Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

510. Memorandum of Meeting¹

Washington, December 11, 1959, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Present: The Vice President, General Persons, Secretary Herter, Mr. Farley, Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Douglas, General Loper, General Fox, Secretary Anderson, Attorney General Rogers, Chairman McCone, General Starbird, Dr. English, Director Dulles, Dr. Scoville, Director Allen, Dr. Kistiakowsky and Gordon Gray

Mr. Gray opened the meeting by indicating that the Vice President had wanted to have a discussion of the moratorium on nuclear testing. Mr. Gray suggested that the Secretary of State might give a general summary of the situation and that Mr. McCone might follow up in more detail, particularly with respect to the technical discussions now in progress in Geneva.

The Vice President made it clear that the purpose of the meeting was not to arrive at any decisions but perhaps to help in arriving at recommendations to be made to the President upon his return. He was concerned about timing and about the necessity which would confront the President immediately after his return to decide as to what would be the U.S. announced policy to apply after the expiration of the moratorium on 31 December.

Mr. Herter said that of course the principal problem was with respect to a decision as to what we do after the first of the year. The question is whether we extend the moratorium.

Mr. Herter then gave a summary account of negotiations to date. Somewhat to our surprise the Soviets agreed in August 1958 in the Conference of Experts to a system for the monitoring of testing. With regard to monitoring underground tests, the system’s capabilities had to be evaluated largely on the basis of only one underground nuclear shot.

Later in HARDTACK II (in October 1958) several underground shots were fired. These revealed that the capability of the Geneva Conference of Experts’ system was less than had been earlier thought. The President proposed an “atmospheric only” ban but this the Soviets refused. Our officially announced period of moratorium for negotiation was initially for one year—through October 31, 1959, but was extended later to December 31. When we realized from the HARDTACK II data that the system had a lesser capability than originally thought we insisted that there must be joint technical discussions of this new data. If satisfactory technical discussions could not be carried through, we might have reverted to a limited treaty. The Soviets resisted this strongly. However, finally they “caved in” and there is now underway at Geneva a technical discussion of the underground problem. We are receiving detailed reports on the Technical Conference. They are of such a complex nature that it is hard for a layman to understand them and Secretary Herter confessed that he could not ascertain from the cables whether we are or are not making progress in the discussions.

Mr. McCone then spoke, suggesting that there are essentially three serious problems with regard to underground testing:

1. The question of the adequacy of a detection system. For example, what could the Geneva Conference of Experts’ system, even with improvements, actually detect and identify and what would be the number and procedures of inspection of those events detected but not identified?

2. The problem of on-site inspection. This problem itself contains two questions: first, one of criteria for inspection (in which the Soviet effort seems to be to establish criteria which in effect will prevent inspection) and second, a question of what we can do when we get to the site.

3. The problem of decoupling. For example, could decoupling by major factor be accomplished? If this could be done, quite large shots could be made to look so small that they would not be noticed.

Mr. McCone said that he did not think we could now draw conclusions as to the outcome of the technical discussions but he doesn’t now see any real prospect of a common approach. The Soviets had obviously been caught off-balance by our presentation on decoupling. Our people are apparently doing a good job of presenting their data. However, Mr. McCone said that one could never be sure that agreement could not be reached. He recalled in the earlier high altitude conference the Soviets had held back from any agreement initially but had finally reached agreement on many elements of the high altitude detection report.

Mr. Herter then spoke again to the question of timing. He pointed out that it was probable that somewhere between the 18th and 21st there would begin a recess until January 4. This has not been definitely agreed but seems to be the consensus of all parties.

Secretary Herter stated that if it turns out that we just cannot agree with the USSR, we are prepared to lay on the table a phased agreement which would immediately ban atmospheric tests alone. However, in any event, we are faced with the question of what to recommend to the President concerning the moratorium which expires on December 31. Mr. Herter expressed the view that we should make no commitment as to any definite time for the further withholding of underground tests and that in our own minds we should really think in terms of continuing the moratorium on a week-to-week basis. However, he felt that we should publicly say that we have no present intention of resuming testing but reserve the right to do so.

At this point the Vice President said that on the basis of conversations that he had had with many people, he felt that there were three main points of view. He said that there are first those who want to begin underground testing now; second, there are those who feel that we should never resume tests; and third, there are those who feel we should not resume if we get what he described as a foolproof agreement.

To the Vice President the real question was this: Do we resume testing if the Soviets make an offer which is inadequate from our point of view but which may seem plausible to the world?

The Vice President expressed a reservation in his mind about the week-to-week principle pointing out that this might by reason of negotiations and other world developments in effect mean an indefinite moratorium.

