Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

512. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 28, 1959

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Test Cessation Policy

PARTICIPANTS

• WHITE HOUSE

  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Keeny

• State

  • Secretary Herter
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Mr. Farley—S/AE
  • Mr. Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AE
  • Mr. Dean—SOV

• DOD

  • Secretary Gates
  • General Twining
  • General Loper
  • General Fox
  • Mr. Knight

• AEC

  • Mr. McCone
  • Gen. Luedecke
  • Dr. English

• CIA

  • Gen. Cabell
  • Mr. Brent

• OTHERS

  • Dr. James Fisk—President Bell Telephone Labs
  • Mr. Frederick Eaton

The Secretary said that a number of significant things had occurred in connection with the Geneva negotiations since the last meeting of principals. The technical working group had resulted in a largely disagreed report. The Secretary asked Dr. Fisk to describe the impasse that had been reached and to give his appraisal of the technical situation. Dr. Fisk reviewed the course of the meeting, describing the position that the U.S. had taken on the new Hardtack data, the “big hole” decoupling possibilities, system improvements and technical criteria establishing eligibility for on-site inspection. Dr. Fisk said that it was obvious from the outset of the meetings that the Soviet delegation was operating under strict political instructions and it proved extremely difficult to center the arguments on strictly technical considerations. The Soviets never consented to informal meetings until the end of the talks and even then their representatives were under severe constraints. This was unlike the situation that prevailed in the summer of 1958 where informal sessions proved most useful. The meeting ended without any agreement on the US data or its implications. Whereas the Soviets accepted the “big hole” theory they challenged its feasibility and the lack of experimental foundation. Dr. Fisk interpolated that his own first reaction to the big hole had been that it was a bizarre idea. He now felt that it looked more feasible than he had first thought, if constructed in salt domes. The Soviets agreed with all of the improvements we suggested and in general with anything which was optimistic. There was no agreement on criteria, although at some points the Soviet and US drafts coincided. Under the terms of our criteria a large majority of seismic events would be eligible for inspection. The Soviet approach would allow inspection only of highly suspicious events, such as those occurring in aseismic areas. Our delegation took the position that it was impossible to assign degrees of suspiciousness. Dr. Fisk said that he found it significant that the Soviet Annex to the final report does not contain the Soviet criteria proposals and that this must mean they themselves recognize that their position is absurd and that it would fall apart when subjected to objective technical scrutiny. Dr. Fisk continued that despite the failure to reach agreement the meeting had resulted in a far broader understanding on the part of all participants of the technical problems involved in underground detection. All of the US data is now on the record. He referred to the fact that Federov had blasted the US presentation at the last meeting and that he, Dr. Fisk, had tried to answer him on the spot. The effectiveness of our response could no doubt be improved. In general Dr. Fisk felt there was little doubt that the USSR genuinely wanted a treaty but they would not admit anything which makes the problem of detection look more difficult than it did in 1958. Sir William Penney of the UK delegation was in almost total agreement with the US position. The UK annex to the report was only slightly different in its emphasis on minor points.

The Secretary said that the Soviet annex was a nasty document and reflected on the integrity of our scientific team. He felt consideration should be given to how we might most effectively answer the Soviet attack. He said that we were now confronted with the problem of where we go from here and referred to the decision which had been made when the Soviets accepted the technical talks that we would review our position in the light of the conclusions of the technical meetings. Under the US criteria 90 per cent of the events which were detected would be inspectable and this would amount to a very large number. There would be thousands of events of 1 kiloton and above and the problem would be immense. Dr. Fisk agreed but stated that auxiliary information, when used by experts, could reduce by a factor of two or more the events which might have to be subject to inspection. However, this still left a very large number.

