	Program Inspection Years
D	Cut-off of Nuclear Production
E	Nth Country
F	Comments on Proposals of the Soviet Union, the UN and France
G	Inspection
H	Draft Resolution for General Assembly Re Codification
I	Problems of International Law Enforcement
J	Draft Resolution for General Assembly Re Corps of [illegible in the original]
K	Further Arms Control Studies

BRIEF SUMMARY OF REPORT

The United States must strengthen its overall defense posture before significant arms control measures can be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and should proceed to do so, even if it will require a substantial increase in defense expenditures.

In particular, the United States should strengthen its conventional capability, and should make its strategic retaliatory force highly invulnerable in order to establish and maintain a stable balance of deterrence against intercontinental nuclear war. Until a stable balance of deterrence is established, the United States should not negotiate measures which limit its strategic nuclear capability. Therefore, however, the United States might find it advantageous to negotiate agreements which would enhance this stability and permit a levelling off of the arms race.

Comprehensive proposals calling for disarmament in phased stages, with an obligation to move from one stage to another, should be avoided. Instead, the U.S. should establish a broad ultimate goal for disarmament, namely, world peace under enforceable law, and should prepare for immediate negotiations only modest steps toward that goal, in order to test the intentions of the Soviets and actually to accomplish at least something.

Specially, the U.S. should take the following actions:—

Measures to Limit National Capabilities

1. Completion of the current negotiations on the production of nuclear tests, preferably excluding underground tests from the prohibition.

2. Propose a limited inspection zone against surprise ground attack in Europe, in aid of NATO’s mission.

3. Propose the prohibition of vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or maintained in outer space.

Measures to Increase International Capabilities

4. Re-energizing the development and codification of international law by the United Nations.

5. Increasing the jurisdiction and enhancing the prestige of the International Court of Justice.

6. Improving the machinery for the use of a U.N. “presence” in areas of international disputes and adding the function of mediation.

The merits of additional arms control measures are analyzed. Annexes to the report contain comments on proposals made by the Soviets and our principal Allies and, further, contain more detailed consideration of important matters dealt with in the report itself.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Pursuant to the terms of reference establishing the Joint Disarmament Study by the two Departments of State and Defense, I submit to you the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the study.

The terms of reference and a list of my principal assistants and of the able and devoted staff who struggled with the difficult problems presented by arms control, together with data indicating the assistance received from others, the method of operation followed and the scope of the work are attached as Annex “A.”

This report is a group product in the sense that the information and ideas it contains are the result of the labors of all concerned. No effort has, however, been made to reach unanimity. While the report necessarily requires a consideration of the defense posture of the United States, a conscious effect has been made to confine the scope of the report to arms control matters, and to avoid trespassing on allied fields such as military planning, civil defense and political and economic problems.

I. BACKGROUND OF ARMS CONTROL

A. Our Posture for Negotiating Arms Control Measures Must be Strengthened

It is possible that current Soviet propaganda efforts in favor of peace and disarmament may reflect the beginning of a fundamental change in their thinking which could lead to reduction of the communist military threat to the Free World. It would, however, be foolish to base our policy approach to arms control upon that possibility for at least two reasons.

First, it is equally possible and far more likely that the Soviet current peace campaign is designed to lure the Free World into reducing or eliminating its military capability, so that the Soviets can pursue their continuously reaffirmed aim of world domination without fear of a nuclear war. In a disarmed world, they could, through sheer manpower and economic measures, infiltrate, subvert, upset dominate, and finally take over the control of Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and with Red China, the remainder of Asia—leaving one or both of the Americas to die on the vine. And there would be nothing that the Free World could do about it, except to re-arm frantically after it was probably too late. Even if the Soviets are not successful in persuading the Free World to disarm completely, any progress they can make in reducing the military capability of the Free World is so much to the good from their point of view. Until the Soviets have unmistakenly demonstrated sincerity by deeds as well as words, [illegible in the original] prudence dictates that we strengthen our guard against communist aggression rather than relax it.

Second, even if the Soviets have honest motives in proposing disarmament measures, they are tough realists. Should our posture and that of our allies deteriorate relative to the Soviet’s posture during the extended process of negotiations which lie ahead, this would lower any real incentives which [illegible in the original] for the Soviets to accept meaningful arms controls with proper safeguards. As realists, they tend to regard agreements as confirmations of existing facts, not as promises to do something which goes further then facts. Hence, when the facts change for the worse from our point of view, so will the agreements we are likely to get out of the Soviets.

[illegible in the original] that the basic premise of our approach to arms control must be to address the Soviets from a position in which our defense posture is strong and our capacity for effective political action is unimpaired. And this should be so whether we take the gloomy view of stressing the difficulties involved in arms control negotiations with the Soviets, or take the brighter view of explaining the hopeful possibilities of [illegible in the original] useful agreements.

A glance at the [illegible in the original] indicates that our situation for negotiating meaningful arms control measures is deteriorating. Our relative defense posture during the early sixties—the period with which the coming disarmament talks will be most concerned—will be less favorable than it has been since World War II. At the risk of over-simplification, weaknesses in our defense posture present three major problems:

1. Intercontinental War—While the U.S. had a monopoly in nuclear weapons, there was little danger of intercontinental war. The Soviets had no chance of [illegible in the original]. Even after the Soviets acquired nuclear bombs in quantity, the danger of a nuclear war was limited by our large stockpile and our superior delivery systems, in the form of the numbers and quality of the manned bombers of SAC (Strategic Air Command) and their ability to strike from, or recover to [illegible in the original] bases. The enormous advantage to the Soviets of surprise attack was [illegible in the original] by working from the DEW Line (Distant Early Warning Line). Thus, while the danger was much greater than when the U.S. had a nuclear monopoly, the nuclear capability of the U.S. which could survive a surprise attack appeared sufficient to inflict such severe damage on the Soviets as to deter them from starting an intercontinental war.

The development by the Soviets of intercontinental ballistic missiles has changed this situation very much for the worse. While the Soviets probably have not at the moment many ICBM’s, within the next two years or so they may have a sufficient number to knock out most of SAC and destroy our principal cities in a surprise attack. And we may receive little or no warning. Even when BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) is completed, and even if it functions as effectively as its designers expect, the amount of warning it will give will be measured in minutes. Further, there is as yet no known defense against ICBM’s, and the technical problems involved in creating a reliable defense against them seem enormously difficult. And the threat of shorter range missiles launched from Soviet submarines may be almost as serious.

This Soviet capability will exist even after the U.S. has acquired ICBM’s in quantity. But in the interim, assuming that the Soviets have them in quantity and we have not, the situation will be grave. This interim period is frequently referred to as “the missile gap.” Our military leaders are fully aware of the situation and are endeavoring to counter it by such measures as keeping a part of FEC continuously in the air.

Ultimately we would [illegible in the original] greatly if we could persuade the Soviets to [illegible in the original] agreement to give up missiles entirely. For the time being, however, we can neither expect them to give up their strong card, nor does reliable inspection of an agreement to do so presently appear feasible. Therefore, this report envisages that we will press forward with unilateral measures to shorten the duration of the missile gap, rather than counting upon arms controls to do so, and addresses itself primarily to the situation when both the Soviets and ourselves have ICBM’s in quantity.

2. Limited War—The Soviets have been superior to the U.S. in conventional forces since we unilaterally reduced ours immediately after World War II. We are endeavoring to affect this superiority by various measures, including regional alliances, military aid programs, maintenance of some mobile forces and arming with tactical nuclear weapons. We are supplying certain of our NATO allies with the vehicles of nuclear weapons under arrangements whereby the U.S. retains control of the warheads. Our best information is that the Soviets are probably equipping their own forces with tactical nuclear weapons, but not as yet their satellites or Red China.

The superiority of the Soviets and Red China in conventional and para-military forces, combined with their geographic position, results in a situation unfavorable to us in terms of dealing with aggression when for various reasons we might be unwilling to use our nuclear weapons.

It seems clear that, in addition to regional alliances and military aid programs designed to strengthen indigenous forces in areas where limited wars might occur, we must be able to back up our allies with conventional forces to a degree which will make our willingness to intervene in limited wars credible both to our allies and to our enemies, whether or not we use nuclear weapons. While it is beyond the scope of this report to recommend the level and armament of forces required for this purpose, it is readily apparent that our conventional capability must be increased if we are to be able to deal effectively with limited wars which our strategic capabilities are not expected to deter, and if we are to be in a sound position to negotiate meaningful arms control measures with the Soviets.

3. Economic—As distinguished from our military posture outlined above, the U.S. has had, and still has, impressive superiority over the Soviets on the economic side. Its productive capacity and wealth are still much greater than the Soviets. This can be used to advantage in arms control matters—by enabling us if the Soviets drive us too hard, to spend more money on defense than they can.

