508. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Meeting of Secretary’s Disarmament Advisers
PARTICIPANTS
-
Department of State
- Secretary Herter
- Mr. Eaton
- Mr. Farley—S/AE
- Mr. Spiers—S/AE
-
Panel of Disarmament Advisers
- Mr. John McCloy
- Mr. William Foster
- Dr. James Killian
- Gen. Alfred Gruenther
-
D.O.D.
- Secretary Gates
-
A.E.C.
- Mr. McCone
-
Joint Disarmament Study
- Mr. Coolidge
The Secretary said that several important developments had taken place since the group had met last on November 3, 1959 in connection with both the nuclear test talks and our general preparations for further disarmament negotiations in 1960. He introduced Mr. Fredrick Eaton whose appointment as U.S. representative to the ten-nation disarmament committee would be announced by the White House on Thursday. He asked Mr. Farley first to report on the most recent developments in the nuclear test talks.
Mr. Farley said that since the group last met the most important development had been Soviet acceptance of the technical discussions [Typeset Page 1819] on underground test detection for which we had been pressing since last January. Agreement was finally reached after considerable negotiation on terms of reference for the technical talks and the meeting began on November 25 in Geneva. So far no important developments had taken place in these talks, which have consisted to date mainly of a presentation and defense of the new seismic data by the U.S. representative, Dr. Fisk. The Soviets have hinted that they also possess new data. At the end of these talks we will have the problem of determining how the conclusions reached will affect our future course of action. Our prior decision was we had no alternative but to press for a phased treaty in view of Soviet refusal to consider the implications of the new data. As a result of Soviet willingness to undertake these talks we have reaffirmed our objective of reaching a comprehensive agreement provided that the risks involved are acceptable. Consequently it will not be known until the returns are in from Geneva whether we will have to revert to [Facsimile Page 2] a phased proposal or can proceed to a full test ban. In response to a question by Mr. Coolidge about our position on high altitude testing, Mr. Farley described the capabilities and limitations of the system worked out by the technical group which met in Geneva earlier in the year. Our final position on inclusion of a high-altitude ban in the treaty will also have to await the outcome of the present technical talks. If we have to go back to a phased approach omitting underground tests from the initial ban it may be decided that it is illogical to accept the uncertainties in our capabilities with respect to outer space tests while we are unwilling to accept them with respect to underground tests. If we determine that the risks involved in proscribing underground tests are acceptable we would probably reach the same conclusions with respect to high altitude testing.
Mr. Coolidge asked whether if peaceful use of outer space were to be a major U.S. objective in the new disarmament talks this would have an impact on our ability to police outer space tests. Mr. Farley said that if a system were agreed upon to monitor all objects leaving the earth’s atmosphere and to permit pre-inspection of these objects we would not have to set up a separate outer space detection system.
Mr. Coolidge said that be thought any proposal he made with respect to peaceful use of outer space should initially be limited to orbiting vehicles and not include missiles. In these circumstances no contribution could be made to the policing of an outer space test ban.
Secretary Herter reported that in the NSC discussion this morning Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled the conclusions that had been reached in a study two years ago that a ban on missiles testing would be contrary to U.S. interests at the time. He felt that enough had happened in the intervening time to warrant a restudy of this problem. Dr. Killian agreed that such a restudy was needed. With respect to orbiting vehicles he felt that [Typeset Page 1820] there was little practical military use for such objects in the foreseeable future. The key problem was missiles.
Reverting to the weapons test negotiation Secretary Herter said that his feeling about the strength of public opinion on this issue had been re-enforced by a discussion with Amb. Phleger who was our representative in the Antarctica treaty negotiations which concluded today. Amb. Phleger had said that it would not have been possible to conclude the treaty unless we had agreed on a ban on nuclear weapons and nuclear testing in the area. The Latin Americans, the New Zealanders, Australians and others had strong feelings on this question and felt that domestic public opinion regarded this as the most important issue today.