The Secretary said that there were several different ways of proceeding. First, we could press the Soviets further to accept our criteria. The second would be to get agreement on a quota of inspections sufficiently high to provide an adequate deterrent. Amb. Wadsworth felt that the Soviets might take our criteria but that they would not go very high on the numbers. The Secretary was concerned by our lack of a sound basis to defend before the Senate an agreement which provided practically no deterrence to violations in lower yield underground tests. We were confronted with two questions in connection with tomorrow’s meeting with the President. First, what should we recommend to the President with respect to the extension of the moratorium which expires December 31. Second, what direction should the negotiations take upon reconvening January 12. He recalled that there had been a prior decision to table a limited treaty and that this had been reversed when the Soviets accepted the technical talks. Given this background he felt that there were two courses open. The first was to give up any attempt to control underground testing altogether. The second was to reconcile ourselves to accepting less than adequate. A third approach which had been suggested appealed to him more than either of these alternatives, namely, to propose a threshold (expressed in terms of seismic magnitude rather than kiloton yield) above which underground tests would be banned. He asked Dr. Fisk to comment on the feasibility of this approach. Dr. Fisk said that there is a difference in view between ourselves and the Russians on the correlation between yield of an explosion and seismic amplitude, but there appeared to be general agreement among seismologists on the relationship between signal amplitude and seismic intensity. Mr. McCone said he thought that the approach was a feasible one.

Secretary Gates suggested that one way to combine our objectives of establishing a new direction and rebutting the Soviet attack on our scientists would be to draft and despatch a Presidential letter deploring the attack, referring to the lack of technical agreement and suggesting reversion to a phased treaty such as had been put forward on April 13. The Secretary said that he saw two practical dangers that had to be balanced in deciding what to do in the present negotiations. The first is that we should avoid concluding a treaty that does not hold water. On the other hand we must recognize that we live in a world that does not like nuclear testing and our procedure will have to take this reality into account. This is why he felt that the threshold idea offers the best possibility. The world wants us to exert all possible efforts to reach an agreement and the threshold principle, which would ban underground tests in the highest yield ranges, would be supportable in public opinion. We would take the position that the arbitrary position of the Soviets and their refusal to engage in objective technical discussions left us no alternative but this approach. At the same time we would propose a joint research program and express the hope that further work would allow us gradually to achieve the objective of pushing the threshold down. If the Russians reject this suggestion the onus for failure will be on them and we will be in a much better position vis-a-vis world public opinion with respect to resumption of our own testing. General Cabell said that the Soviets have played the technical talks break down in a low key and that their propaganda had emphasized the areas of agreement which had been reached and de-emphasized the areas of disagreement. The Secretary said that this confirmed his view that they genuinely want to reach an agreement and that we should take advantage of this desire.

Mr. McCone said that he was disturbed about leaving unanswered the Soviet attack on our scientific presentation which he felt should be brought into public perspective promptly. Dr. Fisk said that he hoped we would avoid having this degenerate into a name-calling contest and felt that it would be more effective to play this quietly. Mr. Farley said that we might emphasize that the Soviet name-calling was an indication that they had been unable to counter our technical arguments and that we should put out again the technical facts which had led us to the conclusions we had reached.

The Secretary said that he liked Secretary Gates’ idea of a letter from the President. Mr. McCone agreed and said that he also felt that threshold suggestion would have appeal if it were technically practical. Secretary Gates felt that the threshold idea could be mentioned in the letter but that it did not need to be made as a proposal. Dr. Fisk said that there were some technical problems with the threshold proposal, such as our ability to set out a procedure to determine an average magnitude value when confronted with scattered seismograms, each of which had a slightly different amplitude. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that he felt it would be practical to put forward the threshold proposal as long as the threshold were tied to magnitude, as the Secretary had suggested, rather than to yield. Dr. Fisk said that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that if it is difficult to write criteria for on-site inspection, it will be even more difficult to establish the criteria in terms of instrument reading for a threshold. If this were the direction decided upon early and careful study would be required.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the threshold proposal could be sweetened by proposing advance notification of any underground tests conducted below the threshold, and if provision were made to use these tests as part of a research program to advance the art of seismology which could lead to a gradual reduction in the threshold. Secretary Gates said that this proposal made good sense.

In connection with the drafting of a Presidential letter Dr. Kistiakowsky observed that it would be best to avoid going deeply into technical considerations and that it would be best to issue a factual statement to which the President could refer. Mr. Farley suggested that the President might say he had instructed the scientists to go to Geneva to conduct a free and objective scientific inquiry and that thereafter his attention had been drawn to Federov’s intemperate attack. He had then asked the scientists to report to him on this matter and he was transmitting the report to Khrushchev under cover of the latter. This approach would get far more public attention for our position than the Soviet attack had received. Mr. McCone reiterated that we should take early initiative with a factual statement which Dr. Fisk and his group might prepare.