However, rapid technological development plus rising costs are increasing the cost of our weapons at a disconcerting rate. It therefore appears necessary to increase the military budget substantially, until the defects in our defense posture are cured. This is a political rather than an economic problem, but it should be faced.

For the first time, a strictly economic problem has recently appeared, namely, an unfavorable balance of international payments. This could subject us to heavy pressures to reduce our overseas military establishments and foreign aid, which in turn might have a material adverse effect on arms control negotiations. It is not clear at the moment how serious this problem may prove to be.

Conclusion—In weighing the factors outlined above in connection with intercontinental war, limited war and economic problems, the conclusion seems inescapable that defects in our defense posture will result in our negotiating arms control measures with the Soviets from an unfavorable position, and that we are not likely to achieve significant results from such negotiations unless and until our posture is improved or there is a fundamental change in the world situation.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 1

Irrespective of the nature of arms control proposals made at the coming negotiations, the United States should increase its effort to close the missile gap and otherwise promptly to remedy defects in its overall defense posture.

B. The Rational of Arms Control

The fundamental difficulty with arms control agreements is that war is the ultimate method of settling international disputes, when settlement in countries with law or agreements has failed. And war recognizes no contractural restraints. In a sense, therefore, war is a negation of the entire concept of a binding agreement. Hence, agreements to forbid war or to limit war making capabilities, though made in the time of peace, border on the field where agreements are wholly ineffective. This may account for the dismal history of past arms control agreements. Logically, therefore, it can be argued that disarmament agreements are not worth attempting—ever. Even if that gloomy view is not adopted, the considerations outlined in the preceding section seem to indicate that now’s not the time for such an attempt on our part.

But the short answer is that as a political matter we cannot avoid making the attempt and making it at this time. And if we make the attempt, it must be an honest one. It, therefore, seems desirable to examine the rationale underlying arms control.

Up until now, the pressure for arms control has been largely emotional and economic—that is, political. Reduction in the risk of being subjected to the horrors of nuclear war has had, and has, a world-wide human appeal. Exploitation of this continent by the Soviets, if not countered effectively by us, could result in serious political gains for communism. Relief from the [illegible in the original] burden of defensive arms competition also has had, and has a potent economic appeal. But now, for the first time, our future in an unrestricted arms race is not a bright one from a strictly military point of view. In the age of nuclear missiles, we will not be able to buy the security we have known in the past, no matter how much money we spend. Hence, we should use our best efforts to reach arms control agreements which will slow down the race by limiting the capability of the Soviets in a manner which is conducive to our own security. Therefore, arms control should have a significant role in our military planning, and even if efforts to slow the arms race by arms control agreements do not look very promising, they should nevertheless be made from a [illegible in the original] military point of view.

But the great drive behind arms control today remains the dread of intercontinental nuclear war. The feeling is widespread that somehow a way must be found to curtail or abolish nuclear weapons. This is not primarily the result of Soviet propaganda, but rather because of widespread realization that nuclear weapons have added a danger of wholly new dimensions—the possible annihilation of a nation and destruction of its homeland.

II. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Since nuclear weapons constituted the great urge behind disarmament today, sympathetic and intense consideration has been given to the possibility that the United States might agree to measures which would lead to their elimination. This conclusion has been reluctantly reached that the United States cannot afford in the immediate future to agree to eliminate or drastically reduce its nuclear capability.

In the first place, an agreement by the Soviets to eliminate nuclear weapons could not be relied upon, because there is at present no known way of detecting hidden nuclear warheads, and less that 100 nuclear missiles with high yield warheads would put us at the mercy of the Soviets if we had surrendered ours. This problem is particularly acute with ICBMs. They consist of the nuclear warhead and the rocket vehicle. The “Atoms for Peace” program results in enriched uranium going into peaceful reactors, and plutonium—the major element of warheads—coming out. Similarly, the “Peaceful Use of Outer Space” program will result in the production and improvement of rockets of a type admirably suited for use as the vehicle for ICBM’s. So two important peaceful programs greatly complicate the problem of controlling ICBMs.

In the second place, even if we could be sure that the Soviets retained no nuclear weapons, the overwhelming manpower of the Soviets and Red China requires us to retain a nuclear capability unless and until there is created a world authority capable of enforcing international law. If we now surrendered our nuclear capability, the uneasy balance of power which now exists between the Free World and the Sino-Soviet bloc would be upset, because the elimination of the risk of a major nuclear exchange would encourage the Soviets and Red China to step up their military efforts to attain their goal of Communist domination of the world.

Does all this mean that the nuclear arms race must go on unabated? Not necessarily. It seems probable that the Soviets share our desire to reduce the risk of a major nuclear war. At the moment, they apparently prefer other means for achieving world domination. But whatever their recourse, it appears [illegible in the original] for us to explore and build on this mutual desire. And there is a concept which might put a limit to the nuclear arms race, namely, the concept of a stable balance of nuclear deterrence.

III. STABLE BALANCE OF DETERRENCE

A. Intercontinental Nuclear War

The word “deterrence” describes a situation in which a party has the power to take action but voluntarily refrains from doing so for fear of the consequences. In the context of intercontinental war, it is usually thought that for one nation to deter another it is necessary for the first nation to be able to defeat the other—to have military superiority. And that is indeed the most potent form of deterrence. We had that kind of deterrence when we had a nuclear monopoly. There was then, however, no balance of deterrence. Deterrence was one-sided. It prevented nuclear war because we abstained from starting such a war, not because we were deterred by the Soviets’ military power.

Deterrence, however, may also exist when there is a stalemate—that is, where there is roughly a parity of nuclear power between two nations. The present situation between ourselves and the Soviets is often referred to as a “nuclear stalemate.” In such cases, deterrence is not one-sided; each deters to the other, so there is a balance of deterrence—some call it “[illegible in the original] deterrence.” But if parity must be retained in order to preserve a balance of deterrence, it will not be very stable. One side is apt to draw ahead of the other, either by making more weapons or more effective weapons.

It follows that if it is not essential to maintain parity, it will no longer be necessary for each side to keep up with the other; as the balance of deterrence will begin to acquire an element of stability. And close analysis indicates that parity is not essential. The test of deterrence is the damage which the attacker will receive, and deterrence can exist even when the defender has a lesser capability than the attacker. If the attacker will be severely damaged, he is not likely to attack even if he could destroy the defender. It is not necessary “to be there fastest with the mostest.”

The foregoing analysis of both parity and less-than-parity omits to consider the destabilizing effect of a first strike. On first thought, the advantage of striking first seems so great that there can be no stability unless the defender has a much greater force than the attacker, because the defender will have available only the weapons which survive a devastating nuclear missile attack.

On further thought, however, it is apparent that if the retaliatory force of the defender is sufficiently invulnerable so that it will take from three to five of the attacker’s missiles to knock out each of the defender’s missiles, then the attacker must have three to five times as many missiles before the defender’s retaliatory force is completely destroyed. On a 3-to-1 basis, if the attacker has 1,800 missiles and the defender only 1,000, then the 1,800 missiles of the attacker would destroy only 600 of the defender’s 1,000. The defender would be left with 400, which could inflict frightful damage on the attacker’s governmental and industrial centers.

Therefore, if both sides are aware of this [illegible in the original] and make their retaliatory force sufficiently invaluable to [illegible in the original], say, a 3-to-1 ratio, through mobility, concealment, dispersal, hardening and the like, then neither will be likely to attack. A stable balance of deterrence will have been created. Once such a situation has been created, neither side is apt to incur the enormous expense of building enough missiles to overcome the handicap of such a ratio as 3-to-1. Hence, the nuclear arms race is likely to level off at a sensible point. Just where that point should be is a matter of military-scientific judgment, but there clearly is a point where “enough is enough.”

Of course, the situation between us and the Soviets at any given moment of time will lend itself to a mathematical competition such as that outlined above. The differences in types of missiles, their accuracy and yield, the degree of their invulnerability and so on, preclude the use of mathematics. Further, the stability of the deterrence can be upset by technological advances producing greater accuracy or larger yield, or by anything else which would reduce the number of attacker’s missiles required to knock out each of the defender’s missiles. The situation, therefore, must be kept under continuous review. There is, however, no immediate problem on this score. When we have attained a high degree of invulnerability for our retaliatory force, it will be time enough to worry about the point at which we can level off.

It is concluded that the concept of a stable balance of deterrence has sufficient validity to warrant its adoption. Insofar as it works, it is a way, though admittedly an expensive one, of “banning the bomb”—not by eliminating the capability to use it, but by eliminating the willingness to use it.

It is therefore recommended:

Recommendation No. 2

The United States should urgently increase the invulnerability of its strategic retaliatory force to the point where a substantial part of that force will survive any attack the Soviets will be able to deliver.