At Secretary Herter’s request Mr. McCone reported on his conversations with Emelyanov on his recent trip to the Soviet Union and subsequently during Emelyanov’s trip here. Emelyanov apparently took quite seriously Mr. McCone’s statement that the U.S. could not accept a weapons test ban treaty unless the USSR agreed to technical talks and Mr. McCone estimated that this may have had something to do with the reversal of the Soviet position on this question. [Facsimile Page 3] Emelyanov had discoursed at length on the developments in the USSR since Stalin’s death. He took the position that there had been great changes in Soviet objectives and methods since that time and that Khrushchev was strongly motivated by three basic premises: that the victory of Communism would come about by popular choice and not by force, that war is to be avoided at all costs, and the need for the fastest possible economic development of the USSR. Emelyanov believed that Khrushchev was sincere and genuine in his desire to reach agreements with the U.S. such as in the nuclear testing field, although he was still having difficulty with the remainder of the old apparatus inherited from Stalin, among whom he named Tsarapkin and Sobolev. Mr. McCone told Emelyanov that we would have to have assurances from our scientists on the adequacy of control and that we would agree to ban tests only in those areas in which control was adequate. We will agree to end any tests that are within range of detection, whether this includes the whole range of testing or only down to a specified level. The main objectives are controls corresponding to the measures to be taken, relief of public concern over radiation hazards, and to make a start which can be built upon for further disarmament. Emelyanov said that he agreed in general with this approach and that he would take it up with his government. Emelyanov also stated that after talking with Drs. Teller and Weinberg about Project Plowshare he was less suspicious than he had been about our intentions in pressing the idea of peaceful uses explosions. Emelyanov had also stated that some people in the USSR had favored agreeing to a ban on atmospheric tests on the grounds that the U.S. would not go [Typeset Page 1821] along. On the general subject of disarmament Emelyanov had agreed completely that control and disarmament had to go together and that neither could be contemplated without the other. After disarmament was complete the Soviet Union was prepared to allow anyone to go any place in the USSR. This might be easier for the USSR then for the U.S. to accept, since they did not have commercial secrets to protect. He had said also that the USSR had conducted no underground tests and that they did not intend to. Khrushchev had decided not to develop tactical nuclear weapons even though the Soviet military was opposed to this position. Mr. McCone said that he was convinced that in the final analysis the Soviet Union would accept the phased approach if we pressed it.
At the Secretary’s request Mr. Farley explained our position with regard to continuation of the voluntary suspension. The convening of the technical meeting made it less likely that we would reach a crucial point in the negotiations by the end of the year. The way has been paved, by a statement made by Amb. Lodge on November 19 at the General Assembly, for a further continuation of the moratorium on a short-term basis. Lodge had emphasized that controlled suspension was our objective and that we did not intend to fall into the trap of an indefinite uncontrolled moratorium which would reduce our bargaining power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Secretary Herter stated that he did not believe it would be necessary to show our hand on this question or to make any final decisions until the very last minute. Mr. McCone agreed and said that he supported the position expressed by the Secretary at a recent press conference that the moratorium should be continued on a week-to-week basis.
Secretary Herter then asked Mr. Coolidge to present to the group the review of his thinking that he had outlined in the morning to the NSC.
[Facsimile Page 4]Mr. Coolidge recalled that at the previous meeting he had stated his conviction that the U.S. should offer a long-range disarmament goal and should put forward also specific immediate steps which would provide a test of Soviet intentions and present the fewest possible of the complications involved in “package” approaches. He distributed the following statement as an expression of the long-term goal:
“The present policy of the United States on arms control matters should be to favor verifiable arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law; namely, a world in which:
- 1.
- Rules of international law prohibiting armed conflict between nations shall be in effect, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by an adequate international peace force.
- 2.
- National military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the international peace force, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be in the control of any nation.”
Secretary Herter reported that the President was generally favorable to this type of a statement.
Mr. Coolidge continued by outlining the immediate steps which we might propose which he characterized as constituting “2½” measures. The half measure consisted of pursuing the present Geneva negotiations to a successful conclusion. The others would be, first, to propose a system to insure that all vehicles entering orbit were used for peaceful purposes only. The second would be the Norstad plan, involving the establishment of an inspection zone with joint air and ground inspection teams and overlapping radar in an area covering Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This would be combined with a freeze on non-indigenous forces at their present levels. When the system was installed and working we would propose a thinning out of troops in the area. This proposal would be presented as a disarmament plan which would give us working experience in inspection techniques. This proposal would also take advantage of our probable need to withdraw two or three divisions from Europe due to our balance of payments difficulties. He recognized, on the other hand, that this proposal would create great difficulties with deGaulle and Adenauer. Mr. Foster supported the European zone idea and stated that he had informally sounded out Jules Moch on the Norstad plan. Moch had told him that he personally favored this approach although his government did not. He thought that a proposal along these lines would be negotiable with the USSR. Secretary Herter said that he supported this kind of proposal because he believed that it was the best way to test whether the Soviets really meant business in disarmament.
Secretary Gates said that his concern about this suggestion stemmed from its similarity to the disengagement proposals which had been put forth by [Facsimile Page 5] Mr. Kennan and which had frightened the Germans terribly. Mr. McCloy said that he would be extremely worried about putting forward a proposal such as Mr. Coolidge had outlined. Secretary Herter pointed out that a less specific version of this proposal had been incorporated in the Western Peace Plan and had been accepted by our allies in this context. He recognized that a substantial difference was made by the fact that then it was connected with reunification of Germany and that there will be great difficulties with Adenauer in taking it out of this context. Mr. Coolidge observed that Norstad was more strongly in favor than ever of his inspection zone ideas but felt that they should not be combined initially with a thinning out proposal. Secretary Herter said that Norstad would be willing to agree that IRBMs not be stationed in the zone but that he wanted no other restrictions on deployment of weapons or men.