The Secretary asked Dr. Fisk how long it would take to get a scientific study of the feasibility of the threshold. Dr. Fisk said that he thought a week would suffice once the appropriate seismologists and staticians had been assembled. The Secretary asked that such a study be made as a matter of priority. If the study concluded that it was not feasible to suggest a threshold we would have to re-examine the position we would take in the negotiations. Secretary Gates suggested again that it would be better not to propose a threshold but to suggest only that this possibility be jointly studied. The Secretary disagreed, stating that it was far better to make a firm proposal. This would provide a basis for demanding a modest number of inspections. In any case it would be better to take what we can get in terms of a ban on underground tests than to abandon the objective entirely.

The Secretary referred to the need to make a public announcement regarding our future testing policy. He preferred a statement to the effect that we had no plans to resume testing, that we were presently studying the documents from the technical discussions, and that we would state our position on the question in the future. Mr. Gray suggested that we should announce that we would not engage in atmospheric testing but that we would reserve the right to resume underground tests. The Secretary said that this would reduce Amb. Wadsworth’s bargaining power in Geneva to the vanishing point if it became necessary to propose a phased treaty. Secretary Gates agreed. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he would prefer continuation of the week-to-week extension to Mr. Gray’s proposal.

The Secretary said that there was a further alternative course of action which had not been considered and that was to take up the Tsarapkin suggestion that the full system be installed and a temporary ban on underground tests be put into effect for a two or three year period. He was personally not keen on this alternative although it may have to be considered in view of the British position. It is clear that the U.K. will split with us when it comes to actual resumption of testing. Mr. McCone observed that the British could afford this position only because they get weapons data from us. The Secretary said that the question of resumption of testing had to be considered in the light of the importance for us of further underground testing. Whereas this is essentially a political decision we need to have the technical facts available. He recognized that it was difficult to answer the point that you never know what further testing may produce and that important technical break-throughs, presently unforeseen, may materialize. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they were now prepared to accept an adequately controlled cessation of tests, had always thought that any cessation was a big mistake. The Chiefs felt that once tests were stopped we would never be able to resume them. He was convinced that they were right in this assessment. Mr. McCone said that the AEC was not prepared to comment on the need for further U.S. testing but could state that a nation which was free to conduct underground tests could make significant technological advances in a period of three years.

The Secretary said that he would like to stick with the threshold proposal. This had tremendous political advantages for us in showing that we were willing to go as far as we possibly could even in the face of the obstinacy displayed by the Soviets in the technical talks. This would be far better for us publicly than an immediate resumption of testing. Mr. McCone agreed. He stated that a group of scientists were scheduled soon to meet at Pasadena and that this might offer an opportunity to get a quick assessment of the feasibility of a threshold. He added that Dr. Brown of Livermore had supported the threshold idea. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that he felt that the difficulties to which Dr. Fisk had alluded could be minimized if the treaty were drafted to say that no tests would be conducted which would produce a signal larger than magnitude, say, 5.0. At the same time we would state unilaterally that we would not test above a certain yield, say, 20 kilotons, that would allow us a sufficient margin of error. Dr. Fisk agreed that with a “guard band” concept of this type many of the difficulties would be reduced. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated also that our first proposal did not need to spell out all of the details but could be made in fairly general terms. Under Secretary Dillon said that we did not have to have a firm proposal by January 12, although we should work out the technical details as quickly as possible. Ambassador Wadsworth said that we should prepare our position during the recess on other outstanding points which would give us momentum in the meetings in case there was a delay in presenting our new position. We should aim at presenting a counter “package” proposal of our own on these issues.

The Secretary then reviewed the order of presentation for the meeting with the President tomorrow, observing that there appeared to be general agreement on the course of action we should follow.

1. Source: No agreement with the Soviet Union on technical detection criteria, position to take in resumed negotiations, decision on testing. Secret. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.