This foregoing recommendation, like Recommendation No. 1, is not dependent on any arms control negotiations. We should attain the requisite invulnerability unilaterally. But arms control measures could at some point be helpful in understanding a subtle balance of deterrence. It is obvious that we will not be in a position to negotiate meaningful measures of arms control affecting this concept unless and until we can convince the Soviets of the merits of the concept from both their and our point of view. It is doubtful if we can to that before Recommendation No. 2 has been carried out. Nevertheless, sooner or later arms control agreements could be helpful in the following ways:

1. They could help to determine the level at which the balance of deterrence is initially established and might later reduce that level. It should however, be noted that the lower the level, the more effective the inspection system must be. At a high level, a few clandestine missiles may not be dangerous, but at a low level they might be very dangerous.

2. Technological improvements which tend to upset stability could be slowed or halted through monitored agreements to control the testing of missiles, thus enhancing stability and saving money.

Even though the occasion for fruitful negotiation with the Soviets on such arms control measures may be sometime away, the concept should underlie our thinking on disarmament measures.

According, it is recommended:—

Recommendation No. 3

The United States should accept the concept of a stable balance of deterrence as a basic principle underlying arms control measures affecting intercontinental war.

B. The Concept of Stable Balance of Deterrence Appears to Have No Significant Applicability to Limited Wars

The foregoing discussion has been addressed solely to the problem of intercontinental nuclear war. Smaller wars present a different problem. The spectrum of possible limited wars is so broad, and the number of possible participants so varied, that it is difficult to conceive of constructing an adequate system of balanced deterrence which could be stabilized, with or without arms control. Though limitations on force levels and armaments would reduce the forces available to fight limited wars, to equalize these reductions in such a way that there would be a deterrent balance in such relevant geographic area appears out of the question. And there is no such ratio between defensive and offensive weapons in limited wars as underlies the concept in intercontinental war. It is purely a question of who has the stronger forces.

Thus the concept of a stabilized balance of deterrence has little applicability to limited war. While our nuclear strategic capability has tended to hold down the size and possibly the number of limited wars, creating a stable balance of deterrence for intercontinental war does not add anything to that. Indeed, the more stable this balance, the more destabilizing may be its effect on limited war, since a potential aggressor is apt to think that both sides will try to prevent a local war from escalating into a general war, and so press limited war further then he otherwise would. On balance, it seems that the concept has no significant effect on limited wars.

A more detailed discussion of the concept of a stable balance of deterrence is continued in Annex “B.”

IV. DISARMAMENT GOAL

Before turning to specific arms control measures, it seems important to determine the general direction in which we hope arms control measures will take us. It is obviously beyond the scope of this report to suggest an over-all national policy which would correspond to the policy of world domination ascribed to the Soviets, within which arms control constitutes only one of many means of implementation, along with political, economic, ideological, and, in the Soviet case, subversive activities. But it is important that, for the field of arms control itself, an objective should be clearly stated. We should state what we ultimately hope to attain by means of arms control in order to provide a basis for our own decisions and to make our aims and motives clear to others. Further, such a statement would place in perspective initial measures of arms control which might otherwise look insignificant.

A comprehensive phased package of arms control measures is no substitute for an arms control objective. If the phases extend far enough to reach the ultimate objective, the package mixes the specific with the general, and confuses the presently attainable with the ultimate, to such an extent that the package cannot be clearly understood by the many, many people who must understand arms control measures if these measure are to be adopted. It founders on the multitude of the issues it raises. It is, under existing negotiating conditions, “biting off more than we can chew.”

These considerations are of particular importance at the moment, because of the revival by the Soviets of their long-standing proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, to which they have added elimination of all standing military forces. The simplicity and sweep of these proposals require special effort on our part to place our own proposals for arms control in a setting of comparable breadth and simplicity.

Yet, the statement of our goal cannot be so broad that it loses meaning. Some specificity is required. It is too broad to state simply that the security of the United States is the goal which governs our position on arms control measures. We must be more specific and state quite precisely what it is we desire to accomplish in the long run through arms control measures. Otherwise we are in much the same position as if we had no goal; the rest of the world will be uncertain of our aims and we ourselves may hesitate and vacillate when faced with proposals by others.

The President and others have stated a simple and sweeping goal, namely, “world peace under law.” Not only is this simple and sweeping, it is wholly consistent with our national tradition—the rule of law and not of men. It is, however, subject to the above objection of being too broad to be meaningful. Accordingly, it is recommended that, while adopting the goal of “world peace under law,” we should spell out its main elements, as we conceive them.

Recommendation No. 4

The United States should establish the goal which it desires ultimately to reach through arms control measures and toward which it will make progress as fast as in its judgment the world situation permits.

Recommendation No. 5

The United States should favor arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law, namely, a world in which:

1. There shall be universally recognized rules of international law, which if followed will prevent all nations from initiating armed conflict with (or from aiding civil disturbances within) other nations, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement.

2. Through safeguarded international agreements, national military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be within the control of any nation.

The establishment of a long-range goal in accordance with Recommendation No. 4 is fundamental. Whether Recommendation No. 5 sets forth the most declarable form of long-range goal may be open to argument. But if changes are made, they should not substantially reduce the breadth and sweep of the goal.

The above statement of the goal does not, and should not, spell out the means by which it is to be achieved. Nothing is said as to whether the rules of international law are to be adopted by multilateral treaty or are to be enacted by a supra-national legislature. Nor is it stated whether effective enforcement is to be provided by collective security agreements, by creating the type of international peace force contemplated by the present UN Charter or by creating a frankly supra-national police force; and if the latter, what its size should be and how it is to be raised, maintained, commanded and financed. Nor is it stated whether discarded nuclear weapons should be placed under international control, used to arm a peace force or destroyed. There is even no indication as to whether the United Nations or the International Court of Justice should be used, or new organizations should be created.

The omission of these matters is not to deny that they involve many and difficult problems. Rather, the omission is but an essential characteristic of any statement of principle which is expected to remain operative for a long period of time. If means are specified in the goal, the principle is apt to fade when the means are overtaken by events or lose their realism. No one can now foresee what means can be worked out. Measures which now seem wholly unworkable may, through technological developments or changes in the world situation, gradually or even suddenly prove workable. Conversely, measures which at the moment seem workable may prove to be unnegotiable. The important thing is that the ultimate principle be kept alive and bright through all the vicissitudes of lengthy multilateral negotiations on many specific proposals.

That the problems in the way of reaching the long-range goal are many and difficult is wholly obvious. They are so many and so difficult that the goal may never be reached. That, however, should be no drawback to its adoption now. For almost two centuries, we have been working to reach the goals set forth in the United States Constitution, and we have not succeeded yet. But few would say that therefore the Constitution should not have included those goals. Progress toward the goal should be made as fast, but only as fast, as the security of the United States permits, in the light of the military capability of our probable enemies, our commitments to our allies, unsettled political problems, technological considerations and the like. The test in each case should be to adopt only those arms control measures which are compatible with the goal and which involve less risk to the security of the United States then not adopting them.

V. ARMS CONTROL MEASURES FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATION

As indicated in the preceding section, the main purpose of establishing a long-range goal is to relieve us of the necessity of presenting for negotiation a comprehensive phased package of arms control measures. Not only is such a package confusing but creates such a multiplicity of issues that negotiations bog down. Further, it commits us presently to take actions in the future which when the time comes we may not wish to take. We should be free at all times to agree only to such proposals as we are sure at the time we are willing to carry out. As applied to the existing situation, the years of fruitless negotiations suggest that it would be advisable to concentrate our efforts on comparatively few measures. Our goal calls for two types of action, one limiting national capabilities and the other building up international capability. The suggestion to concentrate on a few measures applies to both types.

Accordingly, it is recommended:—

Recommendation No. 6

The United States should take the following actions designed to limit national military capabilities:

1. Endeavour to complete the current negotiations on nuclear testing, preferably excluding underground terms from the agreement.

2. Propose at the Ten Power Conference a European zone of inspection against surprise ground attack, in aid of NATO’s mission.

3. Propose at the Ten Power Conference a prohibition of vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space.

Recommendation No. 7

The United States should take the following actions designed to increase international capability:

4. Propose action by the United Nations to intensify the effort to develop and codify international law.

5. Repeal the so-called “Connally Amendment,” and seek multilateral agreements giving the International Court of Justice, the full jurisdiction set forth in Para 2 of Article 36 of its statute.

6. Propose motion by the United Nations to improve the procedures governing the cessation of a U.N. “presence” in areas where disputes exist.