Secretary Gates said that we were faced with the choice of either reducing our manpower or having a bigger defense budget. We were [Typeset Page 1823] presently spending $22½ billion for Personnel and Maintenance and Operation and this was entirely out of balance with other expenditures. This factor was considerably more important than the balance of payments problem. It would be impossible to reduce our overall forces without withdrawing some troops from Europe. Mr. Foster said that the Norstad plan would allow us to get started on establishing inspection and control, which was of extreme importance. Secretary Gates said that we could proceed on the present basis for another fiscal year only. He acknowledged that the President feels strongly on this subject, believing that our troops were sent to Europe for emergency purposes only and the situation had now become frozen. He himself believed that it was a misuse of forces to keep so many men in Europe. Mr. McCloy said that the Germans would take this as an abandonment by the U.S. and that it would be a very bad tactical error to pull out forces prior to the Summit. Secretary Gates said that there was now no intention to reduce European forces during the next calendar year.
Dr. Killian inquired whether the Coolidge group had looked into the problem of achieving stable deterrence. Mr. Coolidge said that his conclusion was that one of our overwhelmingly important objectives was to work for an invulnerable retaliatory force. Secretary Gates said that studies recently completed in the Department of Defense show that between now and 1963 neither side could win a war without striking first. The importance of pre-emptive attack would grow continuously between now and this period. This projection held good even taking into consideration our plans for base hardening, development of Polaris, increasing mobility and the use of storable liquid and solid fuels. Dr. Killian said that he had reached the conclusion that we will be in the best stance to achieve progress in disarmament when we have gotten ourselves into a position where we can take risks that we cannot now accept because any surprise attack would leave us unable to retaliate. We can only accomplish this by increasing our defense expenditures. Secretary Gates said that he expected to spend a good part of the next year before the Congress justifying our present defense budget.
Returning to the preliminary conclusions of his review of disarmament policy Mr. Coolidge said that the possibilities of developing an international [Facsimile Page 6] police force appeared to be quite barren given the attitude of the majority of U.N. members. Thus he felt the only immediate steps which could be taken towards Part I of the general goal he had outlined would be (a) to regularize U.N. procedure for appointing a U.N. “presence” in troubled areas and adding the power in U.N. teams to mediate disputes; (b) reviving and pressing for codification and development of international law; (c) repealing the Connally amendment and agreeing that disputes on the interpretation of the language in treaties must be submitted to the World Court.
[Typeset Page 1824]Secretary Herter explained the timing requirements for development of our disarmament position. He would like to be able to deal with some specifics such as the Norstad plan at the Western Summit meeting December 19. It is not yet decided when the ten-nation committee will meet since we prefer to have it begin in May, after the Summit, whereas our allies prefer to have it start before the Summit. We are prepared, if they press the point, to agree to convening March 15, although we believe the group could do nothing but “putter” until after the Summit. Secretary Herter said he was very disturbed at our lack of specific ideas on disarmament. The Russians have a position, the British and French both have specific ideas, although the first stages of the British plan seem to be restricted to “study groups” and the French plan starts out with “good faith declarations”. The smaller nations of NATO look to us to take the lead in this field and we cannot fail them.
Mr. McCloy said that he was still disturbed about the Norstad Plan. It was not a small step. Politically it had the greatest implications of just about anything we could propose. It is not a question of numbers of men, but of the concept of disengagement. It would mark the beginning of the collapse of our whole forward strategy. Secretary Herter said that we must have concrete suggestions to present. He was impatient with the Germans and their generally negative attitude. They continuously stress the importance and the priority of disarmament but have never presented a single useful idea. With respect to the Norstad plan he thought it was primarily a question of presentation. It must be put forward in a way that does not appear to the Germans as the beginning of their neutralization. Mr. Foster repeated that in his view there was a great deal of logic behind the Norstad idea. He agreed that we could not afford to keep the same number of troops in Europe as we have today. General Gruenther said that he thought we could sell the idea of reducing U.S. forces. The Norstad plan would have some military advantages but he was afraid of its psychological impact on our allies.
Secretary Herter said that there were limits to the numbers of men we could pull out from Europe, both for the reason Gen. Gruenther had stated and because the only substitute for our troops would be new German divisions so long as French forces were occupied with the Algerian conflict. We would soon reach a point where many of our allies would be nervous about the number of Germans under arms. It was clear to him that the Russians also were genuinely afraid of a strongly armed Germany. Mr. Foster strongly endorsed the last remark.
[Facsimile Page 7]Dr. Killian reiterated his conviction that Mr. Coolidge should look closely at the advantages and disadvantages of controlling missile testing. It is quite possible that if we made such a proposal now it would come into effect only after we have had a chance to better our capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet Union but before we had reached a point of no [Typeset Page 1825] return on missile control and before weapons such as the small mobile Minuteman were developed. Secretary Gates said that he thought it might be as much as five years before we were in this position and that Defense would oppose such a ban. Dr. Killian said that he thought the American public was not aware and should be made aware that the U.S. can never again have a supremacy deterrent as it did when it had the monopoly on nuclear weapons. The best we can get is a system of mutual deterrence and it is illusory to think we have a capability for keeping military supremacy. Our major and most crucial problem in the years ahead is to make sure that this system of mutual deterrence was a stable one both through arms control measures and unilateral action to increase the invulnerability of our retaliatory power.
- Source: Developments in nuclear test talks, Coolidge report, troop withdrawals from Europe, Norstad plan. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