Mr. Gates at this point pointed out that our whole defense rests on nuclear weapons. He also said that we must be able to experiment with weapons for safety purposes and we have a problem of definition within a definition. Is, he asked, the release of nuclear energy tantamount to weapons testing? He pointed out that we had been long prepared to engage in experimentation for safety purposes which would perhaps result in a release of nuclear energy but that there had always been some reason to postpone this experimentation, such as the Khrushchev visit and the Eisenhower trip. There might continue to be reason to avoid announcing resumption of tests by reason of the Western Summit Meeting, the East-West Summit meeting, the Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union, U.S. elections, etc.

The Vice President then pointed out that the President will soon return as a sort of international “prince of peace” and the realities of the situation lead him to believe that the President simply cannot within say, sixty days, order tests on any basis including underground unless in the meantime the Soviets do something egregious. He pointed out that public opinion hangs over us all the time and he would want to raise this question: If we should by reason of public relations have a moratorium in effect, do we then take the best inspection system we can settle for?

Mr. McCone then referred to the safety problem. He acknowledged that the percentage of danger is small but it is there nevertheless and it is imperative that we have experimentation which unfortunately will result in the release of some nuclear energy.

Mr. McCone then pointed out that he had discussed the threshold theory with Mr. Vasily Emelyanov and that Mr. Emelyanov did not seem to object. Indeed, he said that Mr. Emelyanov had told him that at one time the Soviets were prepared to propose a ban on atmospheric testing alone on the basis that the U.S. would reject it and propaganda advantage would result. Later they had been afraid that we would accept it and hence did not propose it. Mr. Emelyanov promised to consult his Government with respect to the threshold principle but there had been no further word.

Mr. McCone expressed the view that perhaps the logical answer to our situation was to propose a threshold system. In explanation, if the detection system were capable, with its on-site inspection, of effectively monitoring, for example, blasts of 10 KT and above then we would agree to forego such blasts but not forego those that were of a yield of less than 10 KT. Decoupling introduced something of a problem but this might not be insurmountable. In any event, Mr. McCone expressed the hope that the Technical Conference would bring in the threshold theory or develop so as to permit us to bring it in.

Mr. McCone then asked if we could agree that we would extend the moratorium on a week-to-week basis. Mr. Herter said it would be better to put it on a basis of no present intention to resume testing. The week-to-week concept would be our own private approach.

At this point then Mr. McCone read a proposed announcement a copy of which is attached. No copies were circulated and the announcement was not discussed in detail.

The Vice President said that he knew there were differences of opinion among scientists with respect to the military necessity of early resumption of tests and suggested that Dr. Kistiakowsky speak to this point. Dr. Kistiakowsky described the McRae Panel report and its conclusion that the greatest and most urgent problem was answering the safety questions and there was no necessity for immediate testing to meet the requirements of systems currently in development. However, he acknowledged that this was not a net evaluation and did not take into account the state of the art in the Soviet Union.

The Vice President then asked about such developments as the neutron weapons and asked whether these could be developed without further testing. It was agreed that they could not be. Mr. Gates then observed that these weapons, including the development of clean small weapons [text not declassified], were of considerable importance to the national security. Dr. Kistiakowsky described more in detail what the neutron weapon is.

The Attorney General asked if we had any evidence that the Soviets were now or had been engaged in underground testing. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there was no evidence whatsoever. The Attorney General then asked whether, if we did not continue testing and the Soviets did, would this put us at a military disadvantage. The consensus was that we would be so disadvantaged. The Attorney General then observed that history would judge the policy makers rather harshly if it ultimately developed that we were withholding testing and the Soviets were not and we had thereby suffered a military disadvantage.

Mr. Herter then adverted to the seeming paradox of the fact that the uncertainty which runs like a thread through this whole matter might redound to our advantage. He pointed out that as the discussion in the meeting had indicated, there was no absolutely foolproof system. In view of the fact that one cannot be sure of avoiding detection, this uncertainty may act in a sense more as a deterrent than would absolute certainty at certain levels because the Soviets would not know exactly what could be detected and identified.

At this point, Mr. Gates pointed out that although this was not a budget discussion we must bear in mind that the kind of an inspection system we were discussing would cost large sums of money and would take a long period of time to install. When Secretary Gates indicated that a very extensive program (VELA) was necessary to prove out the detection system and develop instrumentation, Dr. Kistiakowsky indicated that this was not the purpose of the project. Instrumentation is available. The main purpose is that of improvement of system instrumentation already existent to permit a system of improved capabilities.

Mr. McCone repeated that it would take several years to install the system and in the meantime there would be a deterioration of the atomic stockpile and of the laboratories. He wished also, he said, to raise two other issues: first the question of Communist China and second the Ormsby-Gore talk. With respect to Communist China he pointed out that here was a vast land area where underground testing could be conducted at will without adequate detection and inspection. He said that his reference to the Ormsby-Gore talk was the Department of State cable dated December 9 from Wadsworth, outlining what Mr. McCone described as a very ominous and disturbing conversation with Mr. Ormsby-Gore of the UK, in effect suggesting that we might have to depart from our traditional position of “no disarmament without thoroughly effective control.” (Cable attached)

Mr. McCone wondered whether we were getting ourselves into a position of policy control by the UK. He invited Mr. Herter to comment on these points.