The reasons for suggesting only six measures—of which only two (the European [illegible in the original] Outer Space) would be negotiated at the coming Ten Power Conference, might appear to be based solely on negotiating tactics, which are not a part of the responsibility of this study. And in a sense this is true. But it is thought to be a part of the responsibility of this study to devise ways and means of breaking the dismal history of years of futile negotiations. The same reason which is behind the recommendation that an ultimate goal be established, in lieu of a comprehensive phased package proposal, is behind this recommendation that we confine ourselves to relatively few and simple matters. It is to see if we cannot for the first time actually accomplish something. Specifically:—

(a) Concentration on a few points brings all the prestige and power of the United States behind a few relatively simple measures. If we were to announce publicly our long-range goal objectives, the goal should act as a magnifying glass and focus heat on a few measures.² If no real progress can be made on these measures, it will reveal to us and to the world that the present peace offensive of the Soviets is no more than propaganda.

(b) Concentrating on a few points tends to confine negotiations to limits within which there is little scope for the distracting diversions at which the Soviets are so adept.

(c) Concentration is faciliated by the fact that the measures affected are not dependant on each other. They have not the interconnection which many arms control measures have—for example, the connection force levels and armaments have with each other and with military budgets.

(d) By endeavoring to achieve a few limited objectives which can be relatively easily inspected, we might achieve agreement on inspection procedures which could be helpful in later more important measures. In this connection, it should be noted that none of the selected measures involve Red China, except for inspection of underground nuclear tests.

It is realized that several of our allies have made far more ambitious proposals. In particular, the United Kingdom has proposed a series of phased stops starting principally with studies and ending with the possible abolition of nuclear weapons (see Annex “H”). In concentrating on a few matters, we should not indicate hostility to such more ambitious proposals or indeed to some of the Soviet proposals. On the contrary, we should express interest in considering them, but only after the few measures which we have advanced have been acted upon. Otherwise, our effort to accomplish something this time is apt to meet the same fate as our prior efforts. It will founder on the diversionary tactics of the Soviets

Nevertheless, it is recognized that the very large “gap” between our long-range goal and the few measures recommended above does create a problem. Desirable as it may be to retain freedom as to how, and how fast, that gap should be filled, we may well be forced to say something about it. With that in mind, this report suggests measures which could be added to those recommended above for present negotiations. It further comments on other measures, including those currently proposed by our principal allies and by the Soviets. These comments in many cases indicate what conditions should be met before the particular proposals are adopted.

VI. FULLER CONSIDERATION OF FOREGOING AND OTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT NATIONAL CAPABILITY

A. Above Measures Recommended for Immediate Negotiation

1. Completion of Current Negotiations to Cease Nuclear Testing.

Our hand is already set to the plow in the current negotiations for an agreement to cease all nuclear testing. If that were not so, much could be said for excluding underground tests from the agreement; and it is recommended that if our commitments in these negotiations permit, the agreement should not include underground tests. In this connection, it should be noted that the inspection called for by the proposal to prohibit satellites capable of mass destruction (Proposal #3 in Recommendation No. 6. above) could be made to cover the monitoring of nuclear tests in outer space. But irrespective of what the agreement should cover, the negotiations should be pressed to a conclusion, for the success or failure of these negotiations will be an important omen as to the possibility of progress in other matters. Under the circumstances, a detailed recommendation in this report covering these negotiations seems hardly in order.

2. European Zone of Inspection Against Surprise Attack.

There should be disclosure and verification by the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviets, of the size, composition, and locations of their forces in an area described by terrain features and encompassing most of the territory of the Low Countries, Germany, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in which there is a concentration of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The area is defined in terms of terrain features insofar as practicable, rather than national boundaries, in an effort to avoid suggesting U.S. acceptance of either the existing division of Germany or the Soviet-imposed post-World War II boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Restricting the application of the measure to the military forces of the above-named nations within the area should make it easier to avoid negotiating with the Pankow regime in East Germany.

Verification would consist of joint inspection teams—backed by aerial inspection and radar.

The proposal is described in greater detail in Annex “D.”

The reasons for selecting this proposal for immediate negotiations are:—

(a) It would lessen the possibility of a surprise ground attack in Europe and would thus aid NATO in its primary mission of defending against a European ground attack. This is an important area of the world and the area where the consequences of a surprise ground attack is the most serious.

(b) The zone is relatively small and should serve as a valuable laboratory in which to develop inspection techniques.

(c) If the information disclosed by the Soviets is found to be reliable, it would engender mutual confidence. If it is proved unreliable, we would be warned against agreeing to more serious steps.

(d) The proposal is in the same general field as the first of the five “partial” measures Khrushchev has proposed, and so indicates we have not wholly ignored his proposals.

(e) The zone does not include Soviet territory proper, and so stands a better chance of being acceptable to them, even though it is less desirable from our point of view.

(f) Anticipated objections by our allies, particularly West Germany, should be answered by the inclusion of the territory of the other NATO countries, which negates “discrimination” against Germany, and by describing the zone by terrain features rather than national boundaries. (A description by coordinates appears impracticable). The real point is that under the proposal the zone is not neutralized, not denuclearized, nor is West Germany prevented from building up its twelve divisions, nor is it required to withdraw from NATO, nor are force levels affected.

(g) While force levels are unaffected, nevertheless, if the inspection provides the anticipated increase in the security of NATO forces, a thinning out of non-indigenous forces in the zone should be practicable from a military point of view. At that time, therefore, we might be in a position to consult with our allies and jointly propose to the Soviets some thinning out.

If it should develop that adding zones in other parts of the world would make this proposal more acceptable to our allies or the Soviets, there would be no objection to doing so, provided the other zones make sense by themselves. The main purpose of aiding NATO’s mission would, however, become obscured.

3. Prohibition of Vehicles Capable of Mass Destruction from Being Placed in Orbit or Stationed in Outer Space.

The principal reason for suggesting this measure is a simple one. Twice in the past, an opportunity to control revolutionary weapons at a time when they were controllable has been missed. The first was when we had a monopoly on atomic weapons and the Soviets refused the “Baruch Plan.” The second was when ICBM’s were in their infancy and no agreement was reached to halt their development. Now we have an opportunity to prevent space vehicles from becoming weapons of mass destruction. We should not “miss the boat” a third time. It is highly important to forestall the extension of the nuclear arms race into outer space.

It is to be noted that the proposal is confined to space vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction. It does not include communications or reconnaissance vehicles. These are extremely important to our country. They will provide many types of information for verification of arms control agreements. Our ability to use them must not be compromised, in spite of the probable opposition of the Soviets to permitting them.

The essential first step is to obtain early agreement to the prohibition of the launching of mass destruction weapons designed to sustain themselves in space. This would not include ballistic missiles since they do not sustain themselves in space. This could be achieved through an agreement that no weapons of mass destruction would be placed in orbit or projected into sustained space flight; disclosure by registration of flight plans of all satellite sustained space flights reaching over 100 kilometers (60 miles); verification of satellite and sustained space flights, through international inspection of payloads prior to launching and inspection for undisclosed satellites and monitoring of sustained space flights above 100 kilometers through a space surveillance and tracking system.

A specific height above the earth is suggested so as to avoid running into unsettled questions of law and fact, such as the definition of “space,” the limitation of national sovereignty in the areas above national terrestrial boundaries and the use of national airspace and outer space for peaceful purposes. The figure of 100 kilometers (60 miles) falls between the theoretical upper limit of continuous flight of winged aircraft based on aerodynamic force (approximately 55 miles) and the lower theoretical limit at which a satellite can exist in orbit (about 70 miles).

In the interest of speed, and because only two nations are launching space and satellite vehicles, it is probably desirable that the agreement be negotiated bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviets as a subcommittee of the Ten Power Conference. The agreement should provide that other nations might join and if, subsequent to its execution, any nation engaged in a space program failed to do so, the parties to the agreement might withdraw.

While seeking to obtain the proposed agreement, the United States should undertake to establish its leadership in space matters unilaterally and by participation in existing international programs. To do so, emphasis might be placed on utilitarian programs, such as improved weather forecasting, communications and geophysical reconnaissance. There are areas in which the United States presently excels. This is not to imply, however, that efforts to develop more powerful propulsion systems should not be pressed. While this is being done, it might well be desirable to endeavor also to set up certain programs jointly with the Soviet Union.

The questions of law and fact, some of which are outlined above, which in the past have plagued consideration of space matters, should be set apart from arms control negotiations. They might in due course be referred to either the UN or to some other international body for resolution.

B. Other Measures Which Could Be Presently Negotiated.

As previously suggested, it is recognized that the recommendation to concentrate our efforts on the few measures recommended above may not be accepted or the attempt to do so may not be successful and that in any event it will be necessary to discuss, with our Allies at least, what we are willing to talk about next. We will have to say something about the great gap between our initial proposals and our ultimate goal.

Accordingly, this report considers measures which could be presently [illegible in the original] danger to the security of the United States.

