Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

517. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 18, 1960

SUBJECT

• Preparations for Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary Herter
  • Mr. Kohler—EUR
  • Mr. Eaton—U.S. Representative, Ten-Nation Talks
  • Mr. Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AE

• Canada

  • Amb. Heeney
  • Gen. Durns—Canadian Representative, Ten-Nation Talks
  • Mr. Rae
  • Mr. McCordick
  • Mr. Campbell

• France

  • Amb. Alphand
  • Mr. Lebel
  • Mr. Pelan

• U.K.

  • Amb. Caccia
  • Miss Brown

• Italy

  • Amb. Brosio
  • Mr. Perrone—[illegible in the original]
  • Mr. Petri—[illegible in the original]

The Secretary said that the purpose of the present meeting was to give some direction to the meeting of disarmament representatives which would convene next Monday. The present group should be regarded as a steering committee unrelated to any of the others set up for Summit preparations. The group would continue in existence after the disarmament talks begin to access the progress which takes place between now and the Summit in order to discuss and decide on what problems relating to disarmament might be raised at the Summit. He did not foresee the need to decide on any more meetings of the present group at this time. Generally the disarmament experts could work directly on their own, reporting as appropriate to their governments and directly to NAC on the progress of their work. Ambassador Brosio agreed and suggested that the meeting of the group of Ambassadors could be reconvened at the end of February, at which time they would make a general assessment of the progress made by the experts. Ambassador Heeney said that he had not thought of this as a formal group but simply as an ad hoc meeting. He hesitated to accept the idea of the Ambassadors “assessing” the work of the disarmament group. He would prefer that arrangements be kept informal and flexible. The Secretary agreed and suggested that it might be useful to meet occasionally when the Geneva negotiations had begun. He suggested that the primary task was to determine in most general form what the disarmament representatives could most usefully discuss. First, there was the question of Western objectives in the negotiation. He said that the U.S. would have a draft objectives paper to submit at the opening meeting on the 25th. Ambassador Caccia agreed that this should be the first item. He had been instructed to put forward a proposal in this connection, i.e., that our objective should be to present a comprehensive plan as an alternative to Mr. Khrushchev’s and, with it, specific suggestions for limited steps which would constitute a first phase. He was instructed to distribute such a paper at the present meeting (Tab A). The purpose of the limited first steps was to counter the idea that nothing could be done unless everything was done. The Secretary agreed with this thought, observing that we must test Soviet good faith by simple measures which would be characterized as leading to specifically identified goals. Ambassador Alphand said that this was in line with French views and that they would themselves submit a more elaborate working paper on the 25th. Ambassador Brosio said that the Italian Government was also working on a paper which accorded with the views which have been expressed and that they hoped to have it ready for the working meetings.

Secretary Herter said that since the Soviets will try to have discussion based on their own proposal, we should be prepared with a coordinated position on the Soviet plan. The first step might be to exchange analyses of Khrushchev’s proposal. Ambassador Caccia said that one of our major objectives should be to prepare an agreed critique of this proposal.

Ambassador Caccia suggested three additional items for consideration by the disarmament representatives: (1) the working methods which the delegations would follow during the Geneva sessions; (2) the opening tactics for the meetings on March 15; (3) procedure on consultation with NAC during the preparatory work and the ten-power meetings. Secretary Herter agreed with these items, noting that there might be some discussion of the third point here.

Ambassador Alphand said that techniques and general political questions should be discussed at the Ambassadorial level and not on the “technical level”. Ambassador Heeney said that he thought the meeting on the 25th should not be characterized as a meeting of “experts”. Ambassador Caccia said that Under Secretary O’Neill would represent the U.K. at the preliminary meetings and suggested that the date of February 8th be set for a meeting of heads of delegation to review the work of the deputies. Mr. Ormsby-Gore would be prepared to come to Washington at that time. The heads of delegation should also plan to meet in Geneva a few days before the actual convening of the Ten-Nation session. Secretary Herter said that we should aim for February 8th for the heads of delegation meeting with the proviso that it could be changed if necessary to the 15th. The earlier the target date the more pressure there would be to complete our work. Ambassador Brosio concurred, noting that Ambassador Cavalletti would initially head the Italian delegation and that Mr. Martino would be prepared to come to Washington on February 8th. Ambassador Heeney said that General Burns would be here on the 25th and would head the Canadian delegation throughout the meeting. Secretary Herter said that he was not prepared to get into a discussion of substance at the present time and wished to note that the U.S. wanted to avoid presenting a completely frozen comprehensive package plan. He wished to have separable first step measures which we could suggest and he reserved judgment on the desirability of presenting a program in which there is a fixed commitment to move ahead all the way to the end. Ambassador Caccia agreed that the group should have the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan with separable first steps.