Mr. Herter replied that from the beginning it was apparent that the UK wishes to reach an agreement. This was true before their recent elections and continues to be true. The UK, he said, was prepared to make many concessions which we have not been prepared to make. Indeed, they want us to declare another moratorium. Mr. Herter said that the British would probably do this on their own part and there was nothing we could do to stop them. With respect to Communist China, Mr. Herter pointed out that we have a treaty article which would seek to include Communist China. However, there was no point in tabling that until the three powers agree among themselves.

Mr. McCone pointed out that by reason of information the British are getting from us, they do not need to continue their own test program.

At this point there was a discussion of the state of the art of seismology.

Secretary Herter commented that one thing that handicapped us in knowing what to do was the general lack of clear and consistent scientific indication as to exactly what were the capabilities of the monitoring system. He said there were differing opinions. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that the scientists could advise that shots above a few kilotons should be detectable and identifiable. He said further that below a few kilotons they could advise that the system would not be fully reliable. Also, if decoupling worked, much greater shots could be concealed. He indicated that there had already been certain improvements in the instrumentation which would improve the system. However, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that beyond describing the capabilities of the system, the scientists could not go. It was up to those concerned with policy to decide the nature of the agreement, considering the capabilities and limitations of the system. With particular reference to decoupling, Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that if we accept the notion of decoupling then regardless of what the experts agree in their present discussions, we will not have an adequate system. The question is, he thought, whether we really believe the Soviets will undertake this costly and difficult operation for evasion purposes. He indicated the range of costs of a big hole of $20–50 million. To underscore his point, he said that it was possible to conduct a test behind the moon in the outer atmosphere but raised the question of whether it was realistic to suppose that anyone would really attempt it.

Mr. Allen expressed the view that perhaps we should take a system of the 20 control posts only and without on-site inspection. After all, he said, if the control post detected questionable events and these were revealed publicly perhaps this would deter violations. There seemed to be no agreement on this point.

Mr. McCone then asked if we could not work out of the dilemma by taking the initiative; why don’t we come out and say that we won’t test in the atmosphere—period. Mr. Herter expressed his view that this would not be wise because he feels that we should get something for such a declaration in the way of an inspection system.

Mr. McCone then reported on the meeting he had had with some members of the Joint Committee on the preceding day. He said that probably an 80% majority of the Committee wish us to resume testing right after January 1st.

Mr. Gray then said that he wished to point out that we were really perhaps talking about two different problems—one was the experimentation for safety tests which might release some nuclear energy but which could be treated as experimentation for safety purposes and not as the resumption of weapons testing—second, was the question of the resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. Gray said that it seemed to him that there was a consensus that as long as the negotiations are going on and indeed in any event for the foreseeable future the political problems confronting the State Department would prevent the President from announcing a resumption of nuclear testing. However, if the safety problem was as great as those responsible for defense said it was then in the interest of national security the President might feel it essential to go ahead with the experimentation.

Mr. Herter then said that the State Department had been ready and willing for these experiments to be undertaken. He said that Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that they could be described as experiments and not testing. However, said Mr. Herter, the Defense Department had resisted this; he thought perhaps because it could be used as a lever for an agreement to resume testing. Mr. Gates denied this as a Defense Department position but Mr. Herter reiterated that he had understood this rather clearly from Mr. Irwin.

At this point, Mr. McCone broke in to say that it was not the Defense Department which was resisting proceeding with the experiments under the presently announced moratorium, but the AEC. He said that if this work were done at the laboratories where there was a sophisticated press it would be impossible to avoid headline stories which would describe the experiments as nuclear weapons testing. This, he pointed out, would be for the Soviets, propaganda-wise, the equivalent of an actual resumption of testing. He therefore was opposed to proceeding under the current moratorium with these experiments because no way could be found to conduct them without the release at some point of nuclear energy.

Mr. Gray said there appears to him to be one major question which we weren’t facing up to and that was this: Would the continuing international political situation be such that in fact we would never resume testing? Mr. Herter observed that the State Department was not recommending such a position. Mr. Gray responded that he did not suggest that anyone was recommending such a position but as a practical matter was this not a possibility? If so, we would have an uncontrolled moratorium and if this were to be inevitable (and he expressed the hope that it would not be) then would not we want to face the decision of taking the best system we could negotiate even if it turned out to have only primarily intelligence values?

The Vice President said that what all of this suggested to him is that perhaps some decisions which one might think could be indefinitely postponed might have to be made rather early upon the President’s return. He asked Mr. Gray to complete a memorandum for record which could be given to the President, or used in connection with informing the President of these discussions.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

1. Source: Moratorium on nuclear testing. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing.