Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

514. Telegram 5162 to London¹

Washington, January 7, 1960, 12:28 p.m.

5162. VERBATIM TEXT. Deliver immediately to Foreign Secretary Lloyd following message from Acting Secretary. Advise date and time of delivery.

QUOTE.

January 6, 1960

Dear Selwyn:

Since the adjournment on December 19 of the Nuclear Test Cessation negotiations in Geneva, we have been devoting much thought to the situation created by the Soviet refusal to acknowledge the technical facts regarding the problem of underground detection and identification. This refusal and the discourteous manner in which our scientists were treated have given us a good deal of concern. I am enclosing for your personal information a copy of a letter which Chris sent to Gromyko just before he left town for a short vacation. Gromyko was informed on delivery of the letter that we have no present intention of making it public. So far we have had no response.

Both the British and American scientific delegations were in accord that the capabilities of the control system recommended by the experts in 1958 are not as great as previously believed. As long as the Soviet Union refuses to concur in this evaluation of our difficulties, we find ourselves without any basis for attempting to reach agreement in the political conference on the provisions of a comprehensive treaty which, while taking the problems fully into account, would, at the same time, seek to overcome them.

In these circumstances, we feel that upon the resumption of the talks on January 12, we should press the Soviet delegation to accommodate itself to the scientific facts as we see them. In particular, we should stress that it is both logically and practically impossible to proceed with negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty without a set of agreed criteria and without established procedures for initiating and carrying out on-site inspections. We are opposed to any reconvening of the technical working group; any necessary technical questions might be discussed either at the political conference itself, or in such ad hoc sub-groups as it may prove desirable to set up.

We cannot, of course, now predict how the Soviet delegation will react to such an approach, but their reaction should indicate the area of agreement now possible between the two sides. If the Soviets do not prove to be forthcoming within a week or two, we feel that there is no alternative but to revert to some sort of phased treaty. We naturally have very much in mind our proposal of last April that we negotiate a phased treaty to be applicable initially to atmospheric tests, with a correspondingly simplified control system. At the same time, we believe that if it should prove technically feasible, it might be advantageous for the Western position, before proceeding to this scheme, to advocate a treaty including a limited underground ban above a prescribed threshold.

Our specialists in this matter are now studying whether it would be technically feasible to define a threshold in terms of seismic magnitude. By putting the threshold in magnitude instead of kiloton values, we would avoid disputes with the Soviets both about the proper scale for converting explosion yields into seismograph readings and about large cavity decoupling. The Soviet objective of keeping the number of inspections to a minimum would mean that they would bear part of the burden for whatever threshold might be adopted. As you remember we have always maintained that there is a direct relationship between the number of unidentified events and the level of inspection required. As soon as our study is completed we will be in touch with you about our specific ideas.

We believe that a threshold approach would be an earnest of our wish to accept obligations under the treaty up to the very limit of what it is scientifically possible to control at the present time. It would be understood that, as advances were made in detection and identification techniques and agreements reached for their effective use, we would be willing progressively to lower the threshold. In addition, we might well at the outset propose a jointly agreed program of research with the USSR to speed up progress in seismology. I think you will agree that this proposal would have the additional merit, as compared with the April suggestion for a limited treaty, of providing justification for the installation and operation of a full-scale control system on the territories of the three original parties.

In the light of the major problems which remain unresolved in the technical area, we do not now consider it fruitful to push to immediate decisions on political-organizational issues. We are not now willing to deal with the Soviet “package” proposal as such, but we understand that it is sensible to continue discussions on such questions as would have to be settled in any type of treaty. The U.S. Delegation, therefore, expects to have several new suggestions for dealing with matters such as the powers of the Commission and the Administrator. It plans to discuss these as well as the general position outlined in this letter with the U.K. Delegation in Geneva within the next few days.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Douglas Dillon

Acting Secretary

The Right Honorable
Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

London.

END QUOTE.

1. Source: Transmits letter from Dillon to Lloyd outlining U.S. position in resumed nuclear test suspension talks. Confidential; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.