Secretary Herter suggested that the U.S. provide Ambassador Durgess with a resume of today’s session to use as a basis for reporting to NAC. Ambassador Caccia agreed, but stated that the committee of disarmament representatives should decide on their own procedures for consulting and reporting to NAC. He raised the question of the press line that should be used at the conclusion of today’s session. It was agreed that no formal communique would be issued and that each delegation would state that the Ambassadors and the Secretary reviewed procedural arrangements for next Monday’s meeting.

Ambassador Brosio suggested that the disarmament representatives should also discuss the implication of Khrushchev’s Supreme Soviet speech and how the West should react to it. Consideration should be given to the possibility of counteracting the Soviet move with unilateral measures of our own. Ambassador Heeney said that Canada felt some helpful work could be done by the NATO international staff which could be fed into the working group. The Canadians were considering making such a suggestion in Paris next Wednesday.

Tab A

Revised United Kingdom Comprehensive Plan

FIRST STAGE

(i) The endorsement of any agreement which might be reached by the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

(ii) Study and initial establishment of an international disarmament organization.

(iii) Collection of information by the international disarmament organization on present levels of forces, including conventional armaments possessed by various powers, followed by restriction or first stage reduction of armed forces of the United Kingdom and the United States, USSR, and France to agreed maximum limits. The collection of information would be based on declarations (to be completed in the first stage) by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria. The information would cover existing conventional equipment and armaments, pertaining to land, sea, and air forces.

(iv) Consequent upon such reduction, placing by these States in storage depots within their territories and under the supervision of the disarmament organization, of specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

(v) Prior notification to the disarmament organization of launching programmes for missiles according to certain predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and reports on launching operations, including information on the location of launching sites. Notification of flight plans of satellites, international arrangements for tracking and for exchange of resultant information.

(vi) A technical conference on the possibility of controlling the stopping of production of fissile material for weapons purposes and on the possibility of the transfer, under control, of existing stocks of such fissile material (whether fabricated into weapons or not) to non-weapon uses.

(vii) A conference on measures to prevent the launching of surprise attack. This conference would consider the political as well as the technical aspects of measures against surprise attack.

(viii) A technical conference to study a system to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purpose only.

(ix) Study of the arrangements required for the international authority which will have to be set up in order to preserve world peace as purely national armaments diminish.

The first stage shall be completed, if possible, within one year; the second stage shall then start.

SECOND STAGE

(i) A world conference shall be convened to determine the levels to which all States shall reduce their forces and armaments in the final stage.

(ii) Progressive establishment of international disarmament organization.

(iii) Progressive reduction of existing conventional armaments and military man-power through adequately safeguarded arrangements for international control (levels to be agreed) and collection of information relating to manufacture of conventional armaments and equipment of all kinds.

(iv) All states producing fissile material to make full declarations on all plants producing it and their capacity. Introduction of the “cut-off” of production of fissile material for weapons purposes, conditional upon specified progress on conventional disarmament.

(v) Reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons by successive transfers, under international supervision, of existing military stocks of fissile material (whether fabricated into weapons or not) to non-weapon uses.

(vi) Missile launchings to be subject to prior notification and on-the-spot control. International tracking system to be installed.

(vii) Progressive establishment of inspection against surprise attack.

(viii) Agreement on the establishment of a system to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

(ix) Joint study of the control of a ban on the manufacture of biological and chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(x) First stages in the establishment of the international authority required to preserve world peace.

The timing of the start of the final stage shall be decided by agreement among the States concerned.

FINAL STAGE

Comprehensive disarmament by all powers under effective international control including:

(i) A ban on the manufacture of nuclear, chemical, biological, or other weapons of mass destruction.

(ii) A ban on the use of outer space for military purposes.

(iii) A ban on the use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

(iv) Destruction of all military missiles. Control over manufacture of rockets and satellites.

(v) Establishment of effective international control over military budgets.

(vi) Completion of the establishment of the international authority to preserve world peace.

(vii) Measures, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to control existing stocks of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction with a view to their elimination.

(viii) As progress is made on such control and elimination, final reduction of conventional armaments and military man-power to the levels required for internal security purposes and the fulfilment of the obligation of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter. Destruction of surplus armaments.

(ix) Control over manufacture of all types of armaments to ensure that production is limited to that required for (viii) only.

1. Source: Preparations for ten-nation disarmament talks. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.