1. Mechanics for Lessening Likelihood of War by Accident.

In the missile age the defender against an intercontinental attack may receive little or no warning. Hence the time for deciding to launch a retaliatory attack is dangerously reduced for, once launched, missiles cannot be recalled in the same manner as bombers. Under these circumstances, there is great danger of war starting from an accidental nuclear explosion or from the isolated act of an irresponsible individual or from some other ambiguous event.

It would, therefore, seem that both the Soviets and ourselves should [illegible in the original] some means of lessening that danger and that the Soviets would be willing to explore jointly with us ways of lessening the danger.

It is not clear what form the means should take. Hence, prior to discussions with the Soviets, it is hardly profitable to do more than suggest a possibility for joint exploration. This might consist of stationing in the capital of each country high ranking officers, with direct communications to their own capital, who could personally verify [illegible in the original] ambiguous incident, such as an accidental nuclear explosion. [illegible in the original] the last country would be most anxious to aid [illegible in the original] verify the true character of the incident, so the problems [illegible in the original] by ordinary foreign [illegible in the original] in the Soviet Union would not [illegible in the original].

The ultimate might be a “purple telephone” directly connecting the Soviet Premier and the President of the United States.

The idea here suggested would be particularly important in times of heightened tension between us and the Soviets. Obviously, the time to establish the mechanics is before tension arises. It is possible that other nations would wish to participate. There appears to be no objection to a few additional participants. But the number should be kept small so that the mechanics do not become too cumbersome to be effective.

2. Preparatory Steps for Limiting Force Levels.

It clearly would be to our advantage to bring about a reduction in the conventional capability of the Soviets through a reduction in their force level. We have already unilaterally reduced our own forces to 2.5 million, and in the present state of the world it appears unsound for the U.S. to reduce its force level further. This is not so much because the Soviet’s level is over 4 million as it is because of the unsolved political problems, particularly their impact on us through our commitments to other nations, and because of the menace of Red China.

Nevertheless, if the Soviets should come down to our level we might be willing to agree to a modest reduction. It seems apparent, however, that for us to propose to the Soviets that they come down to 2.5 million, while we remain stationary, is too one sided to propose. The best we can do is to say to them that if they will come down to 2.5 million, and that is verified, we will be willing to discuss with them some further reductions.

If the Soviets indicated interest in that proposition, it is not too soon to begin to study mechanics for the verification of force levels, as the British suggest. Presumably those mechanics would include furnishing the UN with inventories on force levels (and perhaps conventional arms), and the development of the technique of effective inspection by an international inspection organ, possibly using a random system of spot checks. It is a complicated matter, even though it involves but a small part of what total disarmament would involve.

While care should be taken to make it clear that we are not interested in talking force levels until the Soviets come down to a verified 2.5 million, and that even then our idea of a reduction in force levels is not large, there seems no harm in attempting presently to develop plans for verification and for the creation of an international inspection organ.

C. Measures Which, for Various Reasons Should Not be Presently Negotiated.

1. Limitation on Conventional Arms.

What has been said above about force levels applies to conventional armaments. The two go hand-in-hand. While theoretically a limitation on weapons is more effective than a limitation on men, because an unarmed man is not much of a [illegible in the original], yet the only sensible method of limiting conventional arms appears to be to tie the number of permitted weapons to the number of permitted men. Therefore, limitation of conventional arms should wait until a limit on force levels is agreed upon. The possibility of depositing arms in depots is considered separately below.

2. Limitation on Nuclear Weapons.

As previously indicated, intense thought has been given to ways and means of eliminating the principal reason behind the current world interest in disarmament, namely the dread of intercontinental nuclear weapons; the best which seems practicable is the levelling off of international nuclear capability once a stable balance of deterrence has been achieved. Neither their elimination nor other measures of control appear at this time to be consistent with the Security of the United States. Accordingly, none of the following proposals on nuclear weapons should be negotiated at this time:

a. Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. At the risk of repeating what has previously been said, we must retain a nuclear capability as an effect to the overwhelming manpower of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This capability must be retained unless and until effective machinery for enforcing international law is in operation. Additionally, even the Soviets admit that there is no way of detecting clandestine warheads and if we were to surrender our nuclear weapons, even 100 clandestine nuclear weapons of high yield would place us at the mercy of the Soviets. Nor is it feasible to eliminate the most dangerous type of vehicle — the missile. The “Atoms for Peace” and “Peaceful Use of Outer Space” programs seriously complicate the inspection problem. Even if an agreement for elimination could be inspected, the Soviets would certainly not agree to go back to manned bombers in which we clearly have the advantage, while we retain any nuclear capability. There therefore is nothing to negotiate on this score.

b. Limitation on Numbers of Nuclear Weapons

For the reasons given in connection with the discussion of the concept of a stable balance of nuclear deterrence, no negotiations should be undertaken on limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons until that balance is established, and then only if an adequate inspection system can be devised. Limitation of numbers, as used here, includes cut-off of production of missiles, which is an indirect way of freezing numbers.

Nor should negotiations be undertaken on limiting tactical nuclear weapons. Certainly not unless and until the conventional capability of the Free World equals that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and maybe not even then in view of the overwhelming manpower of the Bloc.

c. Cut-off or Reduction of the Production of Nuclear Materials for Weapons.

The inspection of a cut-off of the production of nuclear materials to weapons purposes in disclosed plants appears at the moment to be practicable only if the Soviets would permit the inspectors to share in the management of the plant. Further study may devise a simpler method for effective inspection of disclosed plants without such participation in management. However, clandestine plants are not impossible, especially in view of a new German improvement in the centrifugal process. In addition, diversions of plutonium produced by electric power reactors could create a significant number of warheads, if the Soviets should embark on a sizeable atomic electric power program. These problems are more fully considered in the attached Annex E. Additionally, from our point of view it would be difficult to negotiate a cut-off and still preserve the right to continue to manufacture a certain fusionable material without which a large part of our nuclear stockpile would shortly deteriorate.

Irrespective of these considerations, the controlling reason why there should at this time be no negotiations looking toward a cessation or reduction of the production of nuclear material is that we may well need our full production for the next few years in order to attain a stable balance of deterrence and for tactical weapons. The existing programs of the Department of Defense call for practically full production until 1968. This, however, is not conclusive since these programs are not necessarily designed to attain a stable balance of deterrence. The problem is accordingly complicated, involving a detailed knowledge of existing and future weapons systems, military plans and Soviet capabilities—all addressed to the rather nebulous concept of a stable balance of deterrence. The conclusion here is that no negotiations for a cut-off or reduction should be undertaken until an exhaustive study demonstrates that on balance it would be to our advantage. This study should be undertaken promptly since the proposal to reduce or cut-off nuclear production for weapons appears to be the most promising of all proposals to limit nuclear weapons.

d. Testing Intercontinental Missiles.

Study has been given, and is currently being renewed, on the desirability of seeking a cessation of the testing of missiles. The theory in favor of cessation is that by the time an agreement to cease missile testing can be negotiated and put into effect, the U.S. will have done all the testing it requires for all the missiles it needs, and hence a cut-off of testing might leave the Soviets with much the same cumbersome and relatively inaccurate early generation missiles as they now have. But, unless the renewed study discovers new considerations, the danger that delays in the development of our own missiles will leave us at the time of cut-off with “soft” and unsatisfactory missiles (so that balanced deterrence would be difficult to achieve) outweighs the possibility that the Soviets may by testing reduce the size and increase the accuracy of their missiles. The conclusion is that once we establish stable balanced deterrence, with an adequate number of relatively invulnerable missiles, it may well be worthwhile to negotiate for a cut-off of missile testing, although study should be proven as to whether the knowledge to be gained in the development of space vehicles may not render such a cut-off largely meaningless. But until satisfactory invulnerability is attached we should not agree to a cessation of missile tests.

e. The “Nth Country”.

Should the U.S. presently negotiate an agreement that we will not aid any other country in obtaining a capability to manufacture nuclear weapons nor transfer nuclear weapons to it? Both are presently prohibited by the Atomic Energy Act. Presently, selected allies are training in the use of certain nuclear weapons and are furnished with the vehicles, but the nuclear warheads are stockpiled under U.S. control. The object of this arrangement is of course to offset the great Soviet superiority over NATO in conventional forces. There are those who advocate seeking an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act permitting the US to transfer nuclear weapons to selected allies or assist them in manufacturing their own nuclear weapons, and our present national policy envisages that as possibly a desirable step. On the other hand, there are many who believe that the more nations who have nuclear weapons, the greater the danger that a major nuclear war will be irresponsibly started, and the less chance there is that effective controls over nuclear weapons will ever be established. The 1957 Western Proposals included a partial limitation on the transfer of nuclear weapons after production of nuclear material for weapons purposes has ceased. Also a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 30, 1959, suggests that nations producing nuclear weapons agree not to hand over the control of such weapons to other nations.

If the Act should be amended and selected Allies should make their own nuclear weapons, it might well increase the stability of balanced deterrence between the Free World and the Soviets, and it should save considerable money. Also there are a number of nations who may well acquire a nuclear capability without our help, and if we should help them we might retain some participation in the decision of when to use them. On the other hand we would be faced with a great deal of unfavorable world opinion and, incidentally, we would lose the veto on their use which our present control over the warheads now gives us.

If we went the other way and negotiated with the Soviets an agreement not to help other nations to manufacture nuclear weapons, we would inevitably become involved in an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to them, in which case it would be exceedingly difficult to preserve our present practice of transferring the vehicles and retaining control of the warheads. Of course, if such an agreement were effective, it would present the Soviets from giving Red China a nuclear capability. But it seems likely that the Soviets will not do that for reasons of their own, unless they are badly threatened by the West, in which case they would do it anyway.

On balance it seems that in the present state of the world the existing situation is reasonably satisfactory, and that until there is a change in the world situation we should refuse to negotiate on proposals to prohibit the transfer to other nations either of the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons or the weapons themselves.

A summary of an analysis of this problem by the Rand Corporation is attached as Annex F.

3. Foreign Bases. The overseas bases of the U.S. which so bother the Soviets vary widely in the type. Some are SAC bases from which an attack can be launched. Others are merely for SAC recovery, after an attack. Some are only staging bases. Others support IRBMs. Still others are naval bases. And there are a number of other types besides. In fact what is a “base” as distinguished from merely a U.S. military contingent is often difficult to say.

Also, the relationships with the host countries vary widely. In some cases the host country is extremely anxious to keep our base, either for military or economic reasons, or both. In other cases the host country is reluctant and may even impose overflight or other conditions which substantially reduce the value of the base to us.

It seems probable that in the course of time we will voluntarily or otherwise abandon some of our bases. It is conceivable that our balance of payments problem might force us to abandon more than we otherwise would, for our overseas bases constitute an unfavorable item in that balance. This suggests that we should use such abandonments as ammunition with which to obtain some concessions from the Soviets in arms control negotiations.

The problem, however, is not a simple one. In so far as the abandonment of these bases would hurt our nuclear retaliatory power, they should not to abandoned. Nor should bases which are useful to support limited war operations be given up. Our supply problem for such operations, as compared with the Soviets, is bad enough even with these bases. Further, there is an important political problem: an indiscriminate surrender of our overseas bases will raise the ghost of “Fortress America”. And lastly, while we may surrender some of our present bases, we may well need additional ones for new weapons systems which will strengthen our retaliatory capability.

All these considerations lead to the conclusion that no agreement should be negotiated with the Soviets which calls for any substantial or indiscriminate reduction in our overseas bases until there is a sufficient change in the situation so that the above considerations will have lost their force.

4. Budget Controls. There can be considerable advantage to the U.S. in obtaining budget information from the Soviets—more than they will get from receiving such information from us. But the difficulty of checking the accuracy of Soviet information means that an agreement to limit military expenditures should be regarded only as supplementing other more reliable measures of control. It would be valuable when combined with other intelligence data, but not reliable by itself. The measures here recommended for immediate negotiation are so few and of such character that they need no such supplementing. Irrespective of that, however, we should not negotiate an agreement to limit our own military expenditures until the defects in our defense posture have been cured as recommended in Recommendation No. 1.

5. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare “CBR”.

Not all CBR weapons are capable of mass destruction. For instance our police arsenals include several types of gas used merely to disable civilians temporarily. Tear gas is a common example. But insofar as CBR elements are capable of mass destruction, they should be classed for arms control purposes in the same category as nuclear weapons. Ultimately, therefore, no CBR capability should remain in national control. However, the problems of monitoring of an agreement to limit or abolish CBR when the time comes are not at all the same as monitoring limitations on nuclear weapons, nor are they the same for the different elements of CBR. In particular, the biological element requires very little in the way of plant, equipment and materials. Since this report recommends no limitations on nuclear weapons in the immediate future, these problems of CBR need not be faced at this time.

D. Other Measures in the 1957 Western Proposals.

The forgoing comments have covered most of the important measures contained in the Western proposals of August 29, 1947. Comments on the remainder follow:

1. Deposit of Arms in Depots—There is no objection in principle to the 1957 proposal (originated by the U.S.) for placing conventional arms in storage depots within the national territories of signatory states, under the supervision of an international control organization, as the levels of the forces which would use those arms are reduced. But there is a real question whether it is worth the effort to try to negotiate with the Soviets either on the principle or on the lists of armaments to be deposited. Since the arms would be deposited in national armories and either obsolete or quickly available in the event of hostilities or of violation of any other agreement limiting arms or armed forces, the proposal is largely of symbolic value and seems scarcely worth pursuing.

2. International Control Organization — As indicated earlier, the measures recommended for immediate negotiation do not require the creation of an over-all international control organization. They call for limited, specialized inspection mechanics, adapted to the particular measures they are to control. It may therefore be premature to negotiate the establishment of an over-all control organization. However, planning for reduction in force levels, which could be started presently (see D.2., above), might well indicate planning for such an international control organization. But the establishment of such an organization involves many difficult political problems, such as the relationship of the organizations to the Security Council, its composition in the light of Soviet insistance on parity, and its voting procedure in the light of the Soviet preference for unanimity. These problems are at issue in the Geneva Nuclear Test negotiations and even though the inspection there involved is of a specialized nature, until the negotiations have terminated, it may be well to fight the battle there rather then begin it anew in a parallel form. If they result in the establishment of a Nuclear Test Organization, it may be desirable to use that organization as a nucleus for a control apparatus of wider responsibilities.

3. Political Problems — It is obvious that such political problems as Berlin German unification and Formosa have an important bearing on the amount of disarmament the U.S. can safely accept. No specific tie-in between arms control measures and political problems is, however, recommended. The 1957 Western proposals conditioned future steps on progress in solving political problems, and that did not prove to be a fruitful approach. In this report, the only connection between arms control measures and political problems is that political problems constitute an important element in references to the “present world situation” and the like.

4. Movement of Armaments—A related aspect of the 1957 Western proposals which has not yet been mentioned is the proposal that there be a study of a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments. While there may be some justification for considering arms export controls applicable to specific areas (for example, the Middle East and Africa), the general concept of control of arms traffic has serious implications for our foreign military aid program and it is better not to raise the issue at all.

5. Suspension of the Convention—Provision for modifying or suspending an arms control agreement should be incorporated in the agreement itself. Since future political and technological changes may render an agreement obsolete, mechanics for keeping it up to date are highly desirable. Suspension should be provided in order to protect signatories in the event of violation by one of the parties. Such provisions should be formulated in the light of the measures included in each agreement and, therefore, are not discussed in detail in this report.

E. Comments on Current Soviet and Allied Proposals.

To avoid repetition here, comments on the current proposals of the Soviets and our principal Allies are contained in Annex G.

F. Red China.

In our past disarmament proposals Red China has been mentioned by name progressively less often. She has merely been included in general references to “other essential states”. It is not suggested that Red China has been forgotten, but there is some evidence of a tendency to assume that if we can reach agreement with the Soviets our troubles are over. This tendency should be discouraged. While Red China presently appears to have no more than about 2.8 million men in her armed forces, she apparently is building up their effectiveness, and her violently aggressive and hostile attitude toward the Free World in general and the United States in particular, make it clear that we should agree to no arms control measure without careful consideration of how it leaves us with respect to Red China. This is particularly true of measures which would limit our nuclear capability. Red China must also be considered in connection with verification and inspection, whether or not she is a party to the particular arms control agreement. Otherwise the Soviets might well evade an agreement by carrying on forbidden activities in Chinese territory.

Whether or not Red China will join in any agreements which the Soviets are willing to sign is not known. The political and diplomatic problems of how negotiations with Red China should be handled are beyond the scope of this report. The point here stressed is that Red China should never be forgotten in connection with arms control agreements.

G. Inspection.

The all-important problem of inspection is involved in some of the measures recommended for immediate negotiation and is certain to come up frequently in connection with other measures. It deserves careful analysis.

For reasons which need no repetition here, adequate verification of compliance is a sine qua non to acceptable arms control agreement with the Soviets. Measures which otherwise might be acceptable cannot be accepted if performance cannot be adequately verified. On the other hand, 100% foolproof verification is rarely, if ever, possible because of technical problems, expense and acceptability to both sides. Further, the degree of accuracy necessary for verification is not the same for all arms control measures; some need less than others. It is therefore important to see if there are not some guidelines which will be helpful in determining the type of verification which particular arms control require.

It should be noted at the outset that verification is not the same thing as enforcement. Verification merely spots whether or not there has been performance of an agreement. What should be done if verification discloses a breach of the agreement is very important, but it is an entirely separate problem. The action required to offset a breach has nothing to do with the action required to detect one. Adequate verification does not make an agreement “self-enforcing”.

Verification is commonly thought of as being synonymous with inspection. That is not strictly true, because there are arms control measures which can be verified without inspection. A large nuclear explosion in the atmosphere would be an example. Of course, if verification of a particular measure can be had without inspection it is an advantage in favor of that measure.

Nevertheless, inspection is the most important single method of verification, because it applies to so many important arms control measures and presents such difficult problems.

To date efforts to establish any inspection system at all have been fruitless. Some progress has recently been made in the current negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. But it is not yet clear that a satisfactory system will emerge.

The principal difficulty is the Soviet reluctance to let foreigners invade their military secrecy. While we think they are almost pathological on that score, they have been so since the days of the Czar; and it is true that this secrecy gives them a distinct military advantage. They claim our inspection proposals are merely for the purpose of “espionage”. Of course, that is not the purpose, but there is no doubt that we would gather valuable intelligence from inspection tours and our present national policy recognizes that fact. Efforts should be made to weaken the Soviet position, but it will not be easy.

This situation is aggravated by the fact that our earlier proposals for the inspection of force levels and arms limitations, called for such a large number of personnel and so much transportation and communications, and were so expensive, as to be impracticable. Incidentally, they probably would not have been acceptable to our own country.

A fresh look at the problem suggests that arms control measures fall into two distinguishable categories. The first deals with the readiness of forces, such as the destruction of operational training flights, presence of warheads with delivery vehicles, and the like. These are matters of great concern in connection with surprise intercontinental attack. They require that accurate information be quickly available if the other side is to take action to offset a breach of agreement. The second category deals with more static matters, such as composition of forces, numbers and types of conventional weapons, military budgets, and the like. On such matters, information can be less precise, and time is not of the essence.

Inspection systems adapted to deal with matters in the first category pose complicated requirements in terms of numbers of inspectors, fullness of access, speedy and reliable communications, and so on. Such systems are likely to prove unacceptable to the Soviets and in arms [illegible in the original] perhaps to us also. Above all, the consequences of failure could be serious.

On the other hand, inspection may be workable and effective when applied to the second category of matters, where timelines and margin of error are not so critical. Less cumbersome inspection machinery, the use of sampling techniques supplemented by unilateral intelligence, might make such systems acceptable.

As a general criterion it would, therefore, appear that arms control measures which require elaborate inspection and in which even small scale violations could be serious, should be avoided.

It is entirely possible that further studies will devise new technologies which will simplify the inspection problem. For instance, industry uses the sampling technique of random spot checks, which with inventories and the like produces a very high probability of complete accuracy. That technique might greatly simplify inspection of arms control measures. Also technology might be able to invent helpful devices. Such studies cannot, however, be profitably pursued in a vacuum, so the terms of reference for the studies must state with some precision the particular arms control measure to be inspected.

It is also essential to take full advantage of our own unilateral intelligence capability in designing inspection systems.

Finally, a consideration which has a bearing on the negotiability of arms control proposals requiring inspection is whether or not inspection can be accomplished adequately from outside the Soviet Union. Measures which involve only inspection in the satellite countries, for example, will probably have a higher probability of Soviet acceptance.

A more detailed consideration of the problem of inspection is contained in Annex H to this report.

H. Surprise Attack and Unintentional War

The terms of reference of the Joint Study direct that priority attention be given to types of international agreements which might reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war. These subjects do not lend themselves readily to separate negotiations apart from substantive arms control measures. Since they largely involve the use of weapons, they cut across many arms control measures. The unsuccessful effort of a year ago to discuss the technical aspects of surprise attack as a separate matter illustrates the difficulty of separate treatment. Nevertheless, these two priority subjects have been kept consistently in mind and some of the measures recommended in the report are helpful either directly or indirectly.

1. Surprise Attack. The recommended inspection zone in Europe (page 25) is specifically designed to lessen the possibility of a surprise ground attack against NATO forces in Europe. While lessening the likelihood of surprise ground attack does not compare in importance with preventing an intercontinental nuclear attack, Europe is clearly the most important area for preventing a surprise ground attack.

On the all important problem of preventing a surprise intercontinental nuclear attack, it is difficult to envisage any presently practicable agreement which can prevent a surprise attack in the age of ICBMs. The danger of it has increased, and so has the difficulty of preventing it. However, the creation of a stable balance of deterrence (Recommendation No. 2) will discourage a nuclear attack. Since any attack by ICBMs will presumably be a surprise attack, the deterrence against any nuclear attack is deterrence against surprise attack. Further, the use of photographing and other types of satellites should be of some help in detecting preparation for a nuclear attack. Additionally, the more inspection of other measures which can be put into effect, the greater is the chance that information indicating preparations for a surprise attack may be detected.

2. Unintentional War. The only recommended measure directed specifically to the prevention of accidental war is the proposed mechanics outlined on page 31. However, the creation of a high degree of invulnerability in retaliatory forces as a part of establishing a stable balance of deterrence may mean that retaliatory forces will not have to be set in motion right away. Time may be available to determine the real meaning of an ambiguous incident which will lessen the likelihood of an accidental war.

It is probable that if and as other arms control proposals than those recommended in this report came under negotiation, further measures can be worked into them which will be helpful in preventing surprise attack and unintentional war. This should be borne in mind.

It may appear that in the foregoing analysis of specific arms control measures a great deal of attention has been given to the limitations these measures would have on our own activities and that very little attention has been given to the benefits we would receive from the limitations these measures would impose on Soviet activities. Insofar as that is true, it is not because the latter has been ignored. One reason is that the problem of inspecting a number of the most important measures remain unsolved. The primary reason, however, is that we cannot afford to freeze the situation as it will exist a few years from now. We must get stronger before we can agree to measures which reduce the capabilities of ourselves and the Soviets equally; otherwise an imbalance of power in favor of the Soviets will be made permanent through arms control measures. Of course, if the Soviets should agree to verified measures which limit them more than us, then the field might open up considerably. But, at the moment, the likelihood of that does not seem great.

VII. FULLER CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITY OUTLINED IN RECOMMENDATION NO. 6 (P. ?)

A great deal of material has intervened in this report since measures to increase international capability were outlined in Recommendation No. 6. That is because the forum for these measures will be the UN, whereas the forum for the measures discussed in the interval will be the coming Ten Power Conference. It seems desirable to group in one place in this report the measures which will come up in the latter forum.

The thought behind the recommended measures designed to increase international capability is to build on what we have, namely the United Nations, rather than to attempt a great leap forward by making a drastic revision of the UN Charter or by creating a new organization. The steps proposed represent very modest progress toward the ultimate goal of peace under international law, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by effective means of enforcement. But they appear to be as far as can go at the moment.

While in this area we do not face the recurrent Soviet objection to inspection teams as “sabotage”, there are at least as formidable difficulties in the way. One such is that to attain the ultimate goal will require either drastic changes in the Charter of the United Nations or a new world organization. Nevertheless, there is still scope under the present United Nations Charter for considerable progress before the question of making drastic changes must be faced. It seems well worthwhile to attempt to exhaust that scope, before deciding whether to advocate a drastic change.

A. Development and Codification of International Law

It is assumed by many that before any rules attain the status of international law, they must be enacted by a supra-national legislative body. This is true only in the sense that to be as effective as domestic law (in that an offender goes to jail) international law must apply to individuals and must be enforceable. To accomplish that, there must not only be a supra-national legislative body but there must be a supra-national court and, most important, a supra-national police force to seize individuals and put them in jail against the will of their government.

However, rules of conduct adopted by treaty an properly be called “law”, and though no one will go to jail for a violation, a court may determine whether or not the rules have been violated, and world opinion can be relied upon as an increasingly potent enforcement mechanism to induce compliance by nations. Even if progress can never be made beyond that point, it seems well worthwhile to attempt to reach it.

And there is ample room for progress under the United Nations Charter as it exists today. Article 13 calls for the development and codification of international law. Little progress on that score has been made to date, because efforts have been largely confined to codifying rules which we generally recognized as presently constituting “international law”. Little or no effort has been devoted to the development of rules which, if adopted by nation members, would restrain actions leading to armed conflict. Specifically, progress has bogged down on the definition of “aggression”. It would seem that this obstacle might be overcome by defining most if not all of the specific acts which together or singly constitute aggression, without attempting to define the conclusion represented by the word “aggression”. Domestic law generally does this by defining numerous acts which together or singly constitute a “breach of the peace”, without formulating a definition of “breach of the peace”.

However that may be, it seems well worthwhile to revive and intensify the effort to develop and codify international law. This appears of sufficient importance not only to entrust the task to the highest legal talent member nations can produce, but also to provide adequate staff assistance and to devise [illegible in the original] to ensure that progress is periodically checked and validated by periodic diplomatic conferences.

It should be noted that a valuable by-product of such an endeavor would be to increase the area of common understanding between nations which would tend to lessen tensions and perhaps provide a broad basis for real international cooperation.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 8

The United States should introduce in the General Assembly a resolution which will:

a. Establish a new organ composed of outstanding jurists, who would be required to devote full time to their duties, would be cleared for appointment by high courts, law schools, and academics, as provided in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, would be well-compensated well-staffed, and would be charged with the following duties:

(i) To codify existing principles of international law, giving priority to those principles which will make armed conflict between nations, and aiding civil disturbances within another nation, less likely.

(ii) To prepare rules not presently within the scope of international law but which, if adopted by member nations, would make armed conflict between nations, and aiding civil disturbances within another nation, less likely.

(iii) To submit the results of their work from time to time to the international diplomatic conferences described below.

(iv) To recommend the establishment of periodic diplomatic conferences of representatives of member nations to review the work of the new organ.

(v) To recommend procedures whereby the results of the work of the new organ will have the force of treaty provisions. Perhaps agreement could be presumed if no objections were made within a specific period.

A draft of such a resolution is attached as Annex J.

B. Increasing the Jurisdiction and Prestige of the World Court

Again there appears to be considerable scope within the United Nations Charter for progress. To date the International Court of Justice has had far too few cases for it to become the important instrument for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which the Charter envisages. This is not only because, as noted above, little progress has been made in developing or codifying international law, but because its jurisdiction under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court’s Statute to pass upon the four important matters there enumerated³ is not firm. The so-called “Connally Amendment,” which reserves to the United States the right to decide when a dispute involves domestic matters, set a precedent beclouding our declaration conferring jurisdiction on the Court which many other nations have followed.

Lastly, the Court’s prestige should be increased by making sure that all members of the Court represent the highest judicial talent in each of the nations supplying members.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 9

The Connally Amendment should be repealed. International agreement should be sought for unqualified declarations under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The member of the Court appointed by the United States should at all times be of outstanding judicial ability.

It has been suggested that jurisdiction of the Court be extended to individuals, and that a system of regional inferior or “trial” courts are necessary in order to establish the facts on which the World Court may act on appeal, and also to meet the convenience of litigants. The suggestions have merit, but they would require a Charter amendment and it seems desirable to concentrate on making the present Charter work before seeking to amend it. It should be noted that a special Committee of the American Bar Association is working constructively on this and related fields.

C. Progress Toward Effective Enforcement of International Law

Leaving aside fulfilling the ultimate goal by an international police force large enough to cope with the armed forces of any nation or group of nations as being too far in the future for present consideration, it seems clear that if there could be created a small mobile, well-equipped force analogous to our Marine Corps, under effective UN control, it would be of real help in the prevention of limited war and armed aggression.

It is equally clear, however, that no such force is presently practicable. Not only is the Soviet Union opposed but so are a substantial number of small nations, principally for fear of their forces becoming involved in a struggle between the two major powers. Also the problems of the recruiting, financing, supplying and commanding of even a small force are presently insoluble. Further, the UN Charter provides only for earmarking of units by member nations and even that has broken down in the face of the unrealistic composition of the Security Council and the vast differences in political concepts between nations, particularly between the Free World and the Soviets. In general, the Soviet veto in the Security Council has blockade the functioning of the UN’s peace machinery.

The best that can be expected in the near future is that some UN members will continue to supply small armed forces on an ad hoc basis under the Uniting for Peace Resolution which by-passes the Security Council when the Council fails to act. Incidentally, it should be noted that small ad hoc forces have the great advantage over standing forces in being selected from nations not involved in the particular dispute.

This is a discouraging outlook for establishing effective enforcement of international law. Nevertheless impressive results have been accomplished by UN observer teams and by UN semi-military forces charged with policing borders and the like. It therefore seems worthwhile to endeavor to formalize the procedures by which such groups are brought into being, and to add to them a mediation function. If successful, this might well establish a basis of confidence which would permit further progress. Further discussion of the problems of international law enforcement is contained in Annex I.

Accordingly, it is recommended:

Recommendation No. 10

The United States should introduce in the General Assembly a resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to develop measures, for adoption by the General Assembly, which would establish a corps of observers nominated by member nations from which the Secretary General, when authorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly, would appoint teams charged with any one or more of the following functions, subject to the consent of one or both of the parties involved as at present: (1) to determine and report the facts involved in any situation involving an actual or threatened breach of international peace; (2) to recommend measures to terminate or avoid such hostilities; (3) to act as mediators to settle such disputes; (4) to supervise the cessation of such hostilities or the measures adopted to avoid them; and (5) to assist in the administration of disputed territories.

A draft of such a resolution is attached as Annex K.

VIII. MATTERS NOT THE SUBJECT OF RECOMMENDATION

There are various matters which have a distinct bearing on the subject matter of this report, but which are beyond its scope. While no recommendations are therefore made on these matters, a few brief comments upon them may be helpful.

A. Civil Defense.

The only aspect of Civil Defense considered here is its effect on a stable balance of deterrence. On that it is arguable that if we and the Soviets had fallout shelters, the stability of balanced deterrence would be enhanced, since an attack would have to be more massive to give the same results as without shelters. On the other hand, the attacker would suffer less damage from retaliation and so might be more likely to attack. The result appears to be a standoff.

B. Opening Up Soviet Society.

In view of the Soviet’s unswerving goal of world domination, any measures which tend to open up Soviet society, and eventually even alter their goal, will in the long run have a beneficial effect on disarmament, indeed may be a prerequisite to the accomplishment of significant arms control. Thus exchanges of civilians in all walks of life, cooperation on scientific projects, and the like, should be helpful to this end. Similarly, arms controls and related inspection measures might in themselves help to open up Soviet Society.

C. Negotiations.

There are at least two matters which seen to deserve consideration by those charged with the coming negotiations:

1. Negotiating Margin.

It appears that in past negotiations we have sometimes tabled proposals which reflect our ultimate position, and the recommendations in this report naturally state an ultimate position. If, however, we table proposals for negotiation in that form, we have no margin for trading. We have no basis for the give and take which is the essence of the negotiating process. Hence the measures actually tabled at the coming negotiations should, where appropriate, ask for more or offer less than our ultimate positions or in some other manner provide the required margin.

2. Joint East West Studies.

Joint studies on technical problems may seem innocuous and desirable, not only as evidencing activity but also as an aid to assessing the merits of a particular proposal. But they carry with them a strong implication that, if the Western and Soviet experts solve the technical problems, we will agree to the proposal itself. The current negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing is an example of this. Irrespective of the merits of this particular example, it is a dangerous practice. We should be sure we are willing to go through with a proposal before we agree that experts should be convened to study the technical problems it involves.

D. Publicity.

A number of knowledgeable individuals have expressed the conviction that in the past we have been too interested in the public reaction of other nations and have neglected our own public. They maintain that the best way to obtain the understanding support of world opinion is through educating the United States public. In that connection it is suggested that we should publicize our long range goal, explain why we cannot take bigger steps toward it under present world conditions, explain the concept of stable balanced deterrence, and hammer mercilessly on the fact that deeds speak louder than words and that the United States record as a non-aggressive nation is incomparably better than that of the Soviets. For example, a comparison of our actions in liberating Cuba and the Philippines with the Soviets’ actions in Hungary and the fact that we committed no aggression while we had a nuclear monopoly, make their epithet of “fear mongering” utterly absurd. Mobilizing special publicity talent for the coming negotiations would seem highly desirable.

IX. FURTHER ARMS CONTROL STUDIES

While a number of outside organizations (see Annex A) have rendered valuable help to this study, this has proved insufficient for the identification and detailed study of all issues involved. Certain issues have however been identified, work statements for their study are in the final stages of preparation for recommendation to the Departments of State and Defense is in process. These studies are described in Annex I, which also includes suggestions for additional fields for studies.

It seems clear that the successor organization to this Joint Study should be authorized to contract for substantial outside assistance if it is to cope adequately with the continuing problems of disarmament.

* * * *

While the Annexes to this report have been reviewed for consistency with this report, in case any inconsistencies remain, this report, and not the Annexes, is to govern.

The cooperation by all agencies of the Government consulted in the course of this Joint Study has been outstanding, at all levels, and is gratefully acknowledged.

Respectfully,

Charles A. Coolidge
Director

1. Source: Transmits joint State Department-Defense Department study on disarmament prepared under Coolidge’s direction. Secret. 73 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Disarmament.
2. To emphasize this concentration, it might be desirable to “wipe the slate clean” by withdrawing all proposals we have previously made. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Namely, interpretations of treaties, questions of international law, the existence of facts constituting a breach of agreement, and reparation for breach of agreement. [Footnote is in the